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2Abstract
This thesis contributes to a theoretical understanding of change in governance of 
natural scientific research in the UK. The time period studied in detail is the years 
of the New Labour Governments, 1997 to 2010. Two case studies were chosen 
to explore the issues: research using human tissue and research using human 
embryos. Investigation was guided by these two questions:
To what extent and in what way do governance regimes incorporate 
proposals and approaches developed by social scientists, Science and 
Technology Studies and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge theorists in 
particular, and taken up by a range of actors in response to the perceived 
failures of older regimes?
What are the impacts of contemporary governance regimes on natural 
scientific research?
A reflexive theme and approach runs through the thesis. Aspects of SSK and 
social science theory are drawn upon, as a means to explore governance and as 
a means to critically explore social science itself. Beyond SSK, a novel reading 
and combination of Erving Goffman and (more critically) John Rawls is used to
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interrogate the many dimensions of the performative work of natural and social 
scientists who were drawn into public engagement and deliberative exercises.
The thesis finds that in some areas there has been significant change to the 
ways in which governance is organised and conducted, and that STS and SSK 
themes and approaches have contributed to this. The thesis outlines what has 
been lost: professional discretion; clarity about social science analysis and goals; 
and clarity about issues of public interest and issues associated with scientific 
research and knowledge. A typical outcome is greater complexity and greater 
bureaucrats’ and managers’ influence. That campaigners and STS / SSK 
theorists did not aim for this is largely true. That they have some responsibility for 
the outcome is also true.
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Chapter One: Introduction
The idea of making this speech has been in my mind for some time. The final 
prompt for it came, curiously enough, when I was in Bangalore in January. I met 
a group of academics, who were also in business in the biotech field. They said 
to me bluntly: Europe has gone soft on science; we are going to leapfrog you and 
you will miss out. They regarded the debate on GM here and elsewhere in 
Europe as utterly astonishing. They saw us as completely overrun by protesters 
and pressure groups who used emotion to drive out reason. And they didn’t think 
we had the political will to stand up for proper science. I believe that if we don’t 
get a better understanding of science and its role, they may be proved right. Let 
us start with the hardest thing of all to achieve in politics: a sense of balance. 
Already some of the pre-speech criticism suggests that by supporting science, 
we want the world run by Dr Strangelove, with all morality eclipsed by a cold, 
heartless test-tube ideology with scientists as its leaders.’
Tony Blair, 2002
In 1945 Robert Oppenheimer, physicist and scientific leader of the Allies’ atomic 
bomb project, argued that 'it is not possible to be a scientist unless you believe 
that knowledge of the world, and the power which this gives, is a thing which is of
intrinsic value to humanity.' (Pais and Crease, 2006, p. 51). In that same year, 
Vannevar Bush, head of the US Office of Scientific Research and Development, 
published a report entitled Science, the Endless Frontier. In it he envisaged 
endless benefits to American society from scientific advance. Science would 
bring jobs, rising living standards, and improvements in culture.
If the post-war period was the atomic age, with physicists in the ascendancy, 
today is the age of biotechnology, with biologists and information specialists to 
the fore. And in their eulogies for the completion of the ‘rough drafts’ of the 
human genome in June 2000, scientists and politicians made bold claims for the 
future, echoing the themes of Oppenheimer and Bush. Mike Dexter of the 
Wellcome Trust, which funded a substantial proportion of the public sector effort, 
described the project’s significance as surpassing that of the wheel: ‘I can see 
technology making the wheel obsolete’, he said, ‘but this code will be useful and 
used as long as humans exist.’ President Clinton was similarly hyperbolic: ‘with 
this profound new knowledge, humankind is on the verge of gaining immense, 
new power.’
But such apparent continuities cannot hide the fact that we all—the public, 
scientists and politicians—sense even if we don’t fully understand that our 
relationship to scientific innovation has changed in the past half-century.
Compare the concerns of two leading scientists from the respective eras, Joseph 
Rotblat and Bill Joy. Rotblat resigned from the atomic bomb project (the 
Manhattan Project) in late 1944 when he learned that Germany had abandoned 
its attempt to make a bomb. It was a lonely step, but one which won him respect 
and support in the years that followed. He campaigned thereafter, for the rest of 
his life indeed, for scientists to sign an oath to do no harm, akin to the Hippocratic 
oath signed by doctors. Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995, his central 
focus was opposition to the obvious and possible military uses of science, and 
support for socially and environmentally useful alternatives.
In the same year that scientists and politicians were celebrating the completion of 
the rough drafts of the human genome, Bill Joy, cofounder and Chief Scientist of 
Sun Microsystems worried that ‘the future doesn’t need us’ (Joy, 2000). The 
combination of three new technologies, robotics, genetic engineering and 
nanotechnology offers not just dangerous power to the wilfully destructive, but 
also threatens accidental catastrophe. Echoing more contemporary themes about 
the dangers of unforeseen events, of things running out of control, he wrote: This 
time—unlike during the Manhattan Project—we aren’t in a war, facing an 
implacable enemy that is threatening our civilization; we are driven, instead, by 
our habits, our desires, our economic system, and our competitive need to know.’ 
For Joy, who helped to develop some of these technologies, the only solution is a 
far broader relinquishment than that called for by Rotblat: ‘to limit development of
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the technologies that are too dangerous, by limiting our pursuit of certain kinds of 
knowledge.’ Recognising the role he played, and the possibility that the cat might 
already be out of the bag, he concluded, sadly, ‘henceforth, for me, progress will 
be somewhat bittersweet.’ (Joy, 2000).
Joy’s is an extreme voice within the scientific community, as was Rotblat’s in his 
day. But in a focused way they highlight shifting general attitudes. This is not to 
say that we are not still fascinated by science and hopeful of its potential. Indeed, 
numerous surveys all agree that a majority of people believe that scientific 
progress makes the world a better place. But we are also worried, not just about 
deliberate use and misuse, but also about a wider and more diffuse set of issues: 
the speed of developments; the unintended consequences of scientific advance; 
and the threat innovation may pose to the values we hold dear. Today we tend to 
see science as something that happens beyond our control, as likely as not 
driven by commercial self-interest rather than the quest for pure knowledge or 
social benefit. The link that Oppenheimer made—between expanding knowledge 
and value to humanity—is today still present, but less clearly so in the public 
mind. It is also a link that is less clear in the minds of some scientists themselves, 
or is one that they do not always proclaim from the rooftops. And for some 
scientists working in the area that so troubled Bill Joy, responsibility must rather 
be embedded in the very practices of research and knowledge production 
(McCarthy and Kelty, 2010).
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1.1 The changing governance of science?
An aspect of changing attitudes towards natural scientific research is a significant 
shift in the discussion of the governance of natural scientific research, one that 
has accelerated since the mid 1990s. In the opinion of a number of social 
scientists this change was particularly rapid and is particularly marked in the 
United Kingdom (Brown, 2009, Gottweis, 2008, Irwin, Jones and Stilgoe, 2006). 
The discovery in 1996 of a link between Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE), a disease affecting cattle, and variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (vCJD), 
a new form of a similar disease in humans, shook the Conservative Government, 
which was perceived to have falsely re-assured the public about the safety of 
eating meat from UK cattle. This episode also, quite quickly, and with long-term 
effects, catalysed a transformation in public deliberation on the governance of 
science. Indeed, the meaning of governance itself is now different in many 
contexts.
Intense discussions took place in the media, civil society, academia and within 
Government and elite scientific circles in the years that followed. Then further to 
that, and in part encouraged by it, while much reflection was taking place on the 
appropriate Governmental and governance response in the period 1999 to 2001, 
further controversies erupted around genetically modified food and crops, the
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safety of mobile phones and the use of human tissue in research, all of which 
either directly or indirectly fed back into further debate on research governance.
The political damage caused by BSE was perceived to be about the mishandling 
of risk and in particular risk communication. Lord Phillips’ official inquiry cleared 
the Government of serious wrongdoing when it reported in October 2000, but it 
also made clear that official attitudes could never be the same again: ‘The 
Government was preoccupied with preventing an alarmist over-reaction to BSE 
because it believed that the risk was remote. It is now clear that this campaign of 
reassurance was a mistake.’ (The BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1, p. xvii). The 
implication of this was that Governments should not reassure people, or seek to 
calm panics, for the report did not merely mean that the ‘campaign of 
reassurance’ was a mistake with hindsight. Phillips meant it was wrong full stop. 
This is justified in the report with the comment that ‘the importance of 
precautionary measures should not be played down on the grounds that the risk 
is unproved.’ (The BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1, p. 266). In this way, the 
precautionary principle, or approach, became, in popular discussions, the most 
well known aspect of the new approaches to governance.
But the new approach is about far more than precaution. It has been 
characterised in a number of ways and called a number of things. For the editors 
of the critical investigation The Limits to Governance, it entails ‘an increased role
of non-government actors in policy-making through various participatory networks 
and mechanisms.’ This understanding, they go on to note, foregrounds 
governance as ‘an inherently political process, concerned with articulating 
different actors’ interests, values and beliefs’. (Lyall, Papaioannou & Smith, 
2009a. p. 261). Simply and directly it was dubbed the ‘Democratic Model’ by 
social scientists Alan Irwin and Peter Healey in a submission to the important 
House of Lords inquiry into Science and Society (published in 2000). Ian 
Hargreaves, former editor of the Independent, has championed this framework, 
and argued that it should include ideas of ‘socially, economically and 
environmentally sustainable development’ and be “‘based largely on participatory 
processes in which publics (as citizens and consumers) predominate”.’ 
(Hargreaves and Ferguson, 2000, p. 11).
In the immediate aftermath of BSE through to and after the controversy over GM 
foods and crops, critics of previous practice secured the moral high ground in 
public debate on issues as diverse as modern farming methods, genetic 
engineering, global warming and mobile phones. Jonathon Porritt, a former 
Director of Friends of the Earth and an advisor to both Prince Charles and Tony 
Blair when he was Prime Minister, believed that science would only regain trust if 
it became ‘more precautionary; more participative; less arrogant; less 
compromised by its paymasters; more compassionate; and more holistic.’ Porritt 
hoped to persuade, but suggested that we might have to ‘constrain’ scientists,
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addicted as they are to the Promethean spirit; accustomed accordingly to 
‘pushing endlessly on into new territory.’ (Porritt, 2000, pp. 33; 136).
But while the controversies of the time provided him with an elevated platform, 
Porritt feared that behind and through all the talk of change individual scientists 
and also Governments and scientific institutions were still wedded to the (old) 
values of science. In other words, while there was much talk of change and much 
innovation in terms of consultations and the like, regarding the big picture of 
Government thinking and action, and at the practical level of governance and 
research practice, it was business as usual, or nearly so.
A number of social scientists agree with Porritt. Starting with a critical 
assessment of the Phillips report into BSE (which they regard as being far too 
sympathetic to the Government) through to continuing opposition to the 
Government’s in principle support for GM technology, they wonder what has in 
fact changed, beyond the extensive talk of change. In regard to the broad themes 
associated with the Democratic Model, for leading Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge (SSK) theorist Sheila Jasanoff, the need to pursue change is as 
strong now as it always was:
‘we need disciplined methods to accommodate the partiality of scientific 
knowledge and to act under irredeemable uncertainty. Let us call these the
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technologies of humility. These technologies compel us to reflect on the 
sources of ambiguity, indeterminacy and complexity... This call for humility 
is a plea for policy-makers to cultivate, and for universities to teach, modes 
of knowing that are often pushed aside in expanding scientific 
understanding and technological capacity. It is a request for research on 
what people value and why they value it. It is a prescription to supplement 
science with the analysis of those aspects of the human condition that 
science cannot easily illuminate. It is a call for policy analysts and policy­
makers to re-engage with the moral foundations for acting in the face of 
inevitable scientific uncertainty.’ (Jasanoff, 2007).
There is undoubtedly much continuity in both the rhetoric and practice of 
governance. Regarding the rhetoric, in the UK one could point to any number of 
speeches by Prime Minister Tony Blair or his successor Gordon Brown 
celebrating natural science and its importance in a way that Porritt, Jasanoff and 
others would characterise as hubristic, exclusivist and deterministic (such as the 
one by Tony Blair I quoted from at the beginning of this chapter, and others I will 
refer to throughout this thesis). There is also a general sense of agreement with a 
point Jasanoff made in 1996, one that applies even more so today perhaps, that 
natural science is ‘the institution that many regard as the most potent source of 
authority in the modern world.’ (Jasanoff, 1996, p. 393).
However, while most would agree that there is a good deal of continuity, some 
social scientists have suggested that we should consider the possibility of 
substantive change when taking stock of developments over the past 15 to 20 
years; substantive change that is beyond the talk of change. As Alan Irwin has 
put it:
The starting point for inquiry must be to view the new scientific 
governance as a legitimate object of study in itself. Rather than contrasting 
current discussions with some Habermasian ideal, seeking to squeeze 
them into one analytical model or else dismissing them as “business as 
usual”, it is important to approach these various statements as an 
expression of government thinking in the face of what is seen as a crisis of 
public trust in scientific institutions.’ (Irwin, 2006, p. 310.)
Examining the nature of contemporary governance in the above spirit raised the 
question, or the difficulty, of how to analyse changes in governance and how to 
weigh up the role of particular factors and agents in any change. This thesis 
provides some answers to the latter issue as it investigates the substantive 
question of the scale and nature of change in governance.
A distinction needs to be drawn between different aspects or components of 
natural science governance. In the quote given above, Jasanoff is particularly
critical of the use of or issues associated with science as authority. It is other 
things as well of course; notably it is also a research activity, a practical process 
of inquiry and knowledge generation. There are connections, clearly -  prior 
claims about the state of knowledge point to and are used to justify research 
activities; as are promissory claims about the (projected) outcomes of research. 
Social science investigation and critique over the past 15 to 20 years has run up 
and down the continuum of science seeking to open up debate. It hasn’t always 
been clear about the issues thrown up by continuity and discontinuity. In this 
thesis the focus is, in particular, on the governance of natural scientific research, 
that is natural science as a research activity.
1.2 The framing of governance
Governance is a broad topic, and it might be appropriate to use different 
conceptualisations in different contexts. For example Andy Stirling takes the 
following wide-ranging approach when focusing on opening up debates:
The starting point for this analysis is a distinction between parallel, 
interlinked, and mutually coconstituting processes of commitment and 
appraisal in technology governance. Here, “governance” is taken to 
encompass the diverse totality of actors, discourses, structures, and 
processes implicated in guiding and shaping technological configurations
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(Kooiman 1993). In these terms, appraisal is about informing, and 
commitment is about forming tangible social choices in the governance of 
science and technology.’ (Stirling, 2008, p. 265).
In related contexts but with a somewhat different focus, Lyall, Papaioannou and 
Smith suggest that it is rather the limits to wide-ranging notions of governance 
that might be most interesting and important:
‘In this and many of the chapters that follow, we consider some of the 
“new tools of governance” and how they might apply to the life science 
industries. We shall suggest that there are actually limits to the all 
pervasive notion of “governance” and that, instead, the multifaceted policy 
and regulatory situation that applies to genomics and the life sciences 
more generally actually argues for the existence of a government- 
governance continuum with different aspects of genomics technologies 
sitting at different points on this spectrum. Despite the political (and 
academic) rhetoric about new governance approaches, we perceive the 
enduring capacity of the state (in the North at least) to control and also to 
frame debates about new technology -  hence “the limits to governance”.’ 
(Lyall, Papaioannou and Smith, 2009, p. 3).
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The focus one chooses and the concepts one reaches for may appropriately be 
influenced by circumstances, but there is always a choice. Stirling’s point about 
the relationships between commitment and appraisal, forming and informing, and 
the comment about academic rhetoric in the above quote points to the issue of 
framing, and a particular issue highlighted by Haddow, Bruce, Calvert and 
Williams:
There has been much criticism from STS colleagues about the disposition 
of scientists to persuade public/s that the science they are conducting is 
good and fair by framing the issues in a particular way. A much overlooked 
issue in these interactions is the problem of “framing” by the social 
scientists themselves.’ (Haddow et al, 2009).
Arguments about how to think about the governance of science and the changing 
governance of science include different ideas about how to frame debates. One 
must pay close attention to statements that appear as or are presented as 
observations that might rather be viewed as framings. Relating to one of my case 
studies, consider the following observation:
‘Regulatory decisions concerning hybrid forms (i.e. concerning innovations 
in the transfer of DNA, cells, tissue and organs between humans and 
animals) can have profound epistemic and social implications insofar as
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they challenge our commonly held conceptions about what is human and 
what is animal... In this article, we critically examine how regulatory 
institutions in the UK respond to the challenges to human identity posed 
by xenotransplantation and cybridization.’ (Haddow et al, 2010, pp. 4-5)
This is a good example of an apparent comment on governance and ethics, that 
is in fact loaded with the authors’ own assumptions about governance and ethics. 
To take one of the examples they study: cybrids, that is very early stage 
embryonic masses created by transferring a human cell nucleus into an 
enucleated animal egg. These need have no epistemic or social implications, still 
less ‘profound’ ones, if one makes the distinction, as many people surely do, 
between cellular life and humans and animals existing as living and breathing 
entities in the world. At the end of the article, under the heading ‘But not animal 
enough to be animal’, they discuss the problem of trying to define species in 
terms of their genetic composition, pointing out that there aren’t such things as 
human genes etc. But doesn’t this count against the argument presented in the 
above quote? They then go on to conclude the main section of the article in this 
way:
‘UKXIRA (or a similar organization) could be reconvened and given a 
permanent standing committee (as was originally intended) with a remit that 
would include all animal-human fusions. Insomuch as this would bring
equilibrium back to the “regulatory” and “organic” body balance, as shown in 
Figure 1, it would also avoid real or perceived transgressions between what 
is considered animal and what is considered human given the rapid, and 
often unpredictable, pace of change in this area. To all intents and 
purposes, experience, independence, public consultation and open 
governance are required in an area that has the potential to bring back the 
mythological creatures of the past.’ (Haddow et al, 2010, p. 15)
Isn’t their commentary encouraging the revival of mythical thinking? Three of the 
authors of this article were coauthors with Williams of the comment I quoted from 
immediate beforehand on the problem of framing by social scientists. This 
juxtaposition of the two pieces suggests that while vigilance is required, framing 
is also inescapable in large part. The issue is how to examine and think about 
framings -  both those of others and one’s own.
The issue of framing is no less important in the other case study I used, the 
governance of research using human tissue. Mary Dixon-Woods et al present a 
far more positive view of public attitudes towards research than is often the case 
in the social science literature, and make some important observations in the 
course of challenging other framings:
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‘Claims about the views and feelings of “the public” are increasingly 
important in bioethical and policy debates, and are influential in the 
regulation and governance of bioscience. The organ retention 
controversies and associated media coverage (Seale, Cavers and Dixon- 
Woods, 2006), for example, led directly to the UK Human Tissue Act 2004 
(McHale et al., 2007), while earlier guidance issued by the Medical 
Research Council (2001) and a report by Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
(1995) on use of human tissue for research can also be seen as an 
attempt to respond to address perceived public concerns. In this article, 
we argue that a large body of academic literature, primarily within 
bioethics and the social sciences, has also been active (activist, even) in 
its commentary on use of human tissue for research purposes, and has 
tended to depict “public opinion” as overwhelmingly negative.’ (Dixon- 
Woods, Wilson, Jackson, Cavers and Pritchard-Jones, 2008, p. 58).
They go on:
‘Public views are then seen as supplying the imperative for wholesale 
overhaul of regulatory structures, the better to reduce opportunities for 
opportunism, exploitation and repugnance... A coalition of legal and 
ethical scholars, anthropologists and social scientists has thus begun 
speaking for those who contribute tissue for research purposes, and
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speaking for1 the public” more broadly conceived.’ (Dixon-Woods, Wilson, 
Jackson, Cavers and Pritchard-Jones, 2008, p. 61).
I agree with much of their argument, and discuss it further in chapter five. 
However, a limitation of their analysis is that it draws upon, without fully 
acknowledging the framing this creates, the views of family members of a child 
with cancer; just the kind of people who tend to be favourably disposed towards 
research.
Others have investigated the different perspectives that are generated when 
distinctions are made between specific interested groups and the public more 
generally. Mike Michael considers the Public in General (PiG) and Publics in 
Particular (PiP) as categories that interact with each other and science, one 
theme being that PiP often define themselves against the fickle or uninformed 
PiG. He also at the same time writes a good deal about how the categories are 
defined by others, including social scientists. Of particular interest to me in my 
work was his observation that one of the most basic framings within 
contemporary theories of governance is that publics in general as well as publics 
in particular have a desire to deliberate, participate and engage:
‘Here, however, we shall attend to the ways in which versions of the PiG are 
presumed in the very project of “giving voice” in PES. As noted above, it is
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assumed that the PiG has an in-principle political capacity to deliberate, to 
participate, to engage. But, it is also assumed that there is some deep- 
seated desire in the PiG to deliberate, to participate, to engage. Such a 
desire might be suppressed, or diverted, or dissipated, but nevertheless by 
virtue of the tacit characterization of the PiG as “citizenly,” it can come to 
define the PiG.’ (Michael, 2009, p. 622)
A related framing that I discuss more in later chapters is that older notions 
associated with the idea of scientists having a ‘freedom to research’ are widely 
considered to be no longer tenable. Both of these framings -  that publics of 
different kinds but especially PiG have a deep-seated desire to participate and 
that ‘freedom to research’ is no longer tenable -  are as widely held as they are in 
part because the pro-active social science research community was very active 
in framing debates according to their views over the period considered in this 
PhD, the years of the New Labour Governments.
1.3 The research questions
This PhD thesis investigates critically the nature of some aspects of the 
governance of natural scientific research in the UK through an analysis of two 
contentious and connected case studies: human tissue and human embryology. 
The time period covered is largely the New Labour years, 1997 to 2010, with
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some spillover into the years either side of those dates. Some comparisons are 
also made with earlier periods. The thesis as a whole looks at the following two, 
related, questions:
To what extent and in what way do governance regimes incorporate 
proposals and approaches developed by social scientists, STS and SSK in 
particular, and taken up by a range of actors in response to the perceived 
failures of older regimes?
What are the impacts of contemporary governance regimes on natural 
scientific research?
I conclude that while there is much continuity between old and new forms of 
natural science research governance, there have been changes, and that some 
of these changes are the result of the work of various actors, including some STS 
and SSK theorists, in championing aspects of the Democratic Model.
In developing this argument I engage with some policy makers’ and some natural 
scientists’ sense that things have indeed changed, partly for the reasons I outline. 
I also engage with theorists who have looked at the same issues and come to 
different conclusions. In particular I engage with the radical strand in STS and 
SSK. As a counter-hypothesis to both my own and that of radical STS and SSK I
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also engage, to a lesser extent, with Finlayson, Thorpe and Gregory’s 
characterisation of the New Labour years that links ideas of democratisation and 
participation to different roots and ambitions to the ones drawn on by STS and 
SSK.
The first analysis, that of radical STS and SSK, is outlined and discussed in more 
detail in chapter two in particular and chapter three to a limited degree, but to 
consider it briefly here: as we saw in section 1.1 above, Sheila Jasanoff believes 
that the radical agenda pursued by some in STS and SSK is still very relevant 
and important. Leading STS and SSK scholar Brian Wynne, who has worked with 
Jasanoff and pursued similar themes over the past two decades (and more), 
agrees. And a principal reason it is so important still is that he believes little has 
changed. More than this, he is surprised that anyone could think otherwise, and 
he is positively bewildered that anyone could think that his ideas have brought 
about any change. He concludes his article ‘Dazzled by the Mirage of Influence?’ 
with this observation:
‘My most striking personal experience of STS engagement in policy worlds 
has been sheer disorientation at my failure to recognize my own ideas in 
what has been celebrated as my work’s public influence. In the very 
process of taking on influence, we are reinterpreted in ways that of course 
we don’t control, and may not accept nor even understand. The next
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question hovers: can STS influence its own “influence,” to limit its 
transformation into alien goods? Once started, the agony continues.’ 
(Wynne, 2007, p. 501).
In a sense Charles Thorpe and Jane Gregory agree with Wynne (Thorpe and 
Gregory, 2010; Thorpe, 2010). However, drawing on Alan Finlayson (2003) their 
particular argument is not that nothing has changed, but rather that there has 
been change but that this has little or nothing to do with Wynnian SSK.
Discussing participation in particular, they argue that some STS and SSKers 
might be right in thinking that participation hasn’t worked out as they’d hoped, but 
that’s because participation had more than one root, and other approaches did 
have an impact. Their thesis is that post-Fordist theorising, developed by Charles 
Leadbeater in particular, and pursued in more recent times by the think-tank 
Demos, connected up with strands of thinking developed by sociologist Anthony 
Giddens in particular and others influential upon the New Labour project, 
resulting in the Blairite enthusiasm for science and technology illustrated by the 
quote with which this chapter opens. In that sense participation really was quite 
transformative: technology preparing the market through influencing 
consumption, and consumers themselves changing the way innovation works.
But it was not participation as understood within a concept of the Democratic 
Model held by the Wynnian strand of SSK.
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1.4 Motivation, methods and approach in my research
Up until the end of 2005 I was, through my job with Genetic Interest Group (now 
called Genetic Alliance UK, www.geneticalliance.org.uk), a participant in policy 
debates on the case studies. At the time I was familiar with some STS and SSK 
writings, and in the course of my work had met some activists for whom these 
writings were influential. Part of my motivation for researching and writing this 
thesis was to try to make some connections between what I perceived at the time 
to be two-way influences between some of the arguments and activities of 
activists and academics associated with STS and SSK on the one hand, and the 
worlds of policy and politics on the other. After leaving GIG I continued to follow 
developments, attend some events and conferences and occasionally write on 
some of the issues addressed in this thesis. In sum, in my research I drew on 
previous experience that, after the event, analysing my own experience, had 
aspects of a participant-observer approach.
I made contact with and held informal discussions with a range of natural and 
social scientists as background to scoping out the issues. I conducted a thorough 
review of relevant STS /  SSK, governance writings and the academic literature on 
the two case studies. Specific data sources included reports of Parliamentary 
debates, reports from and materials submitted to Parliamentary Committee 
hearings, and materials held by the Department of Health that I was granted
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access to; specifically responses to the key Governmental consultation leading 
up to the publication of the Human Tissue Bill.
Further to this research I conducted 24 semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
leading players in the fields under study during my doctoral research.
Interviewees were chosen to represent a diverse range of perspectives, on 
account of their intimate knowledge and often participation in the processes of 
governance I was studying and, wherever possible, because they straddled a 
boundary, between, for example, science and governance in the case of natural 
scientists who were interviewed. Interviewees included MPs, civil servants, 
regulators, academic social scientists, campaigners and natural scientists. The 
interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 90 minutes each. With two exceptions, 
one phone interview and one email interview, they were all conducted face-to- 
face. I decided to do the interviews on-the-record because I wanted to be able to 
discuss the specifics of the interviewees’ involvement in the events under 
discussion, and to use specific details in the thesis. As such it would have been 
impossible to anonymise them effectively, and any promise of doing so would 
have failed to ring true, resulting in a less rather than more open and relaxed 
discussion. While interviewing people on-the-record may not be novel, it is 
certainly unusual, and I believe that combined with the methodologically reflexive 
approach I adopted this together may form a new way to research governance
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questions that takes key agents’ role in the public sphere seriously. A list of the 
interviewees is provided in the Appendix.
There are some similarities between the approach I took and that adopted by 
Alexandra Plows in her thesis, subsequently turned into a book (Plows, 2011). 
She used an ethnographic or participant observation approach, and interviewed 
some key players (though in her case these were not on-the-record). She opens 
the book with a discussion of frame analysis, and makes the point that her book 
also frames the debates in a particular way, ‘by focusing on certain groups and 
certain issues.’ This, she continues, ‘is an inevitable problem to which the only 
solution is methodological reflexivity.’ (Plows, 2011, p. 4). A few pages on she 
goes a little further, and makes the case for tilting the frame:
‘Especially in sensitive and complex areas such as reproduction and 
genetics, better forms of participatory democracy are essential to break 
out of the polarised debate framed in terms of people being “pro or anti” 
Individual choice or informed consent in specific contexts. It is important to 
set the debates on some different tracks; to broaden, or to tilt, the frame.’ 
(Plows, 2011, p. 10).
This is a difficult approach to pull off without risking injecting too much of the 
author’s own concerns and preoccupations. Nevertheless, to continue with some
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of the points raised in section 1.2, above, on framing, it is certainly also true that 
in choosing whom we interview, what questions we ask and what issues we find 
interesting and important, researchers are always in a sense tilting the frame. In 
my own case one ‘tilt’ was to take the concerns of natural scientific researchers 
more on their own terms than do some social science researchers. This was 
achieved in part by my choice of research questions. In particular the second 
question (what are the impacts of contemporary governance regimes on natural 
scientific research?), while secondary in overall importance to the first question 
within my research, helped to provide a particular focus to investigation of the 
first question.
To build an understanding of the political context and character of governance, 
and of the two-way links between STS / SSK themes and governance, I 
developed, through my analysis of the two case studies, answers to the following 
question:
What role do important themes in the discourse of contemporary 
governance, specifically precaution, participation, engagement, pluralism 
and deliberation, play in its substantive constitution?
In both cases new Acts of Parliament were passed in the past ten years following 
extensive public and Parliamentary debate. These Acts, to a greater and lesser
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extent, updated earlier ones covering each area. In examining and characterising 
the process of change in governance of tissue and embryology at the legal and 
regulatory level, three interrelated aspects were examined: the extent to which 
governance frameworks were substantively altered through the political process; 
the role of existing governance frameworks within the political debates; and the 
relationship between the political process, governance frameworks and natural 
scientific research.
Pertinent to my study, Hammersley and Atkinson warn, on the theme of trying to 
get ‘better’ and more truthful accounts: ‘this is important, but it can also be 
problematic: “frankness” may be as much a social accomplishment as 
“discretion”’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p.49). The governance of tissue 
and embryology in the UK emerged out of contentious political debates. Going 
into and coming out of these debates, participants had aims and aspirations that 
they attempted to develop in the context of a political landscape that had some 
unknown but also some known parameters -  participants had to feel their way, 
but they also knew which way things were going to some degree. Similar points 
apply to other specific debates and more general debates on science 
governance. Naturally, with varying degrees of calculation, differences between 
private thoughts and public utterances characterised these debates; in part 
statements and positions were and are advanced with an eye towards prevailing 
norms and political realities. This necessitated, at times, challenging the
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statements interviewees made through, for example, asking them to comment on 
the opinions and approaches of others involved in the debates or on materials 
gained from other data sources. Analysis of the two areas, tissue and 
embryology, was helpful in this regard in that it allowed a degree of analytical 
triangulation through the comparisons participants whose focus of work is one 
case study drew with the other.
I took a grounded theory approach to analysis of the interviews and indeed other 
research materials, in particular but not exclusively, the approach developed by 
Strauss and Gorbin (1990) rather than that of Glaser, in the sense of his 
response to the former pair during the 1990s. The approach views social life as a 
process characterised by conflict and contestation leading to the construction and 
reconstruction of narratives and political compromises. As Strauss and Corbin 
put it:
Grounded theory is an action / interaction oriented method of theory 
building. Whether one is studying individuals, groups, or collections, there 
is action / interaction, which is directed at managing, handling, carrying 
out, responding to a phenomenon as it exists in context or under a specific 
set of perceived conditions. (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 104).
This approach was well suited to analysing aspects of the processes under 
study, governance and changing governance, which were characterised by such 
processes of action, interaction, conflict and management of change.
In developing my argument I paid particular attention to the aspect or idea of 
governance as the channelling of activity by Government, quasi-governmental 
bodies and regulatory bodies, though I situated this within a context that has 
become more complex and to a degree more ‘bottom up’. Relatedly, I examined 
the channelling of debate and discussion through governance, and the 
‘assumption of the authority to categorize publics and identify “proper” ethical 
positions’ (Moore, 2010, p. 204) by governmental bodies.
Broadly speaking, I followed Brownsword (2008) in viewing regulators narrowly 
but regulation and governance broadly. Somewhat differently from Brownsword 
and other legally- and philosophically-orientated scholars, I paid more attention to 
an issue he notes but does little to develop -  the political and sociological factors 
that influence and contextualise the approaches to governance adopted by 
Government and other agencies involved in governance. In connection with this, 
Lyall et al make an observation that I found particularly fruitful for my research:
‘Salamon (2002a, 37) describes the result of the “paradox of third-party
government” where policy-makers seem to be under increasing political
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pressures to select those tools of public action that are most difficult to 
manage and the hardest to keep focused on their primary objectives. 
Indeed, many of these new tools of governance are horizontal (Ringeling 
2002, 588-9) -  communication / public information; networking; public- 
private partnership -  and not based on a view of government controlling 
the actions of others.’ (Lyall, Papaioannou and Smith, 2009, p. 9).
Some STS / SSK writers, radical discourse analysts, critical social theorists and 
deliberative democracy analysts have theorised, discussed and critiqued the 
governance of natural science. Some have also engaged directly and indirectly 
with political and policy debates on the ways in which governance regimes could 
be changed. Accordingly, this body of work is considered as an input into the 
public discussion of and as a contribution to the construction of new forms of 
science governance. Their work is also, in part, considered as an output of the 
construction of new forms of governance: through engagement with the political 
and policy process, the issues, ideas and questions addressed by these same 
theorists have in part been framed by those ongoing processes.
In this PhD, data collection, analysis and interpretation in relationship to 
governance in the context of case studies played a central role in informing the 
conclusions to the broader context and questions. But moving from conclusions 
in the specific cases to broader conclusions required further data and
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interpretation. In chapter three I discuss the idea of the changing governance of 
science directly and in chapter four I introduce the case study chapters (chapters 
five and six). In doing so I discuss methodological issues relating to the case 
studies in more detail.
1.5 Thesis plan
Chapter Two
In this chapter I dig deeper into debates within STS and SSK, outline how key 
theorists, in particular the more critical ones, conceptualise governance, consider 
some critical perspectives on STS and SSK, and reflect on the reasons for 
examining some theoretical approaches more than or rather than others in this 
thesis. That some strands of social science have taken such a strong interest in 
critiquing and attempting to change governance of natural science research 
provides a window into examining and characterising this body of thought. Unlike 
some philosophically-focused critiques of SSK in particular (e.g., Haack, 2007) I 
search hard for the political and sociological motivations that drive this body of 
social science analysis and use this understanding to examine why it is that 
important strands within SSK see themselves, and perhaps prefers to see 
themselves, as without power.
SSK has helped to highlight some important issues, such as the meanings and 
values scientists bring to debates, the way that particular lines of inquiry are 
opened up and closed down through a focus on scientific aspects of issues and 
the reification of concrete and specific forms of knowledge in risk debates. 
However, radical elements in SSK are very ambitious, utopian to an extent, which 
has helped to blind them to the influence their ideas, in the hands of others 
sometimes, have had. The focus on critique, of the real and presumed 
institutional and cultural power of natural science, adds to this: there is a lack of 
sympathy, or even interest, in natural scientists’ problems; and a lack of interest 
in the ways in which some natural scientists have absorbed and responded to 
some social science analysis, even if not always in ways that social scientists 
anticipated or imagined.
Chapter Three
In this chapter I look at some aspects of natural science governance that defined 
the social contract for science after the Second World War. I then focus on some 
aspects of natural scientists’ perceptions of the changes that have taken place in 
the more recent period and how they have tried to influence and manage change. 
This discussion includes some preliminary observations on the ways in which the 
interaction of new and old approaches to governance has combined to shape 
contemporary governance. In developing this analysis I draw on aspects of STS 
and SSK as a means to explore governance. Beyond SSK, a novel reading and
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combination of Erving Goffman and (more critically) John Rawls is used to 
interrogate the performative work of natural scientists drawn into public 
engagement and deliberative exercises during the New Labour years.
Towards the end of the chapter I begin to return to the discussion of critical STS 
and SSK and consider the analysis of some academic social scientists 
sympathetic to the concerns of natural scientists. The chapter as a whole and the 
final sections in particular lays the basis for the following chapter, which 
introduces the two case studies.
Chapter Four
In this chapter I focus more explicitly on how I approached governance and how I 
used the case studies in the thesis. I discuss different theories of governance. I 
discuss governance and governance agencies. I discuss how to explore and 
explain the influence of different ideas and activities on governance. In particular 
I discuss how to explore the influence of critical STS and SSK in the light of the 
earlier discussion of the interaction of old and new approaches to Governance. 
One way I suggest doing this is through a comparative analysis of the 
Democratic Model with the case of feminist scholarship and politics. The chapter 
then moves on to a methodological and substantive discussion of how these 
issues are investigated in this thesis, and concludes with an introduction to the 
case studies.
42
Chapter Five
The first case study: the governance of research using human tissue.
Chapter Six
The second case study: the governance of research using human embryos. 
Chapter Seven
This chapter reflects on the findings from the case studies and uses these to 
address the over-arching research question: the changing governance of 
science. I conclude that New Labour’s approach to the governance of science 
can be considered a hybrid. It was defined by its engagement, rhetorically, 
performatively and substantively, with the Democratic Model, a model informed 
by themes linked to SSK and other strands of social science. There were of 
course many other processes in play. In practice, there was overlap in the 
Government’s and others’ treatment of distinct strands, reflecting mixed 
understandings, pragmatism and disparate aims at Government level. Overall, 
while there is much continuity between old and new forms of natural science 
research governance, there have been changes, and some of these changes are 
the result of the work of various actors, including some STS and SSK theorists, in 
championing aspects of the Democratic Model.
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Chapter Two: SSK’s Challenge to Natural Science Governance
‘We may reasonably be asked to cultivate a reflexive self-awareness of the ways 
in which our scholarly work may play out in the arenas of the “real world”. In 
seeking to explicate the nature of science and the sources of its authority, all SSK 
scholars are necessarily engaged in an enterprise that is as deeply political as it 
is intellectual, even when their case studies or historical projects seem to be 
remote from the driving political concerns of late-twentieth-century societies. How 
could a branch of enquiry that takes as its central preserve the making (and 
unmaking) of human knowledge be anything but political to the core? If nothing 
else, the recent surge of concern about the “anti-science” tendencies of science 
studies offers a useful reminder that our field cannot stand detached and apart 
from debates about the allocation of power and resources to the very institution 
whose external relations and internal dynamics we seek to illuminate.
In reflecting on the objectives and possible influence of our individual 
research programmes, we should not be content, however, with an artificially 
thinned description of the politics to which we contribute. The framework of 
controversy studies, in particular, with its implied (and I have suggested 
untenable) dualism between winning and losing beliefs, seems far too 
constraining to accommodate everything that happens when work in science and 
technology studies is brought to bear on political ends. We cannot simply be 
guided by the instrumental uses to which others may put our work, for what we
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represent is not merely a “side” in a controversy but an entire worldview: one that 
is deeply committed to seeing science as a dynamic and integral part of society -  
a social construct -  and to probing its distinctive characteristics with all of the 
theoretical and methodological resources at our disposal.’
Sheila Jasanoff, 1996
There are some old, classical questions at the intersection between science, 
politics and democracy. One way in which society addresses them is through 
governance structures and practices. In turn, the general thinking on governance 
prevalent at the time, to a greater or lesser degree, will influence the politics and 
governance of particular areas of research. Human tissue and embryo research 
are intrinsically connected with the wider trends in the politics and governance of 
science that have been so widely discussed and debated in the past fifteen to 
twenty years within the STS /  SSK community and more widely. A critical 
engagement with the debates within and about STS and SSK in this chapter is 
used to highlight the distinctive approach taken by critical STS and SSK to 
governance.
2.1 Advocating change
A leading advocate for change is STS /  SSK theorist Brian Wynne, who has not 
only written extensively about a wide range of issues in the field for many years 
but has also engaged directly and indirectly with government agencies and 
regulatory bodies. In 2010 he resigned from the Food Standards Agency’s Public 
Dialogue Steering Committee in frustration at what he saw as pre-existing 
commitments within Government to the development, if at all possible, of 
Genetically Modified Crops, a commitment that in his opinion undermines 
genuine dialogue with groups in society. The final straw was FSA chair Jeff 
Rooker’s claim that the public were ‘anti-science’:
‘In being deeply pro-GM in everything but the explicit punch-line itself, this 
FSA position is effectively a state of institutional denial. This is all the more 
dogmatically entrenched for its being unrecognised by its own proponents. 
It is thus either plain dishonest, or it is scandalously unreflective upon, and 
evading accountability for, its own normatively weighted assumptions. I 
believe this adds up to a dishonest structural situation, whatever the 
honesty or otherwise of any individual involved. I also believe that this 
blind commitment renders even sincerely-meant attempts at public 
dialogue prone to meaningless public disorientation, abuse, and alienation 
which undermines public policy authority whichever particular way it might 
commit itself.’
46
He went on:
The issue was never just about what range of framings of the issue, and 
of different attitudinal positions, would be heard, though this has had to be 
argued through more than it should have needed. It is also, crucially, about 
how those wider framings, and those different positions/will be dialogued 
with. I have received no sign that this will even happen, but instead I have 
been told that policy officials and Ministers will consider them as they 
please, at their own convenience, with no accountable justifications or 
explanations or hearing of public and other stakeholder issues and 
concerns. Thus the “dialogue” is at too much risk of becoming a 
combination of effective monologue, and extractive research activity. This 
will only act as yet another public mistrust generator, and all the fine words 
about taking the public into account in future policy will be meaningless.’ 
(Wynne, 2010).
Wynne’s rationale for being involved was to try to make the process work in the 
way he wanted it to, or at the very least to hold the government to its own formal 
commitment to a broader form of engagement and dialogue. He thinks this didn’t 
happen, and more broadly he believes that there have only been limited changes 
in the governance of science over the past two decades or so; his views
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expressed in the resignation letter being of a piece with his assessment that 
Government is ‘Hitting the notes, but missing the music?’ (Wynne, 2006).
Many other, a majority most likely, of STS /  SSK writers share Wynne’s views on 
these issues to a greater or lesser extent as well as his commitment to trying to 
effect change, seeing more novelty in form rather than in substance as the talk 
from Government has moved from public education to restoring public trust to 
public engagement and dialogue. Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden (2007), for 
example, want to use ‘upstream’ engagement to open up engagement and 
decision-making around science so that a wide range of perspectives can be 
brought to bear on early stages of debate on and development of new science 
and technology:
‘the agenda will need to move from industry product based debate (found 
in downstream dialogue) to broader framing of the issues. This will involve 
unpacking the assumptions that go into science alongside exploring how 
technologies fit in with forms of society that citizens wish to have. Thus 
ideally debating visions all parties have for society and how the 
technologies can/should/could and cannot be developed to fit within these. 
This path of deliberating societal visions and assumptions may even lead 
to exploring some more radical ways of approaching the interaction of 
citizens and science that have yet to be conceptualized. In the wake of the
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GM and BSE affairs in Europe, nanotechnologies may well have arrived at 
a time where there is genuine opportunity to try something different.’ 
(Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden, 2007, pp. 360-1).
At the same time, they fear that upstream engagement could, like previous forms 
of engagement in their view, serve more to legitimise standard forms of 
technology decision-making or at least be part of an attempt to legitimise such 
decision-making:
‘it is hard to see how the goals of opening up the research agenda to more 
public scrutiny on the one hand can be reconciled with a push to use 
engagement to shape public discourses on the other. On a practical level 
the danger is that, as with the UK GM Nation? Public debate which 
occurred in 2003 (see Horlick-Jones et al, 2007), engagement will be 
compromised from the outset by incompatible objectives’ (Pidgeon and 
Rogers-Hayden, 2007, p. 355)
While the work of some STS / SSK scholars is sometimes presented as a 
defence of public interests against those of industry and government, It is not 
however just Government, scientists, industry and regulatory bodies that STS / 
SSK writers are critical of. Some feel distinctly let down by the public. Reflecting 
on STS /  SSK engagement with political and policy processes over the past
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decade and more in general, and their own experiences of organising events at 
which they were both participants and observers studying the processes in 
particular, Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and Tutton conclude:
‘A form of deferential partnership tends to ensue in these kinds of events, 
where scientific expertise is supplemented by limited public input... This 
makes us question the extent to which lay people can ever expose 
scientific error and hubris, given that the layness we found was so fragile, 
easily compromised and so readily aligned with expert positions by both 
scientific experts and others. This seems as true of events that are highly 
structured as those which are not.’ (Kerr, A., Cunningham-Burley, S. and 
Tutton, R., 2007, p. 408)
Substituting inaction for action, one is reminded of Brecht’s The Solution
After the uprising of the 17th June 
The Secretary of the Writers Union 
Had leaflets distributed in the Stalinallee 
Stating that the people
Had forfeited the confidence of the government
And could win it back only
By redoubled efforts. Would it not be easier
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In that case for the government 
To dissolve the people 
And elect another?
In the case of STS scholars the typical move in response to the failure of the 
people is to select another group, or more commonly to enact public participation. 
But whether it is advocating, arguing or enacting public participation, what, more 
precisely, are the aims of critical STS and SSK in the arena of science 
governance, and how have these been pursued through the public policy debates 
on governance over the past 15 to 20 years in the UK? In the remainder of this 
chapter I dig deeper into the history of ideas and activity on this subject.
2.2 The politics of SSK
A special issue of the journal Social Studies of Science published in 1996 was 
devoted to The Politics of SSK’. A number of different political and theoretical 
perspectives were on parade, as Brian Wynne put it, and, as he also argued, 
reflecting on the nature of SSK itself at the start of his contribution, ‘the issue of 
its political relations has never been far from the explicit agenda of SSK.’
(Wynne, 1996, p. 357).
Wynne argued that the debate between the explicitly left wing and politically- 
oriented Brian Martin on the one hand (Martin, 1993) and Harry Collins, 
representing an SSK focus on issues with limited explicit connection to politics, 
on the other, was too narrow and dominated by what he termed a ‘decisionist’ 
mode of analysis (a critique he was to replay in his response to Collins and 
Evans’ 2002 paper setting out a Third Wave’ of science studies, which in his 
view was overly preoccupied with propositional questions).
With caveats, Wynne accepted the central critical points of the reflexive turn 
advocated by Woolgar, Ashmore and others, but his own interests were more 
externally oriented: ‘I try to exploit the insights of the broad reflexive turn of the 
1980s in SSK, but focus externally, on the institutional and the political-cultural 
level.’ (Wynne, 1996, p. 359). As Charis Thompson observes, the American 
Scholar Sheila Jasanoff has a similar approach: ‘While most of the studies in 
SSK and ANT focus on the lab or on relatively discreet episodes of science, 
Jasanoff has taken STS into the broader political realm by looking at different 
national styles of accommodating, promoting, and using science for governance.’ 
(Thompson, 2005, p. 50).
It is this external focus on institutional and political-cultural matters that provides 
the link in their work between methodology and political questions, and provides 
the basis for their work on the governance of science. As debate within and
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outside of STS and SSK has developed since 1996, Wynne and Jasanoff have 
often teamed up to pursue shared concerns and objectives.
Wynne argued in his paper (Wynne, 1996) that not only was the debate between 
Martin and Collins concerned with too narrow a set of issues but also that the 
debate within STS / SSK was framed through this confrontation and that his was 
a minority view. But if that was true at the time it was not to remain so for long, or, 
with a nod to Wynne’s own concerns, it was not to remain so for long at least at 
the level of discussion and discourse. By the mid 1990s the terms Left and Right 
were losing clear meaning in mainstream politics and sociological analysis 
(Giddens, 1994) and the BSE saga was a catalyst for changes in part in line with 
the concerns of campaigners and scholars such as Wynne. Ever since the crisis 
point of 1996, critics of previous Government policy and institutional scientific 
practice, notably campaigners, some STS / SSK scholars and other writers on 
science and governance, have successfully influenced the public discussion of a 
number of issues in politics, governance and science. As discussed in chapter 
one, three obvious examples are the significance and meaning of the BSE / vCJD 
issue itself, GM crops and food and, directly relevant to this PhD, research using 
human tissue in the fall out from the discoveries made regarding retained organs 
and tissue at Alder Hey hospital.
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Some STS / SSK scholars were active participants in the political and policy 
debates that took place after 1996, at a number of levels -  engaging and working 
with campaigners, writing reports, running public engagement exercises, advising 
Parliamentary committees and sitting on commissions among other things. This 
orientation to intervene runs through the writings and intellectual work of such 
scholars as much as it does their practical activity, and it was something they had 
prepared for.
Misunderstanding Science? The public reconstruction of science and technology, 
published in 1996, is one example of a deliberate and focused intellectual 
intervention. In their introduction, the editors, Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne, 
describe the book as a ‘fresh line of analysis’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996, p. 12) but 
also a synthesis, based on two decades of work in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge, which, they argued, had ‘convincingly demonstrated the socially 
negotiated nature of science’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996, p. 7).
Clearly, then, fresh for those who hadn’t read the two decades of work; less so 
for those who had. But this merely highlights the ambition to intervene in and 
influence debates: ‘the general argument in this book is that we need to rethink 
and reconceptualise the relationships between “science” and the “public” if we 
are to make progress at the level of either understanding or practical 
intervention.’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996, p. 7). The particular mechanism through
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which influence was to be attempted was policy, thus was born the policy turn in 
STS and SSK: ‘each of the chapters has implications for practical interventions in 
this area. In the concluding chapter we will address this theme directly -  what are 
the policy implications of the new approach to “public understanding” which has 
been developed in this collection?’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996, p. 10).
The signalling of intent, the drawing of lessons in each chapter, and the double 
run at the issues by the editors in an introduction and a conclusion combine to 
give the book characteristics of a manifesto and a call to arms. The editors also 
sought to locate their intervention within what they understood to be a changing 
society: ‘We will also attempt to locate the content of this book within the 
changing structure of contemporary society, and, especially, debates over the 
nature of modernity and the cultural dimensions of political change.’ (Irwin and 
Wynne, 1996, p. 16). The changes they pointed to were, in some dimensions at 
least, accelerated by the fallout from the discovery of a link between BSE and 
vCJD, which was confirmed in the same year the book was published and which 
soon precipitated intense discussion of how science should be governed.
One broader cultural issue with distinct policy implications they were clear on was 
that the ‘problem’ was not so much the public’s misunderstanding of science as 
science’s misunderstanding of the public: ‘In so far as it can begin to recognise 
and reflect openly upon its own deep cultural biases, science may find the latent
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heat of evaporation of the public understanding problem to be surprisingly low. 
The politics of legitimation may be best conducted by questioning the anxious 
culture of control.’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996a, p. 219). Furthermore, science 
needed to show greater understanding and respect for local knowledges, not 
simply because this would aid science’s understanding of the public, but because 
these are forms of knowledge on a par with science. Or, put another way, 
science as commonly understood is itself contextual -  ‘the context in that case 
generally being one of ceteris paribus assumptions and laboratory controlled 
conditions.’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996a, p. 220). ‘Rather than attempting to 
maintain a knowledge hierarchy’, they went on to argue, ‘the aim should be to 
acknowledge and build upon this broader network of knowledge relations -  
always accepting that together they can represent a rich and well-tested body of 
contextual knowledges.’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996a, p. 220). The issue, ultimately, 
was about ‘who should control science’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996a, p. 221).
The themes presented and developed in Misunderstanding Science? run through 
the many articles and reports produced by Wynne and other STS and SSK 
scholars in the years since 1996; scholars whose broad orientation and 
aspiration is to open up a space for a constructivist and political interrogation of 
science and its institutions. While it is perhaps the case that the most widely 
known studies cover agricultural and environmental issues, the analysis has
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been applied to a much wider range of cases. Indeed Wynne argues that the 
trends he is concerned about affect all areas of science:
‘We have meandered blindly from nuclear power in the relatively early 
post-war years of institutional science advice for policy, though a dense 
variety of other imbroglios involving scientific knowledge as supposed 
public policy authority, including thalidomide and other pharmaceuticals, 
chemical pesticides, food irradiation, chlorofluorocarbons, whooping cough 
and later MMR triple vaccines, radioactive waste management and 
disposal, waste incineration, oil and gas rig environmental risk 
assessment and disposal, BSE, high voltage power lines, and other 
electromagnetic fields.’ (Wynne, 2006, p. 213).
Even medical genetics, widely seen as an area of science and medical practice 
in which professionals and patients work closely together based on a high level of 
trust, is not immune to the corrosive influence of institutional scientific arrogance 
according to Wynne (Wynne, 2006, p. 212).
In the following sections I outline some of the key features of this constructivist 
and political analysis and approach, in part by contrasting it with others in the 
field and beyond. There is a difficulty in defining just what constitutes the essence 
of the approach, and accordingly which scholars are aligned with it. It would be
difficult and perhaps foolish to be too definitive about this. My aim is to point to 
themes that define a constructivist, political and at times activist tendency in STS 
and SSK; one with a particular orientation to challenging the influence of 
institutionally dominant natural science.
2.3 Instrumentality and the urge to control
That there is a relationship between science/ decision-making and power is pretty 
much beyond dispute -  only the most apolitical philosopher or scientists could 
possibly deny it. Coming at the issue from a traditional left wing perspective, the 
distinguished geneticist Richard Lewontin posed the question and some of the 
dilemmas it leads to like this:
‘The penetration of science into political and civil society, however, poses 
a special problem for the operation of the democratic state. On the one 
hand the behaviour of the state is supposed to reflect the popular will, as 
determined either by a direct appeal to the opinion of the people or 
through the intermediary of their elected representatives. On the other 
hand, the esoteric knowledge and understanding required to make rational 
decisions in which science and technology are critical factors lie in the 
possession of a small elite...
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...Why would the Salvadorian immigrant woman who cleans my 
office believe that she and the Alexander Agassiz Research Professor at 
Harvard have sufficient commonality of interest and world view that she 
ought to trust my opinion on whether her meagre hourly wage should be 
taxed to support the Human Genome Project? ...
.... For both questions, what knowledge is worth acquiring and how 
we are to apply knowledge when we have it, there is a tension between 
the ideal of democratic decision, the power of which is vested in the 
“people” and their representatives, and the demand for expert knowledge, 
the power over which is vested in a small elite. Just as democratic 
institutions intervene twice, once to decide what is to be studied and then 
to decide what is to be done with the study, so the elite posses a double 
power, first to assert their exclusive competence to acquire knowledge and 
then to use the authority of that same knowledge to influence social 
action.’ (Lewontin, 2002).
STS and SSK is a heterogeneous field. While many would agree with some or 
much of what Lewontin argues in the above quote, there are some distinct 
aspects to the STS /  SSK critique of natural science and natural science 
governance. In relation to risk issues, for example, whereas some 
environmentalist campaigners and left wing activists had typically tried to 
challenge the powerful by presenting concrete truths about harms caused by
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particular technological applications, Wynnian SSK stressed rather inherent and 
deep-seated uncertainty, challenging the powerfuFs (and indeed everybody’s) 
pretentions to knowledge. The editors of Late lessons from early warnings put it 
like this: ‘Complex reality demands better science, characterised by more humility 
and less hubris, with a focus on “what we don’t know” as well as “what we know”.’ 
(European Environment Agency, 2001, p. 193).
Underlying this characterisation of knowledge and uncertainty is a broad 
theoretical difference not only with strands of environmentalist and left wing 
thought, but all modernist approaches to politics and knowledge. In their 
introduction to Risk, Environment & Modernity, Szerszynski, Lash and Wynne 
complain about social science’s complicity in the modernist project and all that 
goes with it:
The translation of things “environmental” into authoritative scientific and 
policy vocabularies occurs in ways which could be described as, among 
other things, epistemologically “realist”, positivistic, disembedded, 
technological and cognitivist, and that it thus tends to mask important 
cultural, social and existential dimensions of the contemporary 
“environmental crisis”.’ (Szerszynski, Lash and Wynne, 1996, p. 1).
While superficially the concerns of this strand of SSK might appear to align with 
the work of sociologists and risk theorists such as Anthony Giddens and Ulrich 
Beck even if they don’t fit with traditional left wing and environmental thinking, in 
fact the critique takes in these thinkers as well. Risk, Environment & Modernity 
arose out of an international symposium held in 1992 ‘founded on a critical 
examination of the perspectives of Ulrich Beck, focusing on modernity, risk and 
the cultural dimensions of contemporary environmental issues.’ (Lash, 
Szerszynski and Wynne (eds), 1996, p. vii). ‘Most of us will argue that Beck has 
not gone far enough in his break with the dominant “technological paradigm” in 
environmental analysis’ was the verdict of the editors (Szerszynski, Lash and 
Wynne, 1996, p. 3). The alternative, they argued, is a hermeneutic project, 
drawing upon critics of Enlightenment rationality such as Ernst Bloch, Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, to expose the meanings mainstream science (both 
natural and social) imposes on publics and the meanings and cultural resources 
available to resist this:
‘This book constitutes a sort of “slow manifesto” against such tendencies 
in the social sciences more broadly, presenting a number of different 
accounts of the environmental phenomenon in late modernity which are in 
different degrees constructivist rather than realist, hermeneutic rather than 
positivist, poetic rather than technological, situated rather than 
disembedded.’ (Szerszynski, Lash and Wynne, 1996, p. 2).
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Debating Giddens and Beck in another collection of essays, Reflexive 
Modernization, Lash at least hoped that the ‘slow manifesto’ might gain traction 
because as he saw it the processes of individualization that they all agreed upon 
lead to hermeneutics acquiring a central importance in reflexive and other 
processes. The task of social scientists was to engage with and develop this 
trend.
In summary, the most general and important theme of the strand of STS and SSK 
whose core interests are political and institutional is a critique of what it regards 
as the instrumentalism and urge to control that it believes animates modern 
science and its leading institutions. Implicitly and at times explicitly this critique 
contains the projection of an alternative that draws on some strands of anti­
modernist, environmental and feminist thinking, which in turn, returning to more 
modest policy-oriented goals, it is hoped can provide resources to change the 
practice of science. In Misunderstanding Science? Wynne and Irwin put it like 
this:
‘If the social purposes of public knowledge are to uphold less instrumental 
and exploitative relationships between human society and nature, and 
between human beings themselves, as much of the impetus of new 
feminist, environmental, and other social movements and post-modern
critique would claim, what does this imply for the redefinition of “science” 
as valid public authority?... it is important for scientific institutions to 
recognise that science is often seen by public groups as a resource for the 
powerful in society -  and against the everyday interests of the weak. Only 
deliberate -  and deliberately humble -  efforts in this area can begin to 
address the issues.’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996a, pp. 218-220)
From this overarching diagnostic and prognostic framework much else follows, 
including the particular flavour given to such analytical categories as 
reductionism, boundary work, how the public is conceived and constructed and 
how risk issues and promissory discourse are understood.
STS and SSK scholars with this interest and perspective have doggedly 
attempted to shine a light on these issues and create a space for academic 
reflection upon it. It is an ongoing struggle as far as many are concerned. Wynne 
was an advisor to the House of Lords committee that produced the important 
2000 report Science and Society. Despite explicit rejection of the idea in the 
report, society is still wedded, believes Wynne, to the original cognitive deficit 
model as an explanation of public attitudes towards science. This is a kind of alibi 
for science, he believes, which explains the ‘persistent institutional projection and 
reinvention’ that occurs around the issue. This excuses what he calls today’s 
‘culture of scientism, or institutionalized idolatry of science’, which ‘is bound to
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treat public rejection of those things done in the name of science, as rejection of 
science, because it has already so falsely narrowed its moral imagination to the 
idea that support for the policy stance is determined by scientific fact, and that no 
alternative is left.’ (Wynne, 2006, p. 214).
The title of the paper from which the above quote is taken, ‘Public Engagement 
as a Means of Restoring Public Trust in Science -  Hitting the Notes but Missing 
the Music?’, does a very poor job of capturing the passion and frustration 
contained in pretty much every paragraph. He concludes by despairing of the 
ability of those involved to see even the most basic points:
‘Scientific institutional actors and the policy officials they advise seem 
unable to recognize these basic points, as the epistemic culture of 
instrumentalism and control which defines modern scientific knowledge 
has been allowed to pervade and latterly to define public science-policy 
institutional culture.’ (Wynne, 2006, p. 220).
The concluding claim, about instrumentalism coming to pervade and latterly 
define public science-policy institutional culture, points to a perspective on 
historical developments. And indeed, for Wynne, the need for his particular focus 
on challenging instrumentalism and control arises not just from its central role in 
shaping everything else but also from a change in way scientists and their
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institutions behave, and the way in which society relates to science. He points to 
‘a powerful change in science’s role since the 1950s, from one which informs 
public policy, to one which also now, by default, provides public policy with its 
meanings', and he believes that social science should focus on this rather than 
drifting off to examine other questions, such as categorising expertise:
‘By this I mean that, first, techno-scientific imaginations of innovations in a 
widening range of areas of social life, have become the imagined ends of 
public policy, to create the conditions of innovation for these end-points; 
and more specifically, when such prospective innovations encounter social 
questions, almost the only public form of concern, thus public issue, 
recognized by policy institutions, is that of “risk.” This therefore, 
inadvertently or not, becomes the public meaning by which such issues 
are defined as public issues. I would suggest that social sciences, 
especially those claiming to deal with publics and science, have a 
responsibility to challenge this development, rather than to reproduce and 
reinforce it... That typical members of the public have always and for good 
reason wished to understand science in terms of its institutional realities, 
of its forms of ownership, control, driving imaginations, and directions, and 
not only or even primarily in terms of its technical contents alone, has 
been recognized in our field for at least sixteen years (Wynne, 1991). 
These dimensions of “science,” and their versions of “the public” including
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“public interest” or “public good,” continue to beg for attention.’ (Wynne, 
2008, p. 29).
2.4 Propositional questions and ‘decisionist’ thinking
The role played by propositional questions or a ‘decisionist’ mode of analysis to 
use Wynne’s earlier formulation of the issue became the focus of intense debate 
following the publication of Collins and Evans’ The Third Wave of Science 
Studies’ in 2002, and then their book Rethinking Expertise in 2007. As was the 
case with earlier discussions, and later ones, as often as not the argument was 
about what the argument should be about, a familiar theme in STS /  SSK 
controversies in general. For Wynne and Jasanoff, Collins and Evans’ new focus 
represented, at best, a diversion from the institutional focus they regarded as the 
priority. The following three quotes give a sense of the issues, contrasting 
perspectives and confusions:
To sum up, we all tend to believe we can make internal judgements of 
expertise upward, downward and horizontally. The sociology of attribution is 
the study of the way actors negotiate the right to judge expertise; public 
legitimacy can be assigned to judgements made in any direction, and those 
judgements which do in fact gain public legitimacy gain it as an outcome of 
the interplay of power, alliance-building, and so forth. For example, in recent
66
years the folk wisdom view has given a great deal of legitimacy to upward 
judgements while reducing the potency of downward judgements. The 
normative view that we are developing here is that internal technical 
judgements, which are of good enough quality to contribute to science and 
technology policy, can be made only when they run downwards.’ (Collins 
and Evans, 2007, p. 63).
The main point of contention I have with such critics as Collins and Evans 
(2002, 2003), Kusch (2007), or partial critics such as Kerr (2004; and 
maybe Durant?), is not as they seem to assume, about the extents of “lay 
expertise.” It is more fundamentally about what they assume to be the basis 
of public divergences from scientific expert views, when these occur. These 
are not divergences of propositional knowledge-claim, or anyway, not that 
alone; but they are divergences of an ontological kind—about meanings, 
concerns, relationships and forms of life. Whereas these colleagues wish to 
reduce the public issues to knowledge and thus “expertise” or its lack, I 
want to insist upon dimensions of contested meanings, and contested 
concerns (and thus, of what is deemed relevant), and the institutional- 
scientific denial of legitimate difference here.’ (Wynne, 2008, pp. 22 -  23).
‘We can surely sustain a respect for real expertise, scientific and non- 
scientific, which remains conditional, for example upon what the issues at
stake, and the aims of knowledge are defined to be, as well as on judging 
its validity against whatever epistemic criteria are in play. Collins and Evans’ 
form of realism seems to demand unconditional surrender to dominant, 
often scientistic, frames of public meaning. This would also involve 
abandoning commitment to real practical collective exploration of better 
human relational possibilities, as woven in with our knowledges. I think it 
appropriate to maintain a tension between what we might imagine as deeply 
entrenched and maybe “inevitable” social-cultural realities of modern 
society, and what (with help from our analytical repertoire) may be worthy of 
reimagination.’ (Wynne, 2003, p. 413).
Wynne is to the point with his insistence on the dependency of argumentation on 
‘what the issues at stake’ are, on the political framing of a number of key issues, 
and the need to bring to the fore the full variety and range of public meaning 
rather than framing issues in terms of science. This is especially the case when 
considering areas in which a number of different forms of knowledge and 
expertise are brought together, when what is at stake is perhaps disagreement 
over predictions about future developments based on these different kinds of 
expertise. Such areas have been termed ‘wicked problems’ and are far from 
atypical today. Collins and Evans close off a full engagement with this set of 
issues in their characterisation of ‘Wave Two’ and ‘Wave Three’ of science 
studies. Or perhaps they provoke but don’t follow through: when Collins and
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Evans argue that Wave Two solved the problem of legitimacy and now Wave 
Three must address the problem of extension, it is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that they think Wave Two also contributed to the problem of extension in the way 
it dealt with the issue of legitimacy; Wynne and Jasanoff certainly respond 
accordingly.
However, there are a number of debates in which the view one takes on 
propositional questions, the answer one gives to them, is important for the way 
one views the wider context in which they are framed. For example, the causative 
role Of HIV in the development of AIDS (Kalichman, 2009) or the relationship 
between MMR and Autism, a debate in which Collins and Evans (2007), 
Fitzpatrick (2004) and Offit (2008) effectively demonstrate that some STS / SSK 
scholars have not exactly covered themselves in glory (for example Irwin, Jones 
and Stilgoe, 2006).
Further, to acknowledge the political framing of some debates and the 
importance of exploring public meanings does not of course give carte blanche to 
SSK writers to engage in this kind of analysis. Nor can it be taken to imply that 
public meanings are clear-cut or uncontested -  careful attention needs to be 
given to the values social science analysts bring to the table. STS and SSK make 
much play of the ways in which Government, regulatory agencies, scientists and 
scientific institutions perform publics through their actions and projections;
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attention also needs to be paid to the ways in which critical social scientists 
perform publics in pursuit of their critique of the institutional power of natural 
science. This has implications for an understanding of the way in which critical 
STS and SSK approach case studies, which, as I discuss in the next section, is 
sometimes closely related to how they handle propositional questions.
2.5 Social scientists and social hype
Charis Thompson succinctly and thoughtfully explains the organic fit between 
STS and SSK and ethnographic approaches: ‘Synthetic, a priori, and purely 
interpretative methods, for example, are all viewed suspiciously if they are not 
bolstered by empirical work. Versions of empiricism and positivism, thought of as 
not requiring any interpretation (as advocated in some natural and social science 
methodologies), are viewed as equally suspect.’ (Thompson, 2005, p. 32). 
Accordingly, while one finds much engagement with theory in STS and SSK, as 
well as periodic bouts of theoretical debate and infighting, a lot of the work and 
thinking is done through case studies.
But, as discussed above, how case studies and propositional questions should 
be approached is a contested point. More than this, distinct strands within STS 
and SSK do not always maintain a consistent approach on the issue: their 
political commitments and aspirations influence the weight given to empirical
findings on a case-by-case basis, as well as which experts are considered worthy 
of listening to. The current vogue within the natural scientific community and 
beyond for emphasising the role of evidence in policy formulation (see, e.g., 
Henderson, 2012) has created something of a dilemma for social scientists 
whose sympathies on some issues (such as environmental, anti-big pharma or 
anti-tobacco industry) are with scientists who are critical of industry. Across a 
wide range of issues today, ethical and political dimensions are often presented 
as or subsumed within detailed arguments over evidence of one kind or another 
(for an excellent study of this process see Kabat, 2008).
A mirror image difficulty for some social scientists is that they find it hard to take a 
stance on propositional questions when the question is wrapped up with an 
institutional and political issue they take a critical stance on (see, e.g., the 
discussion of options for the disposal of the Brent Spar oil platform in Collins and 
Evans, 2007). Relatedly, social scientists sometimes struggle to achieve a 
coherent approach to ethical questions that have a similar character to 
propositional questions and are also wrapped up in an institutional and political 
issue to which a critical approach is taken.
To illustrate the point, consider feminist scholar Marie Fox’s detailed discussion 
of the hybrid embryo debate (Fox, 2009). She is keen to stress from the outset 
that she is not adopting an ‘anti-science’ position:
71
‘In tracking these developments I am not adopting an “anti-science” 
position, which is how I shall argue opposition tended to be characterized. 
Rather, I aim simply to chart the emergence of characteristic patterns of 
reasoning and the success of scientific lobbies in promoting their agenda. I 
argue that in this process of valorizing science/dissenting voices were 
marginalized and as a result of these efforts the official government line 
shifted decisively in favour of the research.’ (Fox, 2009, p. 105).
In the conclusion to the article she brings it all together:
‘by downplaying the concerns of opponents of such research, space for 
dissent about these forms of research was effectively closed off and 
opponents were marginalized. To express objections entailed being 
depicted in a largely homogenous way as anti-science, probably 
influenced by irrational religious beliefs and mired in historical debates that 
had already been decisively lost. Through the deployment of a range of 
rhetorical strategies -  the promotion of faith in science and the law, the 
representation of “human admixed embryos” as effectively human, their 
creation as a small incremental step in research procedures which have a 
long and accepted lineage, and a prohibition on their gestation and birth -  
space for oppositional arguments was minimized. Moreover, the
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government’s concern to secure British pre-eminence in embryology 
research and regenerative medicine was enough to overcome its 
undoubted misgivings about the ethics and efficacy of the research.’ (Fox, 
2009, p. 119).
But surely opponents or critics of hybrid embryo research could have seen these 
strategies coming and done something about them at the time? At the very least 
they must have tried? The interesting thing is that even after the event Fox finds 
it hard to do so. Hard, that is, in writing, not hard in the rough and tumble of 
campaigning. As soon as she starts to consider the arguments made against 
hybrids, there is some awkwardness in her presentation. She notes that the 
statutory regulator, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) 
tried to massage responses and minimize the concern evident in its own 
consultation by stressing medical benefit, but she doesn’t give an account of why 
it was that the unease one encounters in such surveys was never expressed 
forcefully in public in a non-religious way. She complains that the Government 
and scientists characterized the opposition as being motivated by religious 
impulses; she then notes that the prominent voices in the media and Parliament 
arguing against hybrids did stress religious arguments, suggesting that this was 
problematic. But what was to stop someone else putting forward different 
arguments? She is uncomfortable with the arguments coming from a religious
73
perspective. But she is also uncomfortable with arguments based on species 
transgression, the ones that, to a degree, she herself draws on:
‘In consequence, oppositional voices tended to be portrayed as emanating 
from a position that was anti-science and concerned to prevent 
transgression -  whether of nature, species boundaries or appropriate 
moral limits. Intellectually such claims are hard to sustain, given the 
difficulties of defending arguments grounded in anything so vague as 
species integrity or “the natural”’. (Fox, 2009, pp. 115-6)
She then says more about why she doesn’t like arguments about species 
integrity or the natural but then quotes US Conservative bioethicist Leon Kass on 
repugnance as maybe giving some weight to an argument based on species 
integrity or the natural. For Kass, such responses signal: ‘[R]evolts against the 
excesses of human willfulness, warning us not to transgress what is unspeakably 
profound. Indeed... repugnance mat be the only voice left that speaks up to 
defend the core of our humanity’ (quoted in Fox, 2009, p. 116). She immediately 
expresses unease again with such arguments but points to something she wants 
to do: ‘While I have no desire to shore up the “central core of our humanity” 
(whatever that may mean), I do think it may be worth seeking to tease out what 
lies at the root of the unease about species-mixing.’ However, rather than doing 
the teasing out that she thinks needs doing, she then notes that Melanie Phillips
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and Lord Alton made arguments based on repugnance and taboo when they 
opposed hybrids, before, once again, complaining that these kinds of people 
advancing the argument served to associate opposition with conservative political 
and religious voices.
Not only can she not point to or explain why a non-conservative (with a small or 
large c) couldn’t make a secular voice be heard above the religious din, she 
struggles to make an argument in print herself. In the end the point seems to be 
that there is popular unease and that this was suppressed, in part by associating 
it with religious views. In so far as she makes a different argument it is the one 
about breaking down species barriers or more particularly that interspecies 
entities would introduce moral confusion into our existing relationships with non­
human animals and into our relationships with the entities themselves (citing 
Scott and Baylis, Grossing Species Boundaries, 2003). But of course by this point 
in the presentation she has already explained why she doesn’t really like such 
arguments.
A common resolution of the tensions caused by handling propositional questions 
or propositional-like questions contained within an institutional and political issue 
a theorist is critical of is to contextualise or reinterpret the significance of the 
propositional question by linking it with other issues or engaging in forms of 
‘slippery slope’ reasoning. Ironically, these forms of social hype argumentation
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can often be found in writings that are critical of the promissory discourse of 
natural scientists.
To maintain the focus on issues relating to embryology while illustrating this, 
consider the arguments of feminist scholar and writer Donna Dickenson. For 
Dickenson, stem cell research in general is hype ridden; ‘the promissory 
technology par excellence'. But her commentary on the meanings and implication 
of the way the science is pursued, supported and constructed, is itself a form of 
hype:
‘It’s been said that stem cell research encourages a view of the natural 
world as an artefact: “to see the entire natural world, the human body 
along with it, as having the status only of material to be manipulated”. By 
creating immortal stem cell lines touted as having the potential to reverse 
degradation and decay, we may even see ourselves as remoulding the 
biological universe. Government science policies have long tended to 
“privilege the promissory”, and stem cell research technology is the 
promissory technology par excellence.' (Dickenson, 2009, p. 71).
Or consider Sarah Parry’s reflections on the hybrid embryo debate in particular.
In their introduction to Nature After the Genome, editors Parry and Dupre argue: 
‘In public arenas, much of genomics research is couched in promissory terms -
as a future means to revolutionize medicine, agriculture, ecology and 
conservation... no doubt most eagerly anticipated are the cures for intractable 
diseases in humans, constantly advertised as lying just around the corner but 
frustratingly failing to manifest themselves as practical therapies.’ (Parry and 
Dupre, 2010, p. 4). This is a reasonable implicit criticism. But how different is this 
kind of natural science promissory discourse from the social hype discourse that 
Parry engages in later in the same collection (the entities under consideration in 
this case, lest we forget, are very early stage embryos)?:
‘much of the humanist agenda (see Twine, this volume) has involved 
separating, essentializing and bounding categories of human and non­
human animals, and is marked by discourses of human exceptionalism 
that have all too often served to legitimate certain forms of oppression and 
exploitation of non-human animals... The creation of interspecies entities 
for stem cell research involves an unprecedented yet unequal involvement 
between human and non-human animals. In the very creation of these 
novel entities, decisions are being made about who lives and who dies.’ 
(Parry, 2010, p. 115-119).
Similar patterns of reasoning and similar patterns of social hype can be found in 
some social science literature on human tissue research. I discuss this in chapter
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five. Through chapters four to seven I discuss the contribution of this kind of 
critique to contemporary governance.
2.6 Reflexivity and institutional analysis
In Misunderstanding Science? Irwin and Wynne challenged the way they believe 
‘the public’ has been constructed:
‘A “the public is usually implied to be an aggregate of atomised individuals 
with no social composition, hence no legitimate autonomous cultural 
substance;...
C it is assumed that the actor’s basic values are identical with those of 
science -  for example, that she is concerned to maximise control, rather 
than perhaps to negotiate and adapt to actors and forces recognised to be 
beyond such control or which should be beyond such control. Hence, the 
epistemological commitments which frame science, namely instrumental 
control, are assumed -  wrongly -  to be the automatic norm defining all 
valid knowledge;
D lay people are assumed to desire and expect certainty, and risk-free 
environments, so that their lack of enthusiasm for science can then be 
attributed to their alleged inability to face up to science’s “grown-up” 
recognition that risk and uncertainty are intrinsic to everything. Yet our
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research reinforces previous work in showing no such naivete on the part 
of the public; indeed it shows the central kind of risk being faced as that of 
dependency upon increasingly expert-imbued social institutions, the basis 
for trust in which is obscure’. (Irwin and Wynne, 1996a, p. 215)
They went on to argue that:
‘It is an important finding from our research that, since public experiences 
of science can never be detached from imputed institutional interests and 
agendas of whatever kind, the manifest lack of reflexivity on the part of 
science in public only amplifies any existing tendency for public groups to 
mistrust it.
It follows from our argument in this book that “useful” scientific 
knowledge needs to be reflexive and self-aware rather than dismissive of 
such social and epistemological concerns as irrelevant and “soft”. If 
science is to work with rather than against public groups (or simply be 
ignored by them), then “usefulness” and “self-reflexivity” must form part of 
the same social and institutional processes. What is meant by science in 
given cases must be more open to structured reflection and negotiation, 
with particular attention to the conditions of validity of the relevant 
knowledges.’ (Irwin and Wynne, 1996a, pp. 215-216)
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In his own chapter in the collection, focusing on the Cumbrian sheep farmers, 
‘Misunderstood misunderstandings’ Wynne took these observations a step 
further, seemingly suggesting that those in a position of power find it hard to be 
reflexive:
‘it is interesting that those who would be regarded as the representatives 
of traditional society showed this reflexive capability, whilst the 
representatives of enlightened modernity, namely the scientists, did not 
(Wynne 1993; Michael 1992). The scientists show no overt ability to reflect 
upon their own social positioning, that is upon the latent social models 
which their scientific interventions imposed on the farmers. Perhaps the 
distribution of reflexive capability (or impulse) is itself a contingent function 
of social relations of power.’ (Wynne, 1996a, p. 43).
An argument he also seemingly made in the cri de coeur at the end of his 2006 
paper ‘Hitting the Notes...’: ‘Scientific institutional actors and the policy officials 
they advise seem unable to recognize these basic points, as the epistemic 
culture of instrumentalism and control which defines modern scientific knowledge 
has been allowed to pervade and latterly to define public science-policy 
institutional culture.’ (Wynne, 2006, p. 220).
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Wynne’s apparent position on this question has been subject to a specific and 
detailed critique by Darrin Durant (Durant, 2008). Durant focuses on what he 
deduces to be Wynne’s key interest and mistake, ‘the desire to preserve the 
autonomy of the lay actor in the face of hegemonic control of meanings by 
experts.’ (Durant, 2008, p. 5). Wynne rejected this analysis in a response 
(Wynne, 2008), pointing instead to his focus on institutional values and 
commitments rather than any analysis of the inherent reflexivity or autonomy of 
particular actors. But if the above quotes are not to be taken in the way Durant 
takes them, should they instead be taken as rhetorical flourishes on Wynne’s part 
serving a political goal? Or as indicating the absence of coherent institutional 
analysis, or perhaps a cultural theory of institutional character and role is implicit 
but not developed? My own assessment is that Wynne’s focus on the lack of 
reflexivity of the institutionally powerful and his apparent championing of the 
reflexivity of lay actors is a part of his theoretical approach, but only a part. As 
discussed in 2.1 above, critical STS and SSK will often champion lay involvement 
and lay meaning or appear to do so as a part of its challenge to dominant 
framings and the power of institutional natural science. But in principle or at root 
critical STS and SSK is not intrinsically committed to favouring what are 
commonly called lay meanings over and above expert ones. Nevertheless,
Durant is right to point to the analytical tension that arises in political and policy 
contexts, for in these contexts the emphasis is often very much on challenging 
natural scientists’ framing of debates through championing lay involvement. And
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in frustration at a failure or a perceived failure to shift dominant framings, claims 
have been and are made about institutional power and reflexivity.
2.7 Natural scientists as fellow researchers -  a lack of empathy
Wynne, like Jasanoff, has clearly stated that his primary focus and concern is 
natural science as public authority rather than natural science as a research 
activity:
‘It is worth also noting that Durant’s otherwise excellent discussion and 
connection of the reflexivity debate in science studies between for example 
Bloor and Lynch (and more recently, between Bloor and Latour), with mine 
in the public encounters with science domain, nevertheless falls foul of just 
that lack of problematization I opened with, about what we mean by 
“science” in such domains. The definitive science studies exchanges on this 
have always been focused on science as research and specialist 
knowledge-production activities, whereas mine have always been about a 
very different “science,” namely that being deployed as attempted public 
authority.’ (Wynne, 2008, pp. 23-24).
This is no doubt true, but from the perspective of natural scientists it might not be 
such an important distinction. Natural science is a continuum of activity, just as in
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its own way social science is. Among other things findings open up and legitimise 
future research activities, and in turn those research activities lead to findings. It 
is an ongoing process and it is not a simple task to focus attention simply on 
science as public authority. Indeed, critical social scientists recognised the 
connection between natural science as a research activity and natural science as 
public authority when, concerned that society was being presented with a series 
of faits accomplis, they made the turn to ‘Upstream Engagement’ in an explicit 
attempt to shape the research agenda by injecting different values into the 
process. Put another, and more concrete way, challenging science as public 
authority is reasonably taken by natural scientists to have consequences for 
science as a research activity. Was the digging up of GM crops by activists in the 
UK a challenge to science as public authority or the sabotage of a research 
programme (the crops were planted as a part of a trial to test certain issues)?
Whether the challenge is made to science as a source of public authority or 
whether attention is paid to research practice, an influential strand in STS & SSK 
sees natural science as the object to be critiqued more than it sees natural 
scientists as fellow researchers struggling to develop knowledge. There is, in 
short, a lack of empathy and understanding. This runs through into the very 
framing of some social science analysis and the way in which categories are 
developed and deployed.
For example, Nicola Marks, writing about stem cell scientists, uses Gieryn’s 
famous paper on ‘boundary work’ in a suggestive fashion: ‘some researchers 
who work on AS [Adult Stem] cells refuse to argue that a high differentiation 
potential for these cells is enough to stop work on ES [Embryonic Stem] cells, 
instead pushing for research on all cells. This line of argument is often taken to 
“protect the autonomy” of science (Gieryn, 1983:789-91) and exclude ethical 
reasons from becoming relevant to the choice of future research directions.’ 
(Marks, 2010, p. 43). There is something of the ‘when did you last beat your 
wife?’ about this line of characterisation. Most natural scientists involved in the 
area don’t see much of an, or any ethical problem with working on any kind of 
cell. As far as they are concerned there aren’t many serious ethical issues. And 
they really do think that pursuing research on different kinds of cells at the same 
time is the best way to advance knowledge. They are not ‘excluding’ anybody 
else from making a different argument.
More generally, one of the issues discussed in the exchanges between Collins 
and Evans on the one side and Wynne and Jasanoff on the other, was the role 
and importance of tacit knowledge. For Collins and Evans the tacit knowledge 
gained through immersion in a community of researchers is essential to proper 
work in the field, and is an important platform from which to consider the wider 
significance of findings. This could be extended to saying that researchers, 
through their practical and day-to-day immersion, have an important insight into
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how ethical issues play out in practice and into how governance works, if for no 
other reason than that they have been brought face-to-face with the issues on a 
daily basis.
Of course we should be wise to the perspectives professionals might bring to 
issues and to the possibility of special pleading, but such suspicion shouldn’t be 
the default position. It shouldn’t, but to an extent it is for some social science 
critics. Consider again Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and Tutton’s paper (2007), 
which discusses a number of debates they had both taken part in and studied:
The main speakers at the conference, who had academic backgrounds, 
also conveyed their expertise through a combination of esoteric language 
and identification as a particular type of expert, often in contrast to another 
type of expert (e.g. “I am a sociologist, not a scientist”). They also appealed, 
on many occasions, to dialogue and partnership. For example, at the 
beginning of [medical geneticist] David Porteous’s final speech he 
commented: “... the first thing I will say is how useful I think this meeting 
has been and how fortunate, I think, I have been to be able to sit here and 
listen to all of the comments. I hope this doesn’t sound anything other than 
a measure of that, but I haven’t heard anything fundamentally different from 
what I’ve heard from other such meetings that we’ve had in the past, and 
from things that we’ve thought about. So, I’m relieved in the sense that all of
the complexities are there, and they all need to be worked through, but I 
haven’t found one yet that really throws a major spanner in the works ...” 
Here, the boundary between his technical and ethical knowledge 
became blurred, but he nevertheless maintained his expert position through 
his oversight role; a role based on what he presented as a detached 
appraisal of the discussions in which the other participants engaged. When 
he implied that the core set of scientists involved had already anticipated 
the ethical issues raised at the conference and were on the way to working 
them out, he presented the conference itself as secondary to the research. 
This seemed to imply that ethical understanding follows from a more 
privileged form of technical understanding, further underlining David 
Porteous’ and his Generation Scotland colleagues’ expertise while 
maintaining their commitment to public involvement and dialogue more 
generally. Indeed, such distinctions are already somewhat blurred in the 
multi-disciplinary context of the Generation Scotland endeavour.’ (Kerr, 
Cunningham-Burley and Tutton, 2007, pp. 404 -  405).
The authors are engaged in various rhetorical strategies themselves. They also 
say some things that are at face value problematic. The boundary between 
Porteous’ technical and ethical knowledge does not seem blurred at all in the 
statement he gave. Nor does he appear to claim that he or other scientists have 
‘anticipated’ the ethical issues raised at the conference. Rather, he says that he
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has come across the issues in other settings and thought about them. Nor is it 
clear that he is implying that ethical understanding follows from a more privileged 
form of technical understanding. The lack of empathy and the intellectual biases 
to which it gives rise serve to reinforce Robin Williams’ warning about the role 
that STS and SSK may be coming to play:
The arguments that STS researchers deploy have consequences for 
different groups—proponents and opponents, scientists and lay publics, 
industry and policymakers. STS started with a generic commitment to 
challenging the exclusive role of technical specialists in science and 
technology policy—and sought to provide a critical account of the powerful 
industry and state actors that lay behind yesterday’s high technology 
futures. But these historical analytical and political stances may no longer 
be an adequate guide to the role STS is coming to play in the more complex 
and dynamic world of today. In the current climate STS may need to give a 
more balanced attention to the promotion and control of technology, to 
addressing its benefits as well as its risks, to considering the full range of 
diverse interests and public pressure groups favouring as well as opposing 
new technological and medical developments and even perhaps addressing 
the experiences of scientists and engineers, who may not recognize 
themselves, their imputed authority and goals in some of the more 
demonized accounts emerging of the field.’ (Wiliams, 2006, p. 342).
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2.8 Wynnian SSK’s unreflexivity
Sheila Jasanoff, in the quote at the start of this chapter, recognised that SSK 
might be asked to account for its own role. But Williams’ appeal to STS and SSK 
to do just this; more, to reflect on its own role, has not found a receptive audience 
in the political, institutionally-focused and activist wing of STS and SSK of which 
Jasanoff is a prominent member. Whether it be in response to Collins and Evans 
or in assessments of Government policy in ‘Hitting the Notes...’, the Wynnian 
strand of SSK remains fixed on pursuing the critique of both science as public 
authority and the institutional values of science. It does this in part because it is 
committed to creating a different politics and culture around science, a different 
world even. Joyce Tait, who has studied and observed Wynne and others in 
action over the years, remarks on the agenda-driven character of their work:
‘If you look at these cases such as BSE, as being what influenced people 
to turn against GM crops, the first time I saw that written down was as a 
question that was raised by Wynne’s group when he was running a focus 
group with members of the public in a project funded by Unilever. I’ve no 
way of knowing whether the public raised that issue spontaneously or 
whether it was suggested. That’s the problem with focus groups: they’re 
very, very open to manipulation by people who’ve got strong opinions
themselves and are using that opportunity to frame the whole issue in the 
public mind. That really doesn’t get challenged very much. I’m not saying 
you shouldn’t do focus groups, but have that in mind, that it’s a very 
powerful way of framing a new technology in the public mind, especially as 
these focus groups often get an inordinate amount of publicity in the press, 
far more than their validity should suggest. It’s just one small group of 
people in a room that you don’t get to hear -  it is recorded but we don’t get 
to hear it...
... They get reinforcement from the academic system. Their 
approach is seen as academically good social science, so they are 
reinforced and supported in that way. They’re challenging policy and 
politics. They’re not challenging the public because they’re manipulating 
the public I think. They’re challenging industry, but they want to do that 
anyway, and they’re not challenging their paymasters in the social science 
funding council. So there are several wins in it for that kind of approach. I 
think Brian Wynne’s resignation letter [from the Food Standards Agency’s 
Public Dialogue Steering Committee] gives his perspective on what he 
was trying to achieve through that particular committee: he was trying to 
achieve a change in the political system rather than just discuss GM 
crops.’ (Interview, Tait, May 2011).
There is nothing wrong with wanting to change the culture around science or 
having broader political and cultural ambitions. Many people have such aims and 
aspirations to one degree or another (in varying directions of course). But the 
methods by which aims are pursued have consequences for analysis. Oddly, for 
a strand of analysis that puts such emphasis on reflexivity and the need for 
reflexivity in those lacking in it, there is something deeply unreflexive about the 
thinking of the Wynnian strand of SSK. It finds it hard to put itself in the picture, to 
consider its own influence, to consider the way in which it brings or attempts to 
bring meanings and interpretations to bear on debates and processes:
‘Since it appears to be so creatively resistant to simple empirical 
contradiction, it has to be seen as reflecting a deep institutional-cultural 
need rather than a deliberate deception... it has been cumulatively 
entrenched over decades and energized by profoundly emotive feelings 
and insecurities about power and authority... A key feature of this 
entrenched and, to its practitioners, unseeable culture is the way it 
unwittingly performs its other, namely its publics... until a social agent, 
collective or individual, is able to place their own “self into the frame of 
questioning in interaction with others, it will not be in a position to 
genuinely hear those others, because it is instead determinedly if 
inadvertently imposing its own projections of the imagined other into the 
inauthentic “listening” relationship.’ (Wynne, 2006, pp. 217-219).
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Wynne is of course talking about scientists and Government. But many of the 
same points could be applied to him and some other politically oriented SSK 
scholars. However, Wynnian SSK has a big point to make in response: it is the 
institutionally powerful who need to be challenged and who need to change. 
Wynne and others think it is scientists and government that must adapt. Scholars 
with this perspective genuinely believe theirs is the most important agenda, one 
that is as yet largely unfulfilled. They continue to see themselves as underdogs. 
Despite their success in influencing some discussions, they believe that in terms 
of substantive governance, little has changed.
2.9 STS, SSK and the ‘Science Wars’
In the quote from Jasanoff with which I began this chapter, she observed that ‘the 
recent surge of concern about the “anti-science” tendencies of science studies 
offers a useful reminder that our field cannot stand detached and apart from 
debates about the allocation of power and resources to the very institution whose 
external relations and internal dynamics we seek to illuminate.’ She was referring 
to what has been called the ‘Science Wars’, and the way in which some if not 
many natural scientists regard STS and SSK. The Science Wars began around 
1994 in the United States when the tensions long evident between many natural 
scientists and some philosophers on the one side, and some exponents of STS
and SSK on the other, erupted into the open. In that year molecular biologist Paul 
Gross and mathematician Norman Levitt launched a full-frontal attack on STS in 
their provocative book Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarreis 
with Science. The attempt by STS writer Andrew Ross to mount a counter-attack 
in 1996 backfired spectacularly when a special issue of the journal he edited, 
Social Text, became a Trojan horse for the natural scientists’ camp. Tucked away 
at the end of a collection of essays designed to show-off the breadth of STS 
thinking was a paper by New York physicist Alan Sokal: Transgressing the 
Boundaries: towards a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity’. Upon 
publication, Sokal exposed it as a hoax, and a media furore ensued. Sokal 
quickly teamed up with an old friend and fellow physicist, Jean Bricmont, to pen 
Intellectual Impostures. They challenged postmodernist writers on two counts: for 
their meaningless use of scientific analogy and terminology, designed to lend a 
false air of profundity to their theories; and for their relativist epistemology, which 
leads them to view science as just another human convention, or even myth.
In the UK a minor version of the ‘War’ erupted around the same time, one of the 
skirmishes being around the book Misunderstanding Science?, following a very 
dismissive review of it by UK scientist Lewis Wolpert. In the years that followed 
writers on both sides of the Atlantic attempted to reflect on what the key points 
were. The heat has gone out of the issue to some degree, but at the same time 
each side has failed to see much light in the others’ arguments. Philosopher
Susan Haack, in Defending Science -  within reason, and elsewhere, regards 
SSK as self-defeating (relativism undermines the claims of its proponents as well 
as the scientists they study) and little short of crazy at times. At best it is just 
cynical -  we’ve moved, she believes, from Old Deferentialism to the New 
Cynicism. The craziness angle is the central theme of John Zammito’s A Nice 
Derangement of Epistemes, which takes us on a tour of philosophy of science 
from Quine through Latour to STS and SSK. The derangement as he sees it is 
radical reflexivity, digging away at the foundations of knowledge until the house 
falls down. It is all, according to Zammito, ‘an instructive reduction ad absurdum... 
The denouement was pure farce: the Sokal affair.’ (Zammito, 2004, pp. 232,
234).
The analyses by Haack and Zammito hit home in many regards against some 
post-modern and social science assertions to have definitively undermined 
natural science’s claim to some truth content. Natural scientists can point to the 
cumulative character of the findings of their disciplines, the ability of more recent 
theories and findings to explain both the positive findings and to resolve the 
difficulties thrown up by previous theories. But the analyses by philosophers such 
as Haack and historians such as Zammito miss the mark in as much as they take 
the issues raised by the Sokal affair to be the defining issues for the debate, or 
for characterising STS and SSK. The more political and institutional issues, 
including the reflexive methodology used to understand the issues that are of
central concern to many STS and SSK scholars, and that are indeed at the 
centre of many debates within society today whether understood using the 
categories of STS and SSK or not, represent a distinct, if at times, but only at 
times, connected set of issues. It is these social and political and issues that I am 
concerned with and that I focus on through this thesis, as I analyse the 
relationships between STS /  SSK, governance and natural science research.
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Chapter Three: The Changing Governance of Science?
In this chapter I look at some aspects of natural science governance that defined 
the social contract for science after the Second World War. I then focus on some 
aspects of natural scientists’ perceptions of the changes that have taken place in 
the more recent period and how they have tried to influence and manage change. 
This discussion includes some preliminary observations on the ways in which the 
interaction of new and old approaches to governance has combined to shape 
contemporary governance. In developing this analysis I draw on aspects of STS, 
SSK and social science theory as a means to explore governance. Beyond SSK, 
a novel reading and combination of Erving Goffman and (more critically) John 
Rawls is used to interrogate the performative work of natural scientists who were 
drawn into public engagement and deliberative exercises during the New Labour 
years.
Towards the end of the chapter I begin to return to the discussion of critical STS 
and SSK by contrasting that analysis with the analysis of some academic social 
scientists sympathetic to the concerns of natural scientists. The chapter as a 
whole and the final sections in particular lays the basis for the following chapter, 
which discusses theories of governance more formally and introduces the two 
case studies.
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3.1 Key moments in post-war research governance
Siddhartha Mukherjee’s The Emperor of all Maladies: A Biography of Cancer 
richly deserves the critical praise it has garnered. Beautifully and delicately 
written, but also bold in some of its characterisations, it is, as one reviewer put it, 
‘that rarest of things -  a noble book’. Mukherjee truly rises to the challenge of 
providing us with a history the subject matters deserves. His is a story of, as he 
puts it, ‘inventiveness, resilience, and perseverance’, that is at the same time a 
story of ‘hubris, arrogance, paternalism, misperception, false hope, and hype, all 
leveraged against an illness that was just three decades ago widely touted as 
being “curable” within a few years.’ (Mukherjee, 2011, p. 7)
While stretching from the Ancient Greeks to the present, concluding on the 
cautiously hopeful theme of ‘The Fruits of Long Endeavors’, in many ways the 
core of the book is the story of the rise and fall of the ‘The War on Cancer’. And 
without it being an explicit theme, Mukherjee’s whole book and this central core 
in particular draws our attention to changes in the governance of science. Among 
other issues there is the complexity of interactions between goal driven projects 
and basic research; political and bureaucratic goals clashing with those of 
science; the rise of public advocates and patient activism; and rising concern 
about experimental trials on human subjects and scientists’ access to patient 
data without consent.
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Very quickly, the ‘War’ that President Nixon declared on cancer started to fall 
apart: Theories were shattered; drug discoveries stagnated; trials languished; 
and academic meetings degenerated into all-out brawls... The War on Cancer 
seemed, at times, to have devolved into a war within cancer.’ (Mukherjee, 2011, 
p. 193). While some useful knowledge emerged from it, and while one could try to 
argue that the, broadly speaking, failure of The War on Cancer provided some 
lessons, it was also the case that many scientists were sceptical, hostile indeed, 
about it from the beginning.
James Watson, co-discoverer of the structure of DNA thought it was premature, 
bound to lead to a waste of huge amounts of money on mediocre science.
Cancer scientist Sol Spiegelman compared it to launching the Apollo programme 
without knowing Newton’s laws of gravity. Spiegelman’s comparison was a 
response to the fact that the Apollo programme was the direct inspiration and the 
model as far as The War on Cancer’s advocates were concerned. But it wasn’t 
the only model. The other major historical comparison used in aid of the War on 
Cancer was the Manhattan Project to build an atomic bomb during World War 
Two. For Spiegelman and others however, this comparison merely brought out 
how President Nixon and the supporters of the War on Cancer were changing the 
governance of science.
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I began this thesis with Robert Oppenheimer, ‘father’ of the atomic bomb, and 
Vannevar Bush, head of the US Office of Scientific Research and Development 
during World War Two. Oppenheimer argued that 'it is not possible to be a 
scientist unless you believe that knowledge of the world, and the power which 
this gives, is a thing which is of intrinsic value to humanity', while Bush, in his 
famous report Science, The Endless Frontier, envisaged endless benefits to 
American society from scientific advance.
As I went on to discuss, society today has a more ambivalent attitude towards 
scientific advance. Beginning in the late 1960s, society has also come to reject or 
at least question the approach to science governance advocated by 
Oppenheimer and Bush. The War on Cancer was one clear and stark example of 
this. Mukherjee captures some of the dimensions of this well:
‘As Bush perceived it, even the widely lauded Manhattan Project 
epitomized the virtues of basic inquiry. True, the bomb was the product of 
Yankee “mechanical ingenuity.” But that mechanical ingenuity stood on 
the shoulders of scientific discoveries about the fundamental nature of the 
atom and the energy locked inside it -  research performed, notably, with 
no driving mandate to produce anything resembling the atomic bomb... So 
Bush had pushed for a radically inverted model of scientific development,
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in which researchers were allowed full autonomy over their explorations 
and open-ended inquiry was prioritized...
... The plan had a deep and lasting influence in Washington. The 
National Science Foundation (NSF), founded in 1950, was explicitly 
created to encourage scientific autonomy.’ (Mukherjee, 2011, p. 121).
It was just this autonomy and the model of governance of which it was a part that 
Nixon challenged, and that others have challenged in different ways ever since.
Of course it would be naive to take claims about autonomy and pure 
disinterested research at face value, or at the very least to interpret them simply. 
There has always been a social contract for science; the issue is shifting 
emphasis within the governance of science rather than the imposition of an 
entirely novel system of control. But nevertheless, the historical shifts that 
Mukherjee highlights are real and important. STS scholar Mark B. Brown puts it 
like this in considering the social contract for science in the United States post- 
World War Two, what has changed, and how it would be very hard to undo the 
changes:
The government provided money, with no strings attached, and science 
produced knowledge, technology, and medicine. The social contract was 
always a fragile construction, and the separation between science and
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politics was never as complete as nostalgic critics of politicized science 
now claim... Nevertheless, until at least the early 1980s, two basic 
premises governed U.S. science policy: the scientific community is 
capable of regulating itself; and if it is allowed to regulate itself, science will 
produce technological benefits for society. Although the social contract for 
science continues to dominate popular views of science, it is being 
challenged by the politicization of science policy, science advice, and 
scientific research itself...
... Whether their chosen culprit is postmodern constructivism or the 
Bush administration, critics of politicized science usually call for restoring a 
presumed Golden Age of “the pure virtue of the pursuit of knowledge.” 
Such efforts ignore the enormous social forces contributing to the 
politicization of science, which make it both impossible and irresponsible 
for scientists to isolate themselves from politics/ (Brown, 2009, pp. 9-17).
Charis Thompson, another STS scholar we met in chapter two, also agrees with 
the standard characterisation of the Post War social contract: The idea that 
scientific research should be autonomous has deep roots in post-war U.S. culture 
and lay behind the ultimately victorious Program for Postwar Scientific Research 
developed by Vannevar Bush/ (Thompson, 2005, p. 223). But she also 
introduces some caveats and nuances, including the need to take account of the 
rise to prominence of biology over physics when considering change:
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‘twentieth-century physics and twenty-first century biology are very 
different sciences in terms of how (and how directly) they implicate 
citizens, influence (and are influenced by) statecraft, and produce 
knowledge... The physical sciences and their objects (like elementary 
particles) are tremendously needy, especially of real estate, computing 
power, and the formalities of and probabilities of advanced mathematics. 
But these are very different demands and rights than those asked for by 
and owed to the organic objects of biomedical and life science. In 
biomedicine, people, their personal and collective identities, their bodies 
and their body parts are materially and custodially involved and implicated 
in the science. The autonomy of science continues to be an ideal that 
informs research protocols and professional organizations, but it does not 
spell out the relations between biomedical sciences and the government 
or the public.’ (Thompson, 2005, pp. 245-266).
Analysing and characterising changing governance implicitly and explicitly relies 
upon characterising governance itself and developing causal explanations of 
change. How important are the nuances regarding the post war governance 
framework? Is Thompson right to suggest that the shift from physics to biology is 
important? Is she also putting this forward as a causal explanation of change; if 
she is, what does Mukherjee’s history of cancer research governance tell us
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about this issue by way of a counter-history? Delving into these three issues -  
governance, change and causality -  can be attempted over longer and shorter 
time frames, it can be attempted in broad outline and in detail, and it can be 
pursued across one or several specific domains.
On account of the huge growth in state funding for science perhaps, on account 
also of the development of explicit ideas about science governance in this period, 
and, as Mukherjee, Brown and Thompson illustrate in different ways, on account 
of the fact that many natural science researchers look back (with rose tinted 
glasses or otherwise) on the comparative advantages of the post war social 
contract, contemporary changes in natural science research governance are 
commonly situated in a historical time frame stretching from the Second World 
War to the present. This often serves as a longer period in which to contextualise 
changes over shorter time frames, typically the late ‘60s to the present, and the 
late ‘80s /  early ‘90s to the present.
That natural science research governance in the UK and elsewhere has changed 
since the late 1980s, and that this in turn is in part a development of changes that 
began in the 1970s and 1980s, is widely agreed upon in some quarters. Within 
some parts of the natural science community in particular there is a widespread 
sense that not only has there been change but that some, or much of, that 
change is problematic for research activity. The issue for researchers is not just
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specific pieces of legislation, but the whole context for research activity. To begin 
to develop the analysis, in the next few sections I shift focus to this end of the 
spectrum: from the longer time frame and the broad picture to a more recent 
period, focusing on governance and the approach of scientists to this.
3.2 Debating and disagreeing about governance
The differences in analysis between critical STS and SSK on the one hand and 
many natural scientists and others that I discuss in this chapter on the other 
reflect to some extent different starting points: how the nature and merits of 
governance at the beginning of the period discussed in this thesis are viewed.
The differences in analysis also reflect the ambitions for and the desired direction 
of change in governance: Andy Stirling’s comment about social appraisal, that ‘of 
course social appraisal is also reflexively coconstituted -  and its outcomes 
conditioned -  by preexisting and encompassing commitments’ (Stirling, 2008, p. 
266), applies to SSK scholars’ theoretical and practical work just as it does to 
natural scientists’, Government’s and others’. And in part differences in analysis 
may also have been influenced by the fact that some STS / SSK writers have 
been drawn into a relationship with Government and natural scientists which they 
may not feel entirely or even at all comfortable with, for political as well as 
academic reasons. At the very least this latter point may have some bearing on 
the at times over-heated character of the debate.
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A particular issue within this debate and disagreement between critical STS /  
SSK scholars and others is contrasting perspectives on how particular themes 
relating to governance have been developed, have been used and have guided 
the work of regulatory and Government agencies. Perhaps some critics of 
previous governance regimes under-estimate change because regulators and 
Government have taken ideas and approaches developed by social scientists, 
and have been influenced by these approaches, in directions that disappoint or 
frustrate those social scientists. From other perspectives, such as those of 
natural science researchers, in some contexts the changes are, nevertheless, 
significant, in a direction that doesn’t always accord with what researchers want, 
and certainly not within a governance framework that contains a notion of the 
‘freedom of research’. Researchers in the areas covered by this thesis, human 
tissue and human embryology, acknowledge that Government was formally and 
subjectively in favour of science in general and sometimes in particular. At the 
same time they pointed to a whole range of legislative, regulatory and policy 
initiatives that display little knowledge of the realities of research practice, that 
cumulatively add up to a new and problematic pattern of governance and that 
often contain perspectives that scientists regard with suspicion if not hostility.
In assessing the role of ideas associated with STS /  SSK theorists in governance 
the important point to look at is what the ideas ‘do’ when they become a part of
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debate and a part of processes. One issue I examine through the case studies is 
how the ideas have in practice contributed, perversely perhaps for some of those 
most committed to them, to channelling and closing down debate, and to 
reinforcing untoward trends in research governance (untoward from some 
perspectives), such as centralisation, a premature demand for ‘relevance’ and 
bureaucratic management of specialist and professional activity.
So while Andy Stirling argues that ‘although instrumental imperatives may as 
readily be pursued by marginalised groups as incumbent interests, it is by 
definition the latter that exercise the predominant influence on technology choice’ 
(Stirling, 2008, pp. 269-270), it does not follow from this that campaigning groups 
(and STS /  SSK scholars, if he suggesting a marginalised role for them) have no 
influence. Further, and more importantly, it does not follow that what he calls 
incumbent interests are all pulling in the same direction. In particular we need to 
consider the way in which Government and regulatory agencies are using some 
of the themes associated with new approaches to governance in their own ways. 
To open up a discussion of these issues in the next two sections I begin by 
unpacking, somewhat descriptively, relations within the ‘incumbent interests’ 
about which Stirling writes.
3.3 Simply the best?
Science Minister Ian Pearson, in a speech given in 2007, outlined areas where 
he thought things had gone relatively well from the Government’s perspective, 
and areas where he thought they had gone less well. In the former category he 
included human embryo and stem cell research:
To date we have a chequered record on engagement. Difficult issues like 
nuclear energy and genetic modification have not been handled well. But 
there have also been successes - our approach to engaging the public in 
the development of stem cell research in the UK has allowed this country 
to lead the world. The dialogue on nanoscience has generally been 
positive. We have all learned lessons. Public engagement is becoming 
recognised as a valuable part of policy-making. Indeed, one of Gordon 
Brown's first acts as our new Prime Minister was to encourage the use of 
citizens'juries.’ (Pearson, 2007).
It is not clear from the above quote just what made engagement around stem cell 
research a success from the Government’s perspective, but it is clear that they 
do regard the governance of stem cell research and embryology more generally 
as a success story. And it is not just politicians that make this case. The regulator 
makes the same point. Ruth Deech, former Chair of the HFEA, argues that:
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From this period [2001] the UK has led the world in both advancing and 
monitoring stem cell research. The basis on which it does so is that 
established by the HFEA in 1991 for the regulation of IVF and embryo 
storage. (Deech and Smajdor, 2007, p. 28).
In public announcements prominent scientists will also typically praise the UK 
system of governance: President of the Royal Society, Martin Rees, for example, 
did so during his 2010 Reith Lectures. What is more, scientists are widely seen to 
have played a role in developing the governance framework. Some 
commentators go further, suggesting that scientists anticipated and welcomed it. 
In an article on the award of the 2010 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine to 
IVF pioneer Robert Edwards, Nature's Alison Abbott concluded by claiming that 
Edwards ‘was equally prescient on the need for oversight of his powerful 
technique, advocating in 1971 that a legal authority should be established to 
control IVF. The UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [HFEA] was 
founded 20 years later.’ (Abbot, 2010).
This presentation of a public consensus between Government, regulator and 
scientists, about the present and the past, bears some critical scrutiny. In reality, 
some of the key claims are vigorously contested, and the ‘incumbent interests’ 
are far from united. Consider first Pearson’s and Deech’s bold claim that the UK 
leads the world in this area of research on account of its approach to 
governance.
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During the joint House of Commons and House of Lords Scrutiny Committee 
discussions in 2007 of the Bill that would in time be modified to become the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 2008, Committee member (Lord) 
Professor Winston challenged the Government view: ‘America has an 
unregulated scientific community and yet it is producing by far the most effective 
and most published and most respected papers in stem cell biology in the world, 
even though of course it has a President [George Bush Jnr, at the time] who is 
set against it.’ (Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, 
2007, p. 66). Others concur with his assessment on the relationship between the 
UK system and innovation. Researcher Austin Smith is very forthright:
‘I can’t see any credible basis for claiming that the UK is in any kind of 
leading position in human embryo research in terms of the science... in 
practical terms it’s not easy to do in the UK, and we’ve lost out because of 
that actually compared with other countries... It’s not even just the private 
sector in the US, it’s just non-NIH funded, so there’s Howard Hughes and 
JDRF and many others. There are other European countries like Belgium 
and Sweden where they have good quality IVF clinics with a reasonable 
level of research going on. In the UK it really hasn’t happened. That may 
be to do with broader issues than the regulatory framework. It may be to 
do with the way that IVF is funded in this country and the separation of
clinical treatment from research, which is an issue throughout the NHS.
But the idea of the HFEA having a role in the UK supposedly leading the 
world in stem cell research is farcical... the HFEA reasonably enough 
wants to bang its own drum and politicians like to have something to bang 
their drum about. They still seem to be obsessed by the idea that 
somehow we’re ahead of the US because of the Federal ban on funding. 
Any idiot could just look at the amount of funding from other sources going 
into this area in the US, the number of researchers, any metric you want to 
use -  it’s clear.’ (Interview, Smith, July 2008).
Implicit if not explicit within the arguments of Winston and Smith is a very critical 
assessment of UK regulation and governance. They are not alone in taking such 
a critical stance, and nor is such criticism a recent thing. Indeed, contrary to 
Abbott’s brief history stressing ethical consensus in this area, the reality is far 
less consensual. As Michael Mulkay tells the story, in the 1980s, a number of 
individual scientists, many eminent in the field, as well as some scientific 
institutions and journals at an editorial level, opposed the framework outlined by 
Mary Warnock and her Commission, the framework that would later be 
transposed into law. Robert Edwards responded in this way at the time: ‘I deny 
the argument that [the] scientific impetus will necessarily lead to silly 
experiments. It would be unwise to jeopardise future advances by short-term 
recourse to the criminal law.’ Another prominent researcher thought that ‘the first
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part of the report is practical and sensible because it was based on at least 10 
years of experience [with IVF]. When you come to the regulation of research it 
draws on science fiction and so is tinged with hysteria.’ (Mulkay, 1997, p. 21).
But, continues Mulkay, when scientists saw the way the political wind was 
blowing they fell in behind Warnock in the hope and expectation that regulation of 
research would provide some political protection for their work. As one MP put it: 
‘the Medical Research Council recanted and threw its full weight behind 
Warnock.’ (Mulkay, 1997, p. 27).
Mulkay’s discussion of the process gives the impression of a volte-face, and 
implies a compliment about scientists’ tactical sense. But if it is a compliment, it is 
one that embryo researcher Martin Johnson suspects may be a backhanded one. 
Johnson, an active participant in the debates of the 1980s, resists the idea that it 
was primarily an instrumental move by scientists. Yes, scientists did scheme, he 
agrees, but substantially what they did was to throw the decision open to society 
and lay out the options -  out of this they expected regulations to emerge:
‘I don’t think we tried to push the research argument, we just pointed out 
what had happened as a result of research and the consequences of 
banning further research. I don’t think we were dishonest at all in that.’ 
(Interview, Johnson, July 2008).
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Indeed, going further back in time, this is how Johnson believes Edwards 
approached the issue in the 1970s, and how he believes most scientists 
approach the issue today:
‘He didn’t resist regulation, you don’t see him out there resisting regulation, 
he wanted to have the debate in society, he was trying to get society to 
discuss this rationally for years before it did, until Louise Brown was born, 
and then it [society] did because it could suddenly see there was 
something to discuss and so on... the majority of scientists and doctors 
are perfectly happy to be regulated as long as it’s done reasonably, and 
they can see that there is a genuine public concern. I think apart from the 
odd one or two they are broadly of the view that as long as regulation is 
done intelligently and in an informed way with widespread debate, then it’s 
perfectly fine. You may kick against it, you may get irritated by it and you 
may criticise it, but all of that is legitimate, because it is never going to be 
perfect and you have to be articulating your concerns.’ (Interview,
Johnson, July 2008).
Perhaps not surprisingly, former chair of the HFEA Ruth Deech is more 
sympathetic to Mulkay’s (implied) argument. In what reads like a direct rejoinder 
to Johnson she argues that in a key paper Johnson refers to (Edwards and
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Sharpe, 1971) ‘Edwards was perhaps committed to the facilitation of science 
rather than to the imposition of restraints based on public concerns.’ (Deech and 
Smajdor, 2007, p. 29). She develops this point, generalising to broader medical 
and scientific opinion:
‘His [Edwards’] ambivalent attitude towards regulation was revealed when 
he later described state interference in reproductive medicine as ‘Nazism 
and Stalinism’. If nothing else, this illustrates the way scientific and 
medical support for regulation fluctuates in relation to what the scientists 
may regard as the imperative for freedom in research.’ (Deech and 
Smajdor, 2007, p. 29).
This discussion and dispute between Mulkay, Johnson and Deech tells us 
something interesting and useful about the approach of scientists to the 
regulatory process and the governance framework, in addition to their concerns 
and frustrations. Scientists as a group aren’t instinctive political radicals any more 
than anyone else. A distinction needs to be made between their personal views, 
the views they express in public even, and the extent to which they are inclined 
or willing to really pursue such ideas in the political sphere. In large part the main 
concern of many is, in Smith’s words, to ‘do the bloody experiment’. Freedom to 
research would be nice. Clear rules are a second best, but under political realities 
often the most important thing. Johnson’s view is too rosy and reasonable
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sounding, but he is right to say that scientists rarely reject regulation as a matter 
of principle. Rather, more typically, they resent the implied criticism involved in 
the idea of specific regulation while also holding out the hope for an idealised, 
smooth and efficient system of regulation.
3.4 Horror and complexity: human tissue research governance in the UK
In the arena of human tissue governance, there is less of a formal alliance never 
mind a substantive alliance, between the ‘incumbent interests’. When Secretary 
of State for Health Alan Milburn read the report into the organ retention practices 
at Alder Hey Children’s Hospital in Liverpool over a weekend at the end of 
January 2001, he is said to have found it one of the most shocking things or the 
most shocking thing he had ever read (accounts vary, but either way, an 
astounding statement). His reaction and the speech he gave to Parliament on the 
issue the following week in which he described the issue as the worst disaster 
ever to hit the NHS set the tone for the public discussion of the issue over the 
next few years. In these years consultation documents and reports were 
produced, Commissions set up, legislation was drafted and passed by Parliament 
(The Human Tissue Act 2004) and an authority was established, the Human 
Tissue Authority (HTA), tasked with licensing some activities and driving through 
cultural change.
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The language used in the Alder Hey report perturbed the medical and medical 
research community. For Dewar and Boddington the framing of the debate was a 
case of ‘the power of horror over logic’. The tradition of the macabre, they 
argued, includes two particularly powerful myths: The first myth is based on the 
image of the mad and bad scientist and the second on the fantasy of residual 
feeling of human sentience in the dead, or parts of the dead. There is evidence 
that the Alder Hey report has (consciously or not) drawn upon this horror 
tradition.’ (Dewar & Boddington, 2004, p. 463, p. 464). More generally the 
medical and medical research community was perturbed by they way in which, 
as they saw it, the Alder Hey report approached the issue as a whole from the 
point of view of particular families who felt they had been wronged. Without, that 
is, taking account of professionals’ own interests and priorities or the views of 
patients and the wider public who were less concerned. As Dixon-Woods et al 
highlight, a number of disease specific patient support groups or groups of 
families who donate to particular research projects do not view the issue in the 
way we might imagine ‘the public’ thinks from the reports of the time and media 
coverage (Dixon-Woods, Wilson, Jackson, Cavers and Pritchard-Jones, 2008).
It is no exaggeration to say that the research community was also cowed by the 
response to the report, a response in which researchers were cast as the villains: 
‘the organ retention scandal was exceptionally powerful in its designation of 
villains, victims, heroes, and in its organization of the “proper” response to events
and actions, in particular by polarizing the interests of the medical/scientific 
community and the lay community.’ (Seale, Cavers and Dixon-Woods, 2006, p. 
38). One aspect of the professional response, or at least of the institutional 
professional response, was an adaptation to the dominant framing of the issue. 
Dewar and Boddington noted for example that an editorial in The Lancet argued 
that any material not being used with dignity for a scientific or educational 
purpose should be ‘disposed of in an acceptable way, not left to languish 
unattended.’ How, they asked, ‘can anything that is not sentient languish? And 
what defines dignity in a pathology slide?’ (Dewar & Boddington, 2004, p. 464). 
Pathologists felt particularly demonised. According to Burton & Wells they also 
suffered from the adaptation of their representatives, which in this case they saw 
as nothing short of capitulation: ‘Histopatholgists the length and breadth of the 
UK have been left bewildered and drained, feeling that there has been a 
capitulation of professional representation in the face of hostile parents and a 
tabloid press baying for blood.’ (Burton & Wells, 2001, p. 820).
While it was of course the case that Government, like everyone else, was 
responding to events, the reality is that Government also played a key role in 
shaping the media response, and it was and is well aware that different groups of 
patients or different ‘publics’ had different views. It chose to highlight and respond 
to particular views, particular concerns, and it chose at the same time to amplify 
those views. Against this background the Department of Health quite consciously
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set about crafting a form of governance in part in keeping with ideas associated 
with the Democratic Model or new modes of governance, covering not only 
issues directly relevant to Alder Hey but also a wider set. Hugh Whittall, the lead 
civil servant on the issue at the time, noted in interview that this was unusual:
‘What I think was really interesting was the opportunity that was taken to 
take a much wider look at the whole area of regulation and legislation 
relating to human tissue and human bodies. That was in a sense quite 
unusual. First, because the natural tendency of Government and the civil 
service is to do as little as is necessary in any particular set of 
circumstances. And the second is that the prospect of being able to get 
Parliamentary time to introduce or revise legislation without there being a 
critical necessity for it was really unusual, you just wouldn’t expect to do 
that. So that was the context: the crisis moment of Alder Hey combined 
with a really, I think probably quite appropriate, decision to use that to look 
much more widely.’ (Interview, Whittall, May 2010).
It was and is the opinion of Government and many who supported changes to 
governance of human tissue research that the new values and the new 
governance arrangements would facilitate rather than hinder research. On its 
website, the regulator, the Human Tissue Authority (HTA), states: The HTA 
licenses organisations that store human tissue for research. One of our key aims
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is to ensure that research continues to thrive in the UK. We believe that good 
regulation supports good science, which in turn leads to improved healthcare.’
The relationship between the different trends in governance and the practice of 
research in this area is a complicated one. I address it in some detail in chapters 
four and five. But safe to say for the moment that not many researchers agree 
with the HTA’s assessment of the state of research in the UK and its implied 
claims about the governance framework, be it the law, the regulator, or the 
combination of both and other factors.
Scientists and scientific organisations anticipated that there would be problems at 
the time the new framework was being developed. Cancer Research UK for 
example argued that ‘the licensing regime is excessive, unnecessary and 
disproportionate... its scope and impact has been severely underestimated.’
More recently, a 2009 survey of researchers by onCore UK found that 78% 
assessed the environment as either strict or very strict, with only 19% considering 
it about right. 92% considered the complexity of the regulatory environment for 
pathology research as either complex or very complex. Appendix 3 of the 
published report contains a wide selection of comments sent in by researchers. 
They are very strongly critical, with many researchers confessing to feeling quite 
demoralised. It is all a far remove from the HTA’s picture of research thriving in 
the UK. (onCore UK, 2009).
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Of course one has to interpret such survey results carefully. Those who are 
critical might be more likely to respond to surveys, and one other important point 
to note, one I discuss in chapter five, is that researchers working in large 
institutions, perhaps in an organised biobank, are more positive about the 
governance framework than those working elsewhere. Nevertheless, the material 
contained in the report is consistent with my own findings, including my 
interviews with researchers more sympathetic to the HTA as well as those who 
are openly critical. Strikingly, the HTA conducted its own survey of researchers in 
2009 and came up with similar results to those contained in the onCore UK 
report.
3.5 Institutional science’s political approach and body language
The recent debates and changes to governance occurred under the three New 
Labour Governments that ran consecutively from 1997 to 2010. It was a lively 
period for debates on science and science governance; one marked by a number 
of initiatives and structural experiments. And indeed a scientific issue, or an issue 
with a large scientific component, arguably played a role in consolidating New 
Labour’s challenge to the Conservative Government in its final years: New 
Labour was first elected to power shortly after the BSE scandal came to a head.
In the last year of the Conservative Government New Labour used the issue to
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illustrate the incompetence of the incumbent regime and also its deference to 
producer interests over and above consumer interests. Over the first term of the 
New Labour Government a number of other issues, principally GM crops and 
foods, the health risks posed by mobile phones and the use of children’s organs 
and other tissue in research were major public incidents which played a role in 
shaping the official approach to the Governance of science as it became codified 
in a number of Governmental and non-Governmental documents.
In this section and the next one I build on the description of tensions within and 
between the incumbent interests illustrated in the previous two sections and 
begin to characterise some aspects of contemporary science governance, in 
particular how natural scientists perceive the issues, the problems they face, and 
how they have tried to handle them.
A key report, Science and Society, published in 2000 by the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Science and Technology, called for greater understanding 
of public values and a serious dialogue with the public. Not in order to restrict 
science, but to help it: ‘our call for increased and integrated dialogue with the 
public is intended to secure science's "licence to practise", not to restrict it.’ This 
report codified official thinking at the time and guided future practice. But there 
was more than official policy in relation to science policy in play in guiding the
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construction and practice of governance. The general patterns of Governmental 
approach and behaviour were also important.
Simon Denegri has, apart from a brief spell abroad, spent the past twenty years 
working in the patient and medical research charity sector in the UK. Among 
other things he was Chief Executive of the Association of Medical Research 
Charities from 2006 to 2011; he’s chair of INVOLVE, the national advisory group 
for the promotion and support of public involvement in research funded by the 
National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) and he’s an active blogger 
(http://simondenegri.coml . He comes to the debates with an instinctive sympathy 
and enthusiasm for medical research but at the same time a suspicion of medical 
and natural scientific special pleading.
In spite of or perhaps because of the latter point, he has a fine grasp of the 
problems facing researchers, medical researchers in particular, and how these 
problems fit into some ideas associated with defining aspects of New Labour’s 
approach to governance. His reflections on the past fifteen years in particular 
bring out some aspects and consequences of the restlessness, the search for 
new domains and issues, that Moran (2003) identifies as defining the ‘British 
regulatory state’ following the collapse ‘oligarchic club rule’ in the 1980s. Denegri 
points to the political settlement that New Labour crafted, one that accorded a
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very important role for science, backed up with substantial and ring-fenced 
funding:
‘for the first time you had a Government that came onto the block that was 
very serious about putting science at the heart of what it was trying to do: 
innovation, growth, all those kinds of thing. And it had a very strong lead in 
Sainsbury who was there a long, long time. When you have a situation in 
which you have two constituencies who don’t necessarily think the same 
things [Government and science] you need a very strong leader to bring it 
all together, and I think Sainsbury was that leader. He showed 
fundamentally very positive and strong leadership, both within 
Government but also within science. I think we’ve struggled a little bit 
since, because we haven’t had such a strong leader. But I think that whole 
thrust from 1997 onwards to put in place a ten-year framework for science, 
to build NIHR in the health arena, to emphasise translational science, I 
think all this was a very important creation of that settlement between the 
two... I think there is a change afoot at the moment, but there is a 
settlement that you can trace back to 1997 and that period was a period of 
extraordinary positivity for science: having that framework in place; having 
that sort of drive; that sort of ambition; that sort of leadership.’ (Interview, 
Denegri, April 2011).
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However, while believing that they are prone to exaggerating problems, Denegri 
agrees to an extent with those scientists who argue that alongside this 
fundamental commitment to science New Labour was terribly neurotic about 
governance in this area as elsewhere, which created a paradoxical situation:
‘It’s a bit like, pretend the Government was a horse trainer, training an 
amazing stallion, but it keeps putting on its own handicap, increasing the 
handicap all the time. I think there is a paradox there and I think it has 
happened. There are lots of underlying reasons you could go into. I think 
the last Government was very neurotic about all sorts of things. It was 
highly consultative. It was quite passive aggressive when it came to 
regulation.’ (Interview, Denegri, April 2011).
An aspect of this neuroticism was New Labour’s enthusiasm for and approach to 
public consultation, which Denegri colourfully characterises as ‘digging up the 
flowers to see if they’re growing’:
‘Where the engagement agenda has become very, very fuzzy I think is 
where it’s moved more -  and the Government’s got itself into difficulty 
here -  to the James Joyce sort of thing, surveys, opinion polls, which is a 
bit like children digging up the flowers to see if they’re growing type things, 
which is disruptive, not helpful. It’s weathervane politics; it just doesn’t help
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at all. I have been pretty dismayed actually about the way the Government 
has approached things like science and society, general public 
engagement about science. It doesn’t know what it wants to do and it 
doesn’t know how to do it.’ (Interview, Denegri, April 2011).
Scientific research is, to state the obvious, the archetypical activity of scientists. 
Research is practically and symbolically what scientists do. Governance regimes 
for science and scientists often focus on this, as do political and policy debates.
In the fall out from the BSE /  vCJD issue, scientists might have expected to gain 
some credit for their research into prion diseases, for monitoring the development 
of vCJD and for proposing a connection to BSE. However, in addition to New 
Labour’s neuroticism, scientists had to contend with a sceptical cultural climate 
that included the notion that in some sense scientific arrogance was a part of the 
problem. As Jonathan Porritt put it, already quoted in chapter one, linking 
arrogance to a number of other issues, notably, for the purposes of my study, 
precaution and participation: ‘science should be more precautionary; more 
participative; less arrogant; less compromised by its paymasters; more 
compassionate and more holistic.’ (Porritt, 2000, p. 33). In a review of Porritt’s 
book, natural scientist Lewis Wolpert was characteristically typically scathing:
This book is an example of anti-science by someone who has little 
understanding of science but who appears to be happy to use it when it
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suits his political purpose... There is also the delicious irony that when 
science gives Porritt a result he likes, as in the case of global warming, 
then suddenly there is a change in tone and a switch to “we know that...” 
who is this new “we”?’ ‘No wonder Prince Charles is so poorly advised. 
Pity, too, the poor environment that so badly needs rational analysis, hard 
science and positive action -  not moral masturbation.’ (Wolpert, 2000).
With the backlash against GM fresh in their minds, there is much evidence that 
many scientists took a very dim view of Government activity and shared 
Wolpert’s disdain if not contempt for Porritt and other critics: in a survey of UK 
plant scientists, more than 80% believed that the anti-GM campaign had 
contributed to a general anti-science feeling. Colin Lazarus based at Bristol 
University stated: ‘the government tends to put popularity at the top of its agenda 
and has done little to support the rational case for GM. It seemed to start out in 
support but did not have the courage to maintain its convictions in the face of 
hostility.’ (Farrar, 2000a). Catherine Hughes reported, based on a Wellcome- 
funded MORI poll conducted around the same time, that: ‘scientists clearly feel 
that the public has an erroneous view of their profession, and that they and their 
work are misunderstood. A further distance between them might be evident in 
that scientists feel the public trusts a source which they themselves have little 
faith in -  the media.’ (Hughes, 2001, p. 8).
However, not wanting explicitly to engage in lobbying or values-led campaigns, 
for this would be to step outside their preferred role as insiders in policy and 
politics, leaders of the natural science community typical engage in a kind of 
dance or performance regarding the new modes of science governance and 
Government policy. Accordingly, not all scientists were as critical as well known 
individuals such as Lewis Wolpert, and of those that were not all thought it politic 
to voice their criticism so strongly and so publicly. Whatever the mixture of belief 
and calculation, leading scientists and scientific institutions decided on a more 
emollient approach in order to try to manage the situation (and in the process 
eased Wolpert out of his role as a semi-official representative of ‘the scientific 
community’). These scientists stood by their science and worked out a way to try 
to keep what they saw as untoward arguments and social movements at bay, but 
without explicitly confronting some of the values involved. In a context in which 
they were expected to engage with various publics in a more deferential way than 
they were accustomed to this seemed the obvious route to take in order to secure 
that ‘licence to practise’ highlighted by the House of Lords.
3.6 UK medical researchers’ perspectives on the past 15 years
The approaches taken by leading scientists and scientific institutions discussed 
above can be theorised by reference to two seminal sociological and political 
theorists, Erving Goffman and John Rawls. This allows us to contextualise and
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interpret some of the novel aspects of institutional medical scientific activity since 
the mid 1990s as well as to think about the different levels or layers of 
perspectives on the changes that have occurred, particularly as expressed and 
presented in the public and policy domain.
Erving Goffman developed an analysis of the structures of social encounters from 
the perspective of the dramatic performance. The word person, he observes, in 
its first meaning, is a mask. Robert Park, Goffman observes in his book The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, argues that “everyone is always and 
everywhere, more or less consciously, playing a role... it is in these roles that we 
know each other; it is in these roles that we know ourselves.” (quoted in Goffman, 
1990 [1959], p. 30). Goffman was concerned first and foremost with the 
structures of social interaction that develop when people are in immediate 
physical proximity to each other. In such circumstances there is a combined effort 
at impression management; the key point being to maintain a joint definition of 
the situation:
Together the participants contribute to a single over-all definition of the 
situation which involves not so much a real agreement as to what exists 
but rather a real agreement as to whose claims concerning what issues 
will be temporarily honoured. Real agreement will also exist concerning
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the desirability of avoiding an open conflict of definitions of the situation.’ 
(Goffman, 1990 [1959], p. 21).
Of course, people do maintain a distinction between front stage and back stage 
roles, and relatedly they do seek to change the definition of the situation. In order 
to maintain the front stage role this is often done cautiously:
‘This is sometimes known a “putting out feelers” and involves guarded 
disclosures and hinted demands. By means of statements that are 
carefully ambiguous or that have a secret meaning to the initiate, a 
performer is able to discover, without dropping his defensive stand, 
whether or not it is safe to dispense with the current definition of the 
situation.’ (Goffman, 1990 [1959], p. 188).
Goffman develops the analysis and tackles a number of wider issues in his 
magnum opus Frame Analysis. In a typically lyrical passage he develops a view 
on the kinds of human nature that are shaped by such close social interactions:
The human nature that fits with this view of viewing does so in part 
because its possessors have learned to comport themselves so as to 
render this analysis true of them. Indeed, in countless ways and 
ceaselessly, social life takes up and freezes into itself the understandings
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we have of it. (And since my analysis of frames admittedly merges with 
the one that subjects themselves employ, mine, in that degree, must 
function as another supportive fantasy).’ (Goffman, 1975, p. 563).
In this work as with his earlier book he once again emphasised that he was 
concerned with close social interaction rather than the organisation of society. 
However, as he also acknowledged, and as the passage on human nature 
suggests, his theory points to a relationship between the two. Natural scientists 
involved in public engagement and deliberation exercises, and natural scientific 
institutions engaged in the production of reports, might be viewed as performers 
in Goffman’s terms, existing somewhere between intimate personal interaction 
and the broader organisation of society. They take part in the construction of the 
definition of the situation, they seek to change it at times, but they are also bound 
by it in a fundamental sense.
The philosopher and political theorist John Rawls, in his work Political Liberalism, 
argued for a form of public reason based on an overlapping consensus between 
different doctrines. The idea of an overlapping consensus is moral, he argued, in 
its object and motivation, rendering the consensus stable over the distribution of 
doctrines: ‘this gives stability for the right reasons, and this distinguishes the idea 
of such a consensus from a modus vivendi.' (Rawls, 2005, p. xli). In this sense 
(his rejection of a modus vivendi), and in his focus on public reason, Rawls’
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theory is quite distinct from Goffman’s. However, if we take the view that Rawls’ 
approach is both unrealistic in its pure form, but also a real feature of 
contemporary life -  an influence on how politics is conceived, how it is thought it 
should work, and in consequence how it does work to some extent -  then some 
strong connections between the two ideas, Goffman’s and Rawls’, emerge.
Rawls argued that faced with a standoff between comprehensive and 
incompatible doctrines, people could not insist that their own doctrine must 
prevail. Instead, they should rather seek, or vote for, something else: ‘From the 
point of view of public reason citizens should simply vote for the ordering of 
political values they sincerely think the most reasonable. Otherwise we fail to 
exercise political power in ways that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.’ (Rawls, 
2005, p. liii). He links his idea to a view on the kind of human psychology that 
needs to prevail or that he wants to bring about -  his body of work, he says, also 
considers ‘how citizens need to be conceived to construct those more reasonable 
conceptions, and what their moral psychology has to be to support a reasonably 
just political society over time.’ (Rawls, 2005, p. Ix).
A (for Rawls desirable) by-product of this is that, to the extent that it works, slowly 
but surely those outside a consensus become or can be pressured into becoming 
more moderate. Once again, as with the real world application or consideration of 
Goffman’s thinking, this can lead to the construction of a consensus with real
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power. A corollary is that engagement with a consensus can lead to tensions 
within a body of thought, or fracture a movement.
With the above analysis in mind, one reading of official, that is institutional- 
scientific, statements and approaches, is that they are sometimes an implicit, 
perhaps even explicit, rebuke to the more forceful statements of some of the rank 
and file. The statements are attempts at impression management and are 
influenced by pressures to conform to a consensus. However, it is also the case 
that official statements and approaches echo those rank and file concerns.
A new pathway for the regulation and governance of health research is an 
important report produced for and published by the UK’s The Academy of 
Medical Sciences in early 2011. The dominant theme is the problem of 
complexity, which it summarised in this way:
‘Many argue that the complexity of the current landscape, combined with 
an over-emphasis on privacy and autonomy, has created a conservative 
culture around access to data which does not always best serve the needs 
of research or, more importantly, the needs of patients within the NHS.’ 
(The Academy of Medical Sciences, 2011, p. 61).
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The AMS urged the Government to take action to tackle the barriers to effective 
research. But what the report balked at accepting (or stating) was that 
Governments in recent years might have neglected the concerns of scientists, or, 
heaven forbid, have known about the concerns but ignored them. For the AMS, 
complexity resulted from the accumulation of individual regulatory requirements, 
each well-intended:
‘The complexity of the current regulatory and governance environment has 
developed cumulatively. New regulatory requirements and checks have 
been introduced over time to improve on previous arrangements, in 
response to individual cases of actual and alleged clinical malpractice, or 
as a consequence of legislation. Each new requirement was well-intended 
but the combined effect has been the layering of new bodies or checks 
onto existing functions. A key aim of this report is to consider the 
regulation and governance pathway as a whole and its net impact on 
patients, the public and UK health research.’ (The Academy of Medical 
Sciences, 2011, p. 18).
The report did discuss what it called ‘cultural issues’, but the main emphasis as 
ever with reports from the institutionalised great and the good was on 
streamlining processes rather than tackling the public and governmental political 
issues that lie behind the problem. They didn’t even want to acknowledge
elements of deliberate intent of the most basic kind in the Human Tissue Act 
(about which I outline in detail in the next two chapters):
‘Respondents highlighted the broad scope and application of the Human 
Tissue Act to materials such as urine, faeces and saliva as the main 
barrier to research involving human tissue... There was a strong belief 
among those we consulted that the current situation unnecessarily 
increases costs and bureaucracy and was not the intention of the Act, 
which was introduced to prevent the inappropriate retention of body parts 
and whole organs, i.e. any repeat of events similar to those at Alder Hey.’ 
(The Academy of Medical Sciences, 2011, p. 73).
It is unclear the extent to which genuine confusion plays a part and how much is 
political calculation. But it seems clear that some of the latter must have been 
involved. As is the norm, it is stated that patient and public engagement with 
research will improve governance, without, as is also the norm, any discussion of 
what this might mean and whether indeed some forms of such involvement might 
lie behind complexity in the first place.
Without, hopefully, stretching the military comparison too far, it is instructive to 
compare the AMS report with points put forward by retired head of the Medical 
Research Council, Colin Blakemore, in discussion of the report. Just as retired
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Generals have taken to the airwaves in recent years to criticise Government 
policy in blunter terms than their serving colleagues, leaving the no doubt 
intended and probably correct impression that they are revealing an opinion 
widely held within the armed forces, so, writing in The Times in advance of 
publication of the report, Blakemore pointed to the scope of regulations and 
wondered about the values that reinforced the current situation in blunter terms 
than the AMS itself:
There are regulations governing research on animals, human tissue and 
embryos; the use of new medicines; the design, governance and conduct 
of clinical trials; access to medical records; exposure to radiation and the 
archiving and protection of data. Anyone who puts a finger on another 
human being in the interests of research faces application forms the size 
of telephone directories for ethical approval.
A novice in this legal minefield could be excused for thinking that 
society considers medical research a threat rather than potential salvation 
from disease....
... all this regulation comes at a huge cost. In fees for the licenses, 
in time and in research that doesn’t get done because so many well- 
intentioned scientists surrender in the battle against bureaucracy...
... A big problem is the dubious ethical assumption that regulation 
must protect us indiscriminately against the tiniest risk, the most unlikely
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offence and infringement of the least probable individual objection. Of 
course, we must protect against abuse, but we don’t need the current 
quicksand of regulations to prevent horrors such as Dr Mengele or the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study.’ (Blakemore, 2011).
While critical of medical researchers in their conclusion, on-the-ground 
researcher dissatisfaction is noted, and in fact taken seriously by Mary Dixon- 
Woods and Richard Ashcroft, who point to perceived changes since the mid 
1990s in this way:
The last decade has seen huge growth in researcher dissatisfaction with 
the burdens and reach of regulation and governance of health-related 
research. In the UK, researchers find the regulations to be overly 
burdensome in proportion to the risks of research, costly, intrusive, and an 
obstruction to the training of a generation of scientists. The perceived 
negative impact of research governance requirements on the conduct of 
low risk research in the public interest has been especially heavily 
criticised.’ (Dixon-Woods and Ashcroft, 2008, p. 381).
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3.7 Some analyses of STS, SSK and change
The survey results and discussion in the preceding sections suggests that the 
perspective of some natural science researchers and other analysts is that 
governance has changed and in ways that have negatively impacted on research 
practice. Some social scientists, typically ones sympathetic to some of the 
concerns of natural science researchers, link these changes to new approaches 
to governance characteristic of the Democratic Model. Writing of one of the more 
recent ideas in the area, Joyce Tait considered it ‘surprising that upstream 
engagement has been accepted so uncritically by the scientific community, given 
the lack of equivalent scrutiny of the assumptions, values and visions of those 
who have demanded it.’ (Tait, 2009, p. S19). She went on to situate the appeal of 
the approach in a longer historical context, drawing some other STS / SSK 
scholars into her argument as she did, briskly rejecting the notion that it has 
democratic credentials, and worrying about the impact of the approach:
The tension between scientific endeavour, which is seen as the basis for 
human progress, and contrary opinions ranging from mild reservation to 
entrenched opposition, will continue, and upstream engagement is one of 
its latest manifestations.
If engagement is to satisfy the demands of its proponents who want 
evidence that its outcomes are influencing decisions, and at the same time
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these proponents are influencing engagement in a manner that is critical 
of the scientific agenda, restriction of some scientific projects is inevitable. 
As Collins implies, the social science agenda within which upstream 
engagement is located can be seen as taking us deeper into a mire where 
we will have no solid evidence base for making decisions about scientific 
developments (Collins, 2009). Decisions will vary depending on public- 
opinion shifts in response to the latest events, amplified or modulated by 
media campaigns...
...as the influence of activists has increased, the role of industry 
and other professional groups has declined, and the voice of ordinary 
citizens is still not being heard. Neither situation is satisfactory and the 
claim that these new approaches to decision-making are more democratic 
is not being borne-out... There will always be differences of opinion, and 
upstream engagement seems likely merely to substitute one set of 
dominant opinions for another set that is no more universal and, if 
anything, is less based on scientific evidence than the previous one.’ (Tait, 
2009, pp. S20-S21).
In interview, Tait was in little doubt that change had taken place and that, in the 
case of GM at least, critical STS and SSK had played a role, albeit indirectly: The 
impact that it’s had is that it’s been invoked for a lot of actions that have been 
taken. For example, not using GM crops: that’s the area where I can see the
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precautionary principle as being damaging in the long run.’ (Interview, Tait, May 
2011). In thinking about causality, Tait’s point that the idea was ‘invoked’ is of 
course important. For Tait, the influence of social science academics, in 
particular those who championed the Democratic Model, on changes in 
governance is indirect, through an influence on politicians; politicians who are 
however strongly and independently committed to the change:
‘I think there has been quite a lot of change. I don’t think they’ve 
necessarily influenced it. I think it’s come from the political system as 
much as anything: through voting; through who gets voted into power. I 
think the fact that the Green parliamentary groups began to have a big 
influence in Europe on politics had a big impact on the way Governments 
listened to publics and who they listened to, and the fact that they began 
to do things as a result. So I think what you’ve seen is a shift to a much 
more bottom up approach to policy. As Catherine Lyall talks about in her 
writing, we’ve moved to a more stakeholder-oriented style of governance 
rather than top-down government, bringing public debate into the process 
of making policy decisions. I think there’s been a very strong move in that 
direction. I think the green groups were influenced by social scientists. I 
don’t think any one social scientist has had a huge impact, but social 
science has been influential.’ (Interview, Tait, May 2011).
Relatedly, rather than taking the BSE /  vCJD episode at face value, as self- 
evidently a ‘disaster’ driving and illustrating the need for change, some analysts 
point to a number of sociological and political factors as being significant in the 
increased influence of new governance mechanisms, including: exhaustion of the 
Conservative administration by the early to mid-1990s, and to an extent the very 
idea of effective Government; the rise to prominence of campaigning consumer 
organisations; individuation within society; an existing predisposition to food 
scares; and the beginnings of widespread anti-corporatist sentiment. All these 
taken together led many people and writers to invest unrealistic hopes and fears 
in science. Then, against this background, New Labour came to power, on the 
look out for creating some kind of authority within society through making 
connections with such sentiments (Forbes, 2004; Packer, 2006; Alaszewski and 
Burgess, 2007).
Burgess, one of the analysts who has made such arguments, draws on Moran’s 
work and points to a fundamental shift in Government’s approach to governance, 
a shift that frames Government’s actions and perhaps to an extent those of its 
collaborators and critics. His focus is on risk governance, but it has a wider 
relevance, and suggests some ways in which to think about the kinds of 
interactions involved in the construction of contemporary engagement processes 
and governance structures:
‘Following the BSE crisis, the new government was especially sensitive to 
“the need to stay in touch with public opinion on new food sciences and 
technologies” and this drove the GMO and mobile debates (POST 2000, 
20). More substantially, Moran (2003) identifies the emergence of a “British 
regulatory state” following the collapse of what he terms oligarchic “club 
rule” in the 1980s. A vacuum has been left by its collapse characterised by 
a restless “hyper innovation” and search for new institutions and ideas 
through which to engage and govern society. Moran identifies a state and 
political class compulsively attracted to new domains and issues, in the 
process extending influence and even control. It may be fruitful to consider 
the attraction of a trend such as risk campaigning in the context of the 
confused, post-political world that emerged from the collapse of traditional 
governance in the 1980s. Under such circumstances it may seem 
unsurprising that risk campaigning’s relative dynamism and apparent public 
engagement seemed irresistible irrespective of problematic longer term 
implications.’ (Burgess, 2010, p. 71).
3.8 Conclusion: working together -  to what end and with what effect?
Launching a £1m project designed ‘to make science more accountable’, Sir 
Aaron Klug, President of the Royal Society at the time, made this argument in 
2000: ‘Science is necessarily run by scientists, but it is ultimately society that
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allows science to go ahead and we need to make sure that it goes on doing so. 
So we need input from non-experts to make sure we are aware of the boundaries 
to our “license to practice” and, conversely, we need good channels of 
communication if we want to extend those boundaries.’ {Times Higher Education 
Supplement, 1 December 2000).
This encapsulates a primary aim of scientists, and also their pragmatic approach 
to engagement and dialogue. There are some timeless aspects to this, but how 
the relationship works in practice if not conceptually is heavily influenced by the 
political and governance context of the time. Science Minister Ian Pearson, 
whose speech celebrating the success of stem cell research I quoted from earlier 
in this chapter, also talked about the importance of science to the British 
economy, he talked about his enthusiasm for science, and he talked about his 
desire to engage with society to discuss difficult and controversial topics. Later in 
the speech he outlined his idea for a vision for science, and invited discussion of 
it:
Today I want to take the process of refreshing our science and society 
strategy a stage further by launching a debate around what our vision 
should be and how collectively we can up our game. What I want to do now 
is to enlist your help in looking at the Government's role and the focus of our 
activities with a view to developing a strategy that reflects the efforts of all in 
the community. As a starting point, I offer my initial thoughts on a vision of
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what we should be trying to achieve, that is: A Society that is excited about 
science, values its importance to our economic and social well-being, feels 
confident in its use, and supports a representative, well-qualified scientific 
workforce.’ (Pearson, 2007).
Pearson proposed to pursue engagement and dialogue in a number of ways, one 
of which, the headline in fact, was through the Beacons for Public Engagement 
Project. And here we run into an apparent ambiguity at the heart of the 
Government’s actions in this area over the past fifteen years. The values and the 
vision Pearson advanced are at least formally at odds with the conception many 
others have of what public engagement should involve. More than that, if we look 
at who was practically involved in this project we find a number of collaborators 
across the country, some or many of whom most definitely do not share the 
vision Pearson outlined: in the North East for example it was coordinated by an 
academic / activist, Tom Wakeford, who is highly critical of the approach of 
Government and who has had a number of run ins with Government and the 
‘Scientific Establishment’, in particular the Royal Society. This raises the 
questions: what are the points of connection between Government and the 
‘Scientific Establishment’ on the one side, and the range of academics and 
activists working on governance and engagement? When they work together, 
what is the common ground? Why do they work together and what comes out of 
it? These are the questions to be explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter Four: Governance, the case studies and research design
In chapter one I stated that governance is a broad topic, and that it might be 
appropriate to use different conceptualisations in different contexts. I quoted 
Andy Stirling advocating for the following broad approach when focusing on 
opening up debates:
The starting point for this analysis is a distinction between parallel, 
interlinked, and mutually coconstituting processes of commitment and 
appraisal in technology governance. Here, “governance” is taken to 
encompass the diverse totality of actors, discourses, structures, and 
processes implicated in guiding and shaping technological configurations 
(Kooiman 1993). In these terms, appraisal is about informing, and 
commitment is about forming tangible social choices in the governance of 
science and technology.’ (Stirling, 2008, p. 265).
However, it is also the case that governance is, unsurprisingly, both a broad and 
a contested category. While there is a good deal of agreement that significant 
changes have occurred since the 1980s in particular, exactly how those changes 
should be conceptualised is keenly debated. And these debates do not hinge 
simply on which theory is most appropriate for which circumstances, but also 
which theory or approach best captures the main dynamics of governance at a
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particular point in time and of change over time. These debates are connected to 
deep and long running disputes about the connection between governance and 
philosophical and political theory (Bevir and Krupicka, 2011). This chapter 
unpacks these debates a bit further in different ways, for example through a 
comparative analysis of the Democratic Model with the case of feminist 
scholarship and politics. It moves on to a methodological and substantive 
discussion of how these issues are investigated in this thesis, and concludes with 
an introduction to the case studies.
Most writers are agreed that networks and a diverse range of actors play a bigger 
role today than they did in the past. At one level the debate is about what weight, 
significance and consequence to give to this analytically, from a, broadly 
speaking, sociological perspective, and what weight should be given to this from 
a normative perspective. For Lyall et al, as also discussed in chapter one, the 
state still plays a significant role, and what’s more it should do:
‘In this and many of the chapters that follow, we consider some of the 
“new tools of governance” and how they might apply to the life science 
industries. We shall suggest that there are actually limits to the all 
pervasive notion of “governance” and that, instead, the multifaceted policy 
and regulatory situation that applies to genomics and the life sciences 
more generally actually argues for the existence of a government-
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governance continuum with different aspects of genomics technologies 
sitting at different points on this spectrum. Despite the political (and 
academic) rhetoric about new governance approaches, we perceive the 
enduring capacity of the state (in the North at least) to control and also to 
frame debates about new technology -  hence “the limits to governance”.’ 
(Lyall, Papaioannou and Smith, 2009, p. 3).
In analysing the case studies and indeed in analysing the whole topic of the 
changing governance of science, rather than approaches that tend to highlight 
the role of networks and other social actors and deny or minimise the role of the 
state, I cleave towards Peters’ argument that ‘State actors and social actors 
interact to produce governance.’ (Peters, 2011, p. 468), which places me closer 
to Lyall et al rather than theorists who put a strong emphasis on networks and 
social movements. The governance of natural science in general and of human 
embryo and tissue research in the UK in particular, is still relatively ‘top down’, 
guided by a specific and detailed legal frameworks and powerful regulators.
However, and herein lies a complication and a novelty, not only do we have to 
consider the interaction of the state with networks and social movements, we 
must also consider the fact that Government itself and the regulators, formally at 
least, embraced and promoted horizontal tools of governance -  communication 
and public information; networking; public-private partnership, deliberative
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elements -  and downplayed ideas of governance that are based on a view of 
government controlling the actions of others (see Lyall, Papaioannou and Smith, 
2009, for a general discussion). This created some novel and, for natural 
scientists, not entirely positive, outcomes. Relatedly, the battle to influence law 
making and policy-making, and the outcome, were also shaped by chaotic 
elements in UK science governance following the BSE episode of 1996. This 
included attempts to make connections with campaigners through a highly 
consultative approach to policy-making.
In the next two sections I discuss conceptual issues that bear upon the question 
of state and regulatory policy, the values pursued through this and how to think 
about the influence of critical ideas upon it, in particular ideas associated with the 
Democratic Model. After that I outline the methodological strategy I employed and 
how in particular I used case studies to further the analysis.
4.1 Governance and governance agencies
In his Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution the legal scholar 
Roger Brownsword examines how the utilitarian, the rights and the dignitarian 
perspectives use and regard key concepts, especially consent, harm and 
precaution (Brownsword, 2008). Given the tensions between these perspectives, 
he comes to the view that a consensus is not possible, which in turn points to a
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fundamental limit to law’s ability to govern through command and control 
measures in areas beset by such fundamental disagreements, a point which 
applies, he believes, to procedural as well as substantive approaches to 
governance:
‘Although this high theory of proceduralism comes with an impeccable 
pedigree, it seems a pretty unlikely story. Granted, the diagnosis is sound: 
for, in a context of pluralism, the problems of stability and authority are 
most acute when the law takes sides on opposed moral positions; and it is 
in just these circumstances that a legitimacy crisis is prompted. However, 
the proceduralist response (as the earlier Rawls might have expressed it) 
puts too great a strain on the parties. Quite simply, if the protagonists and 
pluralists are to bargain their way to a solution, where the only force is the 
Habermassian force of the better argument, then something very 
fundamental has to give. What the proceduralists ask of the disputants is 
not that they should give an inch or two but nothing less than that they 
should abandon their deepest (but incompatible) moral convictions -  that 
is, those very beliefs that are the source of the instability, and which, if 
insisted upon, would fatally obstruct a consensual accommodation of all 
reasonable viewpoints, or of principles that could not reasonably be 
rejected.’ (Brownsword, 2008, p. 129)
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So what does happen in practice? As Barnes and Dupre succinctly observe, 
often we do not form a Rawlsian consensus based or not based on 
Habermassian dialogue. Rather, often we find ways to work around each other 
(Barnes and Dupre, 2008, p. 238). These are important observations and good 
as far as they go, but just how do people work around each other, what values 
are promoted in this way when a societal position is arrived at to one degree or 
another and embodied in regulation and governance, and what role do regulatory 
and governance agencies play in this?
In his classic text The Sociological Imagination C. Wright-Mills argued that 
‘Unless they justify institutions and motivate persons to enact institutional roles, 
“the values” of a society, however important in various private milieux, are 
historically and sociologically irrelevant.’ (Mills, 1970, p. 47). In both case studies 
Government, civil servants, lawmakers and regulators played an important role. 
This required analysis of lawmaking, and related to that reflection on how to think 
about the role of law. In An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text Materials, 
Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung outline a broad approach to the subject of 
law and regulation: ‘We understand “regulation” scholarship as a broad and 
open-ended category that can readily apply to many forms of intellectual inquiry 
concerning the purposive shaping of social behaviour, particularly state and non­
state standard-setting, monitoring and behaviour modification processes.’ 
(Morgan and Yeung, 2007, p. xiv). The selections in the text are grouped in the
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first instance around a distinction between public and private interest theories. It 
is assumed, they say, by its proponents that is, that public interest theories are 
optimistic about regulation protecting the public interest, so it is not always 
considered necessary to examine this empirically (Morgan and Yeung, 2007, p. 
43).
Private interest theorists, in comparison, are interested in criticising how public 
interest approaches work in practice: ‘In political versions of private interest 
theory, political outcomes, and the regulatory rules in which they are embedded, 
are the aggregate result of different groups pursing their own versions of the 
public interest without any overall umpire imposing constraints on the content of 
those versions.’ (Morgan and Yeung, 2007, p. 44).
A neglected issue, by both kinds of theorists, or one that at the very least does 
not fall easily into one of the two categories, public and private, is the values and 
aims held and pursued by the regulators and other governance agencies 
themselves (the umpires). Regulators will typically have their own aims and play 
a role in shaping the debate that is not captured by either naive theories of public 
interest or the aggregating idea of private interests theorists.
Of course regulators and other governance agencies will often claim to be 
following a general or a particular public interest model when they do play a role.
But how this should be analysed is not straightforward. Stephen Croley argues 
that ‘private interest theories tend to give causal accounts of the emergence of 
regulatory regimes while public interest theories are more prescriptive, 
highlighting the regulatory goals that the law should ideally facilitate.’ (Quoted in 
Morgan and Yeung, 2007, p. 52). That public interest theorists have this notion 
allows or makes it tempting to conflate (confuse themselves about?) the way in 
which the law is working with the way it should be working. In other words, allows 
or tempts the analyst into paying insufficient attention to causal explanations that 
include the role of governance agencies, because they are focused on normative 
analysis. There may of course also be a performative aspect to this. Acting as if 
enacting normative principles and discussing issues in such terms allows the 
pursuit of real world goals (with varying degrees of intention) that may at best 
amount to a particular twist on those principles and at worst something else.
4.2 Analysing influence
One intriguing aspect of contemporary science governance discourse is the 
state’s apparent endorsement of critical approaches. As we saw in chapter one, 
the idea that this discourse might imply more, that it might suggest the 
substantive influence of critical ideas, is one that SSK theorist Brian Wynne finds 
perplexing and disturbing -  he is shocked that anyone could think this: ‘My most 
striking personal experience of STS engagement in policy worlds has been sheer
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disorientation at my failure to recognize my own ideas in what has been 
celebrated as my work’s public influence.’ (Wynne, 2007, p. 501).
In chapters two and three I suggested that the failure to recognise influence 
might be found in the nature of radical STS and SSK more than anything else. To 
develop this point and to think about how to analyse the influence of STS ideas, 
whether pursued by STS theorists themselves or by others, a fruitful comparison 
is with feminist thinking and lobbying around government policy and the 
associated issue of ‘governance feminism’, about which some academic work 
has been done.
There are many parallels between feminist and Democratic Model (including STS 
/  SSK) approaches, and an overlapping set of issues have arisen in after-the- 
event reflections on attempts to influence Government agendas. Consider one 
particular recent study of feminism by Helen Reece spanning the past two 
decades in particular. In her discussion of feminist analyses of United Kingdom 
legislative discourse on stalking 1996-7, Reece argues that feminists under­
estimated their influence on the debate and the legislation, and discusses why 
this matters. She scrutinises in particular the work of two feminist scholars who 
have analysed the stalking debate, Liz Kelly and Catherine Humphreys:
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‘Kelly and Humphreys believe that feminist research and analysis have 
had some influence on past debates. But the extent to which 
interpretations of stalking rode roughshod over feminist analysis reveals to 
them the fragility of feminist influence on public policy, and conversely the 
fragility of the feminist hold on public policy explains why a feminist 
interpretation of stalking did not prevail:
“Feminists have long sought to name the domestic nature... of 
gender violence, and after almost three decades many assumed 
that this particular battle had been won. However, the fragility of this 
shift is demonstrated by the rapidity with which the ‘stranger 
danger’ discourse has been reasserted... Within this particular 
political and socially conservative milieu, feminist discourses can be 
speedily overridden.”
For them, the debate preceding the PHA [Prevention from Harassment 
Act] illustrates that “even the most simple and basic issues which feminists 
have placed on political and policy agendas can be displaced”’ (Reece, 
2011, p. 209).
Upon examination, Reece found the claims to a lack of influence on the 
Parliamentary discourse to be unsustainable. So much so, that ‘it is hard to glean 
the evidence that Kelly and Humphreys are relying on in their critique of official 
discourse. The lack of empirical data leads me to wonder whether their approach
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is postulatory, which would render their interpretation less perplexing.’ (Reece, 
2011, p. 220). However, the reality of resonances between feminist analysis and 
official discourses raises a further set of issues at the same time as resolving 
some others:
There are (at least) two distinct ways to read any such resonances. On 
the one hand, they can be seen as evidence of feminist influence over or 
capture of policy-making; on the other hand, they can be regarded as 
indicating (no more than?) the appropriation of feminist language. As we 
will shortly see, any attempt to adjudicate here is bedevilled by the 
difficulty of determining the meaning of feminism, that is, which and whose 
views count as feminist.’ (Reece, 2011, p. 223).
While scholars such as Joel Best and Janet Hailey argue for the first broad way 
to understand resonances -  evidence of feminist influence over or capture of 
policy-making -  Lisa Gotell among others argues for the appropriation 
explanation:
‘[Gotell] argues that while “the women’s movement can take credit for 
constructing a discourse that has raised consciousness of men’s “violence 
against women” as a political problem”, this process involved “many 
reinscriptions of feminist discourses”, so that “government recognition of
“violence” has been marked by the appropriation and transformation of 
feminist discourses”. In other words, feminist claims were “subsumed 
within and used to legitimize” government’s own agendas.’ (Reece, 2011, 
p. 224).
But what might appropriation mean? Reece suggests three out of possibly more 
ways of looking at this: that Government is employing feminist language to bring 
about non-feminist policy; that Government is using feminist language to bring 
about feminist goals but with non-feminist motivations and intentions; and that 
Government and feminists are using the same words but giving these words 
different meaning.
With reference back to her own point about the debate being ‘bedevilled by the 
difficulty of determining the meaning of feminism, that is, which and whose views 
count as feminist’ Reece argues that however one interprets appropriation, the 
problem with using this and only this to explain the resonances between feminist 
and governmental discourses is that ‘it relies on the expulsion of significant 
strands of feminism from feminism.’ (Reece, 2011, p. 227). That appropriation is 
nevertheless the dominant perspective within feminist writings, or at least the 
default position, suggests to Reece that Janet Hailey analysis of contemporary 
feminism captures an important dimension of its nature and mode of operation:
‘Answering these questions involves recognising “the profound 
commitment of [feminists] to an understanding of themselves as utterly 
without power (Hailey 2006,14; see also Hailey et al. 2006, 419). In 
relation to the 1990’s in particular, Hailey holds up the puzzle of “the 
profound rupture between the actual, real-world and theoretical power that 
feminism was exercising, and its experience of theoretic and institutional 
powerlessness” (Hailey 2006, 32). Hailey suggests that for some feminists 
this is so strong as to be a syllogism: feminism cannot hold power, 
therefore either feminism does not hold power or this is not feminism 
(Hailey 2006, 344).
Hailey puts forward a number of reasons for this commitment 
including “the proliferation on the left of minoritizing identity-based 
vocabularies in which high-priority political and moral claims can be made 
only by the “marginalized” and the “silenced”” as well as the 
“subordination-theoretical assumption that power is always bad” (Ibid, 14). 
But she goes furthest towards answering these questions when she 
queries “the good faith of feminists who persistently represent feminism as 
unequivocally a political underdog” (Ibid, 32). Such bad faith may lead to 
blind spots (Hailey 2006, 344): “As a form of consciousness, bad faith 
reproduces itself and blocks the radical impulse to examine the ways in 
which our precommitments ensure that we’ll ‘see it because we believe
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it.’” In other words, “bad faith” could lead the data to be slotted into a pre­
existing framework, rather than accorded more open-ended treatment.
Apart from anything else, this matters hugely to the integrity of 
academic research. But even leaving this to one side and turning to the 
“real world”, if Janet Hailey is right that feminism has achieved real power, 
then it is surely crucial to notice and acknowledge this, as “a simple 
predicate of responsible power wielding” (Hailey 2006,14). Otherwise, 
feminism “wages power without owning it” (Ibid, 33), giving feminism the 
capacity to change social life without acknowledging, let alone agonising 
over, the full range of its distributive effects in the world (Ibid; see also 
Hailey et al. 2006, 420).’ (Reece, 2011, p. 228).
Unlike Kelly and Humphreys, to take the scholars Reece focuses on, most within 
the STS and SSK community would accept that at the level of discourse, certainly 
within some areas of debate, themes associated with the Democratic Model have 
become a key part of the debate. Wynne’s complaint, after all, is that 
Government is ‘Hitting the Notes, but Missing the Music’. For Reece, to recall her 
point on resonances between feminist and official discourse:
There are (at least) two distinct ways to read any such resonances. On 
the one hand, they can be seen as evidence of feminist influence over or 
capture of policy-making; on the other hand, they can be regarded as
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indicating (no more than?) the appropriation of feminist language.’ (Reece,
2011, p. 223).
Analogously with Janet Hailey’s point about the refusal of feminism to accept 
influence and power, SSK’s default position of rejecting influence is, I would 
suggest, of a piece with its self-perception as much or more than with reality. This 
requires further discussion and analysis of course, to which I turn next. But even 
if we were to accept in part the self-perception of advocates of the Democratic 
Model, the claim to a lack of influence may still not stand. Many in the STS and 
SSK community would probably sympathise with Gotell’s concerns about 
appropriation. In other words, regarding Reece’s two part distinction between 
those who point to direct influence and those who argue instead for 
appropriation, most would probably take the latter view. But this in turn only 
raises the issue that Reece considers in her outline of the three possible 
meanings of appropriation, which are, in relation to feminism: that Government is 
employing feminist language to bring about non-feminist policy; that Government 
is using feminist language to bring about feminist goals but with non-feminist 
motivations and intentions; and that Government and feminists are using the 
same words but giving these words different meaning.
The analysis of how feminism shaped larger governance policy provides an 
interesting comparison with how STS/SSK thinking may have influenced the
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changing governance of science. In the next three sections I review the 
methodological strategy I employed to interrogate my research questions around 
this issue, and more specifically how I used the case studies to develop the 
analysis of the relationship between governance and Democratic Model ideas.
4.3 Grounded theory, the case studies and case study methodology
As discussed in chapter one, grounded theory is well suited to analysing the case 
studies in this thesis. But grounded theory isn’t a mechanism that generates 
results when one turns the handle. To give a concrete illustration of the 
difficulties, consider a study of professionals’ views of human tissue legislation. 
The authors make this claim for the grounded approach:
‘Our research was qualitative and was carried out with small groups of 
professionals in two centres. Although this limits the generalisations that 
can be made from the data, we were able to identify descriptive codes that 
reflect the real dialogue of the professionals rather than a reduction or 
abstraction of their responses. The analysis of the interview data used 
tools associated with the “grounded-theory” approach to qualitative 
analysis, as described by Glaser and Strauss. Using aspects of this 
approach, a systematic and replicable method of analysis, strengthens the 
validity of the research. Given the above caveats, we do claim that our
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research has revealed insights into how professionals have reacted to 
these changes and that it suggests ways in which the ethical dialogue may 
be carried forward.’ (Campbell, McLean, Gutridge and Harper, 2008, pp. 
107-108).
I share the authors’ aspiration to reveal insights into how the world works, but I 
judge the claim they make for a particular method in isolation as applied to a 
collection of interviews to be too strong. The claim that their research results rest 
upon an essentially scientific and replicable approach suggests a reality test, and 
this poses a problem. One of the authors’ main claims is that while they 
recognise that tensions persist, they hope that they have ‘dispelled some myths 
about insensitivity in professional attitudes.’ They suggest further that ‘despite 
misunderstandings that have arisen on both sides, there is much in the new 
legislative changes that reflects a common cause and common concerns.’ 
(Campbell, McLean, Gutridge and Harper, 2008, p. 108). Based on my own 
experience as a participant in debates, the strength of feeling exhibited in public 
and Parliamentary debate, both before and after 2006, the statements from some 
of my interviewees and other recent academic work (Armstrong, 2008; 2009) I 
would suggest that this is a particular interpretation of the debate, one that, at the 
very least, minimises tensions.
In many ways the strengths and weaknesses of the approach, and the issues to 
watch out for, are similar to those involved in using other social science methods. 
Campbell et al overplay the power of the approach; others underplay it or are too 
dismissive. I was not persuaded by some of the well-known critiques of grounded 
theory. Kelle (2005), rightly in my view, argues that grounded theory is not 
vulnerable to the charge that it ignores the ‘theory-ladenness’ of observation. 
Charmaz (2006), also rightly in my view, argues that while grounded theory 
works particularly well within a pragmatist philosophical framework, it is 
consistent with any and all philosophical frameworks. To generalise: all social 
science methodology is vulnerable to the charge that it is undermined by the 
‘theory-ladenness’ of observation, and all approaches have been developed 
within or influenced by certain philosophical traditions and perhaps fit better 
within some than within others. The important point is that an awareness of these 
issues puts the researcher on guard rather than forces him to reject certain 
approaches or follow particular philosophical approaches.
What marks grounded theory out is that it can facilitate the incorporation of a 
number of ideas and theories into the process of building new theory. Use of it 
must combine empirical, interpretive and critical elements. The researcher must 
also be open to different interpretations and be cautious about making strong 
claims based on use of the approach. I used it within a framework that includes a
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number of methodological and theoretical commitments and judgements, some of 
which have been discussed already and others that are introduced in this section.
Having considered the limitations of any claim to have clearly ‘proven’ an 
argument in a complex area of social science, it nevertheless remains the case 
that case studies are particularly suited to developing causal explanations. As 
Alan Thomas argues: case studies are a form of intensive research; they are 
used primarily to develop an understanding of the way in which causal processes 
work in particular circumstances; they are used to test an idea or ideas; and the 
case study methodology can be applied very well to policy processes, which are 
good examples of cases (Thomas, 1998). He goes on to state, and then tackle, 
an important objection to the approach:
‘It is easy to be criticized for simply finding evidence to fit your 
preconceived ideas. Since you choose the case study and start with a 
theoretical explanation already in mind, then finding evidence to fit your 
pre-prepared story may appear to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Case study 
research can indeed be a matter of using a mixture of mainly qualitative 
methods and subjective judgement to tell a story which confirms what you 
already worked out was to be expected. Yin (1994) argues that this is 
unavoidable but acceptable. The important point is to be open to the 
possibility that the story is wrong or needs changing. If your ideas really
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are open to challenge then simply showing that as more and more detail 
comes to light the same basic explanation remains consistent is in itself a 
useful result.’ (Thomas, 1998, p. 329)
Certainly, I had some ideas worked out, and I used the case studies to tell a story 
through developing the ideas in more detail. But I also tested the ideas, and 
explored some questions, some puzzles. I did this through: a thorough 
examination of the academic literature; 24 in-depth interviews with a range of 
actors collected between June 2008 and May 2011; an analysis of the 231 
responses to Human Bodies, Human Choices] other documentary analysis; and 
reflection upon my own participant observtion in the debate as someone working 
in the field for a number of years.
Michael Burawoy makes the case for what he calls the extended case method 
(Burawoy, 2009). This is defined by its four extensions: ‘the extension of observer 
into the lives of the participants under study, the extension of observations over 
time and space; the extension from microprocesses to macroforces; and, finally 
and most important, the extension of theory.’ (Burawoy, 2009, p. xv). For 
Burawoy, extension of theory is most important because that is how we make 
sense of the world, and because whether we make it explicit or not, it is always 
there.
161
Drawing on Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos he marries his model of the extended 
case method to a fairly strict idea that the purpose of research is to test, and in 
particular to attempt to refute, theory, or parts of a theory. In my view this model 
(especially Lakatos’) works better as a model of natural scientific research than it 
does as one of social science research. But, nevertheless, his emphasis on the 
importance of theory is to the point, and particularly relevant to my study was this 
argument:
‘First, we do not strive to separate observer from participant, subject from 
object, but recognise their antagonistic coexistence...
... Second there can be no microprocesses without macroforces, 
nor macroforces without microprocesses. The question is how we deal 
with their relationship. It requires that we recognise how theoretically 
embedded we are when we enter the field. Rather than seek to repress 
this as bias, we turn it into a resource for constructing the linkage of micro 
and macro. Third, history and sociology do not occupy watertight 
compartments; we are living history as we do research. Conceived of as a 
succession of revisits, participant observation is itself inherently historical 
-  how we see ourselves today is inherently shaped by how we were 
yesterday. Once again theory helps us tie together past and present.’ 
(Burawoy, 2009, pp. 8-9).
In dealing with the relationship between the macro and the micro we look, he 
argues, ‘upon the external field as the conditions of existence of the locale in 
which research occurs. Accordingly, we move beyond social processes to 
delineate the social forces that impress themselves on the ethnographic locale. 
These social processes are the effects of other social processes that for the most 
part lie outside the realm of investigation.’ But at the same time, the locale 
affects, is one of the factors affecting, the external field: ‘Reflexive science 
insists, therefore, on studying the everyday world from the standpoint of its 
structuration, that is, by regarding it as simultaneously shaped by and shaping an 
external field of forces.’ (Burawoy, 2009, p. 42). But how does one, from among 
the many external forces at work, identify those that are most important? 
According to Burawoy:
‘They cannot be determined from the perspective of participant 
observation alone but, in addition, require the adoption of a theoretical 
framework for their delimitation and conceptualization. But theory is 
necessary not just to grasp the forces operative beyond the site but also to 
conceptualise the very distinction between internal and external, local and 
extralocal.’ (Burawoy, 2009, p. 90)
Looking back on his own rather unique life and work, he came to the conclusion 
that a mistake he was prone to make was to pay insufficient attention to or to
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reify the broader forces beyond the ethnographic site, treating them as if they 
were natural and external (Burawoy, 2009, p. 259).
The case studies I chose overlapped temporally, but substantially the most 
recent debate on embryology came after the debate on tissue. Going further back 
in time, in the 1980s there was a major public debate about embryo research 
governance, leading up to the creation of the original Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act (HFE Act 1990). One could go further back, and I implicitly do, to 
the 1960s and the creation of the first Human Tissue Act (1961). That both case 
studies had recent and not-so-recent comparators, and that the cases I studied 
more intensively, the most recent on tissue and the most recent on embryology, 
followed one another quite closely and were in important ways related, allowed 
consideration to be given to the ways in which Government, regulators, the 
respective scientific communities and the various actors interested in both areas 
drew upon prior experiences and resources. This pattern also allowed for 
consideration to be given to the framing of the debates by wider political and 
sociological forces specific to the respective times, roughly 1999 -  2005 and 
2004 -  2008, with a further comparison back in time to the 1980s and the 1960s. 
Finally, it raised and allowed investigation of the extent to which, and also just 
how, in Burawoy’s terms, forces operating beyond the site, those wider political 
and sociological forces, interacted with dynamics that are more internal to the 
cases studied.
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A number of influential ideas within the contemporary literature on governance 
can be examined through the case studies I have chosen, approached in the way 
outlined by Thomas and Burawoy. Implicitly, and to a degree explicitly, themes 
associated with precautionary governance, participation and engagement were 
important in the debate over the regulation of the use of human tissue that led up 
to the Human Tissue Act 2004. The idea that Government and regulators 
engaged with the reality of a plurality of views and sought to marry different 
perspectives through a deliberative process was important in the debate on 
human embryology leading up to the HFE Act 2008, a process that also included 
a formal consultation by the regulator on the issue of hybrid embryos (the most 
expensive consultation it has ever done), incorporating deliberative elements.
That the cases are both similar and dissimilar raised some challenging 
methodological issues. I used the cases for the purposes of both literal and 
theoretical replication (Thomas, 1998, p. 324).
Literal replication means choosing cases to be as similar as possible to each 
other according to the conditions that are considered to be important. The two 
case studies I looked at exhibited similarities in some important respects, not 
least in the connections between the themes associated with new approaches to 
governance that were influential in both debates. In addition both debates were
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contentious and politically charged, involving Government, politicians, regulators, 
natural scientists, social scientists, advocacy groups and the wider public.
Theoretical replication means choosing case studies that are different from each 
other in theoretically significant ways. One difference has already been touched 
upon: precautionary governance and related themes played a greater role in the 
debate over human tissue than they did over human embryos. In the view of 
Government at the time, research practices using human tissue had drifted into 
being out of sync with prevailing norms. Government disapproval of researchers’ 
activities was a powerful force in shaping events around tissue. Further to this, a 
second difference is that though separated by a short period of time, changes 
had occurred in the context. The period around 2000, when governance of 
human tissue was debated, was a particularly turbulent time for the governance 
of science in general.
Another, third, issue to consider is that, in their own terms, the ethical issues are 
different or, at the very least important players in the debate cast them in different 
lights. As Martin Bobrow, a leading UK clinical geneticist put it during an evidence 
session to the Joint Parliamentary Committee scrutinising what would become 
the HFE Bill:
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‘if one looks at the types of ethical and social issues that the two bodies 
deal with, they are hugely different. The HTA is essentially concerned 
entirely with the policing of consent, important but quite trivial in a deep 
philosophical sense. The HFEA with its remit to look at all aspects of 
embryology deals with a much wider, more complex range of issues.’
(Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, 2007, p. 
241).
Perhaps linked to the three factors listed above, there are a number of important 
differences between the cases in the way that events unfolded and the lessons 
that the protagonists have drawn, regarding in particular who was involved in the 
debates and on what side. Descriptively, and simplistically, in the case of tissue, 
Government and some patient groups lined up on one side and put the scientific 
community on the defensive. In the case of embryology, key patient groups and 
scientists worked together to bring Government and the regulator round to 
allowing most things they wanted, albeit under a regulatory regime many were 
critical of. In the latter case there was a historical precedent for this kind of 
alliance in the debates around embryology in the 1980s, leading up to the HFE 
Act 1990 (Mulkay, 1997). Embryo researcher Martin Johnson suggested during 
my interview with him that the different approaches of the two scientific 
communities was key to the way the alliances were created and the different 
ways in which the two debates unfolded:
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The whole business of how tissues were used by doctors to help patients 
never got articulated, they let the small group of patients who were very 
emotionally aggrieved for entirely understandable reasons make the whole 
case, they didn’t go out and attempt to engage with them, they just hid 
from them, in shame almost. They shouldn’t have done that. They should 
have gone out and said: “some of the things that have been done by our 
colleagues are appalling but the majority of us are not like that and this is 
what is driving us.” That case wasn’t really made; it just wasn’t made. I 
tore my hair out - 1 said to my colleagues in pathology “why aren’t you 
going out defending this, you’re going to get clobbered if you don’t; you 
have to go out and be prepared to take the flak”... In the UK on embryo 
research there wasn’t a no go area, for the Human Tissue Act there was. 
You couldn’t somehow appear to attack grieving parents. They didn’t need 
to be attacked, but it could be seen as attack, and you had to accept the 
fact that some people would see it as attack, including some parents. 
People [scientists] didn’t adequately engage, and they’re reaping that 
harvest.’ (Interview, Johnson, July 2008).
The important point in working through the methodological issues that similarity 
and dissimilarity give rise to was to be aware of, to specify concretely, the ideas 
that the case studies were being used to develop and test. These are outlined
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and discussed in the next two sections: 4.4 Precautionary governance, 
participation, engagement, tissue and research; and 4.5 Engagement, 
pluralism, deliberation, embryos and research.
4.4 Precautionary governance, participation, engagement, tissue and 
research
My primary focus in this case study was to develop an analysis that identified 
influences from wider debates on the governance of science in the aftermath of 
the BSE controversy on the development of governance in the context of human 
tissue research, and how in turn debates over human tissue moulded those 
general frameworks. With this aim in mind, in addition to examining the role of the 
media and patient groups I paid close attention in my interviews and in my 
research more broadly to the relationships between those who had a pre-existing 
critical attitude towards medical and medical research practice on the one hand, 
and Government and governance agencies on the other. At a theoretical level, I 
worked through the relationships, both intellectual and interactional, between the 
approaches and activities of STS / SSK theorists and theories on the one hand, 
and normative theorists and theories, such as human rights-based perspectives, 
on the other. Does the tissue case study suggest direct influence or at the very 
least STS language and ideas being used to bring about goals in line with STS 
thinking for non-STS reasons?
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A plurality of approaches to, ideas about and analyses of particular issues related 
to research using tissue have always existed. Ethical, legal, cultural and 
sociological analysis of human tissue is one input into the public discussion of 
and a contribution to the construction of governance of human tissue research at 
any given time. Precautionary approaches can create a space for critical 
approaches to influence policy and governance. However, precautionary 
governance as a process involving powerful state and regulatory bodies also 
moulds and shapes those critical influences when they enter the policy debates -  
through engagement with the political and policy process the issues, ideas and 
questions addressed by the full range of interested parties, including the critical 
ones, have in fact in part been framed by these ongoing processes. Account 
needs to be taken of this moulding when considering the appropriate measures 
of influence on governance and changes in governance.
What, in a little more detail, is precautionary governance? For the editors of Late 
lessons from early warnings, the precautionary principle ‘is playing its part in the 
development of civil society and policy-making during the early 21st century 
which, it appears, will have its own distinctive character, as great in its 
differences as those which set apart previous centuries.’ (European Environment 
Agency, 2001, p. 189). Critics of the principle also endorse the overarching 
importance of the idea. Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky pointed a number of
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years ago now to the different ways in which we can think about the future. 
Precautionary thinking is a particular way, one that is in fact quite novel 
historically speaking: ‘in the [19th] century, prevailing opinion held that the future 
would have better solutions for its problems than the present generation could 
devise. They rejected “overconsuming safety” in favour of allowing the future to 
decide for itself.’ (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, p. 23). Alaszewski and Burgess 
take up and expand upon this historical comparative, and critical, approach:
‘From the late twentieth century, a more precautionary approach has 
emerged, in which the fear of future harm influences the management of 
risk. If a sense of risk is historically bound up with the emergence of 
probabilistic thinking and an orientation toward the future, that orientation 
has become less open-ended in a precautionary approach that casts the 
future principally in negative, potentially catastrophic terms.’ (Alaszewski 
and Burgess, 2007, p. 349).
How does the precautionary principle fit together with governance and then with 
participation? According to Lyall et al, as already noted, governance is now 
widely understood to entail ‘an increased role of non-government actors in policy­
making through various participatory networks and mechanisms.’ This 
perspective foregrounds governance as ‘an inherently political process, 
concerned with articulating different actors’ interests, values and beliefs’ (Lyall,
Papaioannou & Smith, 2009a. p. 261). Combining precaution and governance to 
gain an understanding of process, Sue Oreszczyn, in her study of precaution and 
GM crops, argues that the precautionary approach adopted in the UK helped to 
facilitate the process of including different actors in the governmental process 
(Oreszczyn, 2005).
But how did it help, and in what way? Given the ideas it embraces, adopting a 
precautionary stance opens up a dialogue with groups and interested parties, 
encourages their participation, in a particular way. Precaution involves certain 
assumptions about risks and harms. It is not a simple matter of Government 
listening to the (precautionary) sentiments of groups and interested parties: 
precautionary governance is an invitation to respond with concerns and 
problems, and a license to listen to those who do raise precautionary concerns 
more than those who do not. Precautionary governance played a clear and 
obvious role in the conflict over GM crops. For Miller and Conko, this approach 
led to unreasonable restrictions on what they considered to be a safe technology:
‘As a tool of public policy, the primary shortcoming of the precautionary 
principle is that it incorporates neither coherent evidentiary standards nor 
any clear stopping points... it effectively frees regulators to arbitrarily 
require any amount and any kind of testing they wish; likewise it permits
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them to ignore overwhelming evidence of a products’ (or a technology’s)
safety and to prevent its use.’ (Miller and Conko, 2000).
While different in a number of ways, the debate over research using human 
tissue in around 2000 -  2004 has some similarities with the debate over GM 
crops and food. Research using human tissue became controversial at roughly 
the same time as the debate over GM reached a pitch of intensity, it was framed 
by some of the same political and governmental dynamics, and, echoing the 
mutual dissatisfaction evident in the debate over GM, both proponents and 
opponents of a root and branch reform of the culture and practice of research 
were disappointed by the final Act. McHale (2005) called it a ‘missed opportunity,’ 
while Price (2005) felt that the initial purpose of the Bill had been heavily 
compromised. On the other side many tissue researchers felt they had been 
treated badly by the political process surrounding the Bill and are still angry about 
the Act. An important issue for me to research was the reach-through of political 
debate on the Bill to the terms in the Act and to the practice of the Human Tissue 
Authority (HTA). What could it mean, for example, to consider the HTA as 
embodying a precautionary and participatory approach to governance?
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4.5 Engagement, pluralism, deliberation, embryos and research
My primary focus in this case study was to develop an analysis of the continuities 
and changes in the governance of embryo research, and in particular the 
influence or non-influence of themes associated with the Democratic Model on 
the process of the renewal of embryo research governance. This process began 
around 2005 with a Parliamentary inquiry into the legislative framework, which in 
turn developed into a focused Governmental consideration of the issue spanning 
approximately two years. Initially a Bill was drafted that would have covered both 
human tissues and embryos, and would have established a new regulator for 
both areas. This proposal was dropped and a narrower Bill was proposed and 
passed by Parliament (the HFE Act 2008), essentially updating the HFE Act 
1990. During this period the debate turned into a wider public one and included 
controversy over particular issues. Despite many formal or surface continuities 
with the debates of the 1980s, has the new governance framework in substance 
moved away from its old framing based on the moral status of the embryo into 
more normal, and normally problematic, patterns characteristic of other areas of 
science? Does the embryo case study suggest that some SSK themes directly 
influenced the process of governance renewal and the resulting framework, or
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was it more a case of Government using ideas associated with the Democratic 
Model for different ends?
As compared with the regulation of research using human tissue prior to the HT 
Act 2004, prior to the HFE Act 2008 research using human embryos was more 
clearly and strictly regulated under the terms of an existing Act of Parliament, the 
HFE Act 1990, though there was a feeling that the legislation was becoming a 
little worn; that it was struggling to cover new developments. And in so far as the 
scientific community was closely involved in the process at the start, it was 
pushing, tentatively, for a liberalisation of the regulatory regime, a more 
‘research-friendly’ regime, rather than fighting to be heard in the midst of a 
controversy as with the debate over human tissue. Consonant with the scientists’ 
hope that they might be able to nudge the regulations in a more liberal direction, 
broad support for the principle of research using fully human embryos was 
evident throughout the debates leading up to and on the Bill, and in one way the 
2008 Act is more liberal than its predecessor, in the sense that it allows a wider 
range of research activities than the 1990 Act. But that is only half the story. One 
issue came to dominate the public and political debate on research, the debate 
over hybrid embryos; that is, embryos combining human and animal material. In 
this debate the research community found itself fighting a rearguard action to 
prevent what it saw as a thoroughly misguided proposal from Government to ban 
their use.
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True hybrids, resulting from the mixture of human and animal sperm and egg, is 
one kind of hybrid, but the kind that was most widely debated, largely because it 
was the kind that scientists, or some scientists, had the most interest in pursuing, 
is the kind that is formed by the transfer of a human cell nucleus or the entire 
contents of a human cell into an enucleated animal egg cell. This process, cell 
nuclear replacement [CNR], is based on the technique pioneered at Roslin in 
1996 using cell nucleus and egg from the same species (in the Roslin case 
sheep). Human admixed embryos of this kind have been called cybrids.
In the end the research community persuaded the Government to back down, but 
at the cost of re-enforcing the legitimacy of the regulatory structures about which 
some scientists had been very critical. The HFE Act 2008 allows human admixed 
embryos to be created and used in research under licence from the regulator, the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), in effect treating them as 
if they were fully human embryos, but at the same time distinguishing them.
Overall, attempts to liberalise the regulatory structure failed: the character of the 
HFE Act 2008 is substantively similar to the HFE Act 1990, and formally speaking 
the underlying philosophy of the 2008 Act is the same as the 1990 Act, which 
was based on the work of the Warnock Commission in the 1980s (Warnock, 
1985).
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However, in addition to the formal and substantive continuities between the 
recent Act and the 1990 Act, there have also been some changes in the 
processes of governance. Attention back in the 1980s was focused on the status 
of the human embryo and the limitations that should be placed on embryo 
research because of this. There was limited enthusiasm for re-hashing that 
debate prior to the 2008 Act, and in substance it is not at all clear that regulation 
and restrictions on research relate directly to it. Rather, Government, for example 
in its White Paper (Department of Health, 2006) and in Ministerial speeches on 
the Bill, tended to employ second order arguments: setting boundaries to what 
could and could not be done with human embryos was necessary, it was argued, 
in order to give respect to a plurality of views and in order to meet the twin aims 
of supporting research and meeting public concerns.
The setting of boundaries by Government combined with the emphasis on 
renewal through deliberation places the process firmly within the framework 
suggested by Peters (2011) and Lyall et al (2009). In their conclusion, Lyall et al 
highlight the following set of issues, but also suggest something more:
‘Governance, as both a process and a vision of how the state and society 
ought to interrelate, profoundly reflects the dynamism of change in all its 
facets, political, economic, societal, and this dynamism is thrown into yet
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sharper relief by the challenges laid before us by the life sciences. 
Capturing this dynamism is precisely what governance -  as an effective 
policy process -  should be doing. But, what many chapters have 
demonstrated, is that this remains both problematic and increasingly 
necessary.’ (Lyall, Papaioannou and Smith, 2009a, p. 265).
In this quote tensions within governance are pointed to but governance is also 
projected as an overall framework for the relationship between the state and 
society, for how the state and society ‘ought to interrelate’, with a focus on 
governance ‘as an effective policy process’. This appears to be a somewhat 
different approach to governance to the one mapped out in Tait’s contribution to 
the same collection, the editors’ introductory chapter and also other parts of the 
editors’ concluding chapter. It seems more in line with an ideal, perhaps how 
Laurie, Bruce and Lyall (2009) approach the issue in their contribution. In Tait’s 
piece (Tait, 2009a) and the introductory chapter the emphasis is on governance 
following from the hollowing out of the state. The relationship between 
governance and Government is described, and the tensions that follow from this 
highlighted. In the above quote, though the state is mentioned, governance is 
presented as enveloping both state and society (thus subsuming Government?) 
and is also presented as an ideal (‘how the state and society ought to 
interrelate’). The authors appear to be suggesting that an idealised form of
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governance could smooth over the Government / governance tension and should 
be a political aspiration.
Perhaps, taking the book as a whole, the editors are m fact counter-posing 
deliberation to stakeholder engagement. In other words, perhaps they see the 
former as a good thing but the latter, in the context of science and biotechnology 
in particular, as problematic or potentially problematic. They are quite critical of 
some stakeholder engagement processes, pointing to the non-democratic 
aspects of some of them. But perhaps many of the problems that beset 
stakeholder engagement also beset deliberation? This is an issue I explored 
through this case study, by considering deliberation and deliberative processes 
as a part of and as influenced by the political process rather than as mechanisms 
standing above and for the resolution of conflict.
A deliberative approach including a public consultation was cited as the 
background for the proposals in the White Paper, including the proposed ban on 
the creation of hybrid embryos for research. More favourable public opinion 
expressed during detailed and informed consultation and deliberation (Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 2007; Warburton, 2007) along with a 
reasoned case made by scientists is one explanation for the shift in the 
Government’s position on hybrids in 2007.
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In the hands of Government and regulators deliberative processes often have a 
distinctly managerial character. The public were still quite doubtful about allowing 
research using hybrids in the results published by the HFEA, but it was also clear 
that objections were not strongly held, that people could be won round through an 
emphasis on the medical benefits that might follow the research. The decisive 
factor seems to have been a change of heart at the top: there is much anecdotal 
and suggestive evidence that the regulator, and by this time Government, was 
committed to interpreting the consultation so as to allow research, if at all 
possible.1
Contemporary deliberative processes cannot be viewed as standing above the 
political process, as mechanisms to resolve conflict. But neither can they be 
dismissed with a cynical shrug. Taking the ideas seriously and analysing the 
processes seriously should mean subjecting them to critical scrutiny in a more 
substantive way than contrasting rhetoric with practice and results. A fruitful 
critical approach in my research was to analyse the idea of deliberation 
analogously to the STS /  SSK discussion of reflexivity, which includes, but is not 
confined to, approaches which unsettle claims to academic virtue and privileged 
knowledge (see, in particular, Lynch, 2000).
1 The latter point was given an airing on the Today programme, 26 April 2007. With characteristic 
force, Simon Jenkins stated that ‘the process (consultation) is usually completely cynical.’ A press 
release from the HFEA on the same day stated that public opinion would inform its decision but 
that it would not determine it; that it was important to understand public concerns to help ensure 
that public ‘support and trust’ in research was maintained. In November 2005, roughly a year 
before the Government proposed a ban, the authority had argued that research using hybrids 
should be allowed under license in its submission to the Department of Health’s consultation on 
the Review of the HFE Act.
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter I began by outlining in broad terms some contemporary discussion 
of what has been called the new modes of governance, and situated, again in 
broad terms, my own approach within that. Then, to establish in more detail how I 
approached the issues and to explain how I understood and used the case 
studies, I discussed: governance and governance agencies; how to analyse 
influence, especially the influence of Democratic Model ideas and why a 
comparison with some strands of feminism might be particularly fruitful in doing 
that; and grounded theory and case study methodology. Finally, I outlined the 
particular themes I examined through the two case studies. I now turn to look in 
detail at the first case study, research using human tissue.
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Chapter Five: Precautionary governance, participation, engagement, tissue 
and research
‘Fundamentally, there was a social and ethical time bomb waiting to go off. It is 
no surprise that the explosion of anger when it came was huge. The cause lay in 
two conflicting attitudes. For the parents of a recently deceased child, human 
material, certainly substantial specimens such as organs and parts of organs and 
even smaller samples, are still thought of as an integral part of the child’s body 
and thus are still the child. For the pathologist and the clinician the material is 
regarded as a specimen or an object. It is dehumanised.’
Ian Kennedy et al, 2000
In earlier chapters of this thesis I have already analysed a number of aspects of 
the debate on human tissue research. I have briefly evidenced the issues from 
the perspective of some of the participants and discussed some of the work of 
some academics who have written on the issue. Broadly speaking I have focused 
on the discourse around human tissue. In this chapter I move to a more 
substantive discussion of: underlying philosophical, social and legal theory 
relating to tissue governance; the substance of governance itself; and the 
consequence of this for research using human tissue. As a broad organising
principle I start from Dewar and Boddington’s point, discussed in chapter three, 
that two themes were prominent in the discourse around Alder Hey: that of the 
mad, bad, scientist; and the idea of residual feeling in the dead or parts of the 
dead. In moving from an analysis of discourse to a consideration of the 
substance of governance I modify the first point to consider the less dramatic but 
probably more significant point that, in contemporary discourse and governance 
research as an activity has been singled out for particular, and particularly critical, 
attention. Relatedly, I extend their second point to consider the ways in which the 
status of all tissue has been raised. These two processes, I will show, were 
heavily influenced by a combination of Government and media activity, and 
academic analysis and activism. While much of this chapter implicitly addresses 
my second research question on the impacts of contemporary governance 
regimes on natural science research, towards the end I also reflect on issues 
relevant to my first research question, in other words how STS /  SSK thought 
(and critical rights-based approaches) have influenced governance and policy in 
this area.
With particular reference to the Human Tissue Act, a number of academic writers 
have argued that changes to governance are not in fact that dramatic, certainly 
that they are not as harmful to research interests as some scientists claim. In this 
chapter I present the evidence I have collected, to consider, and challenge, 
arguments on this point from Roger Brownsword, Margaret Brazier, Sheila
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McLean, Graeme Laurie and Jean McHale in particular. I also make some 
suggestions about why the critics of previous scientific practice fail to see 
significant change.
J begin, in 5.1, with a critical analysis of the arguments made by others for 
elevating the status of tissue and restricting /  demoting research. The novelty of 
these ideas, or at least the challenge they posed to mainstream, especially 
natural scientific, thinking and practice, is outlined. Section 5.2 looks at those 
participants who argued for change and why the proposals had limited 
connection with public concerns. As Dixon-Woods observes, there was a great 
deal of speaking for the public and performing the public. In this context the role 
of Democratic Model ideas was particularly important: the issue was less about 
participation understood in a literal sense as it was about participation performed 
by Government and others. Section 5.3 focuses on the Human Tissue Act and 
the consequences for human tissue research. The concluding section, 5.4, 
summarises the main theme of the changing governance of human tissue 
research.
5.1 Elevating tissue, demoting research
The events at Alder Hey hospital in Liverpool fully came to light during the Inquiry 
into paediatric heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary in the late 1990s. The
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report into Bristol noted that the press and other media gave considerable 
publicity to the evidence of Professor Anderson to the inquiry, in which he 
described the various collections of tissue, which existed around the country. ‘No 
doubt with the best of intentions’, argued John Bennett, a former consultant 
gastroenterologist,
‘to show that such collections were normal, the unfortunate Professor 
Anderson happened to mention a large collection at Alder Hey Hospital, 
Liverpool. It was soon discovered that the Professor of Foetal and Infant 
Pathology, Dick van Velzen had built up huge numbers of organs 
between 1988 and 1995. The hospital was sluggish in responding to 
hundreds of resultant enquiries from parents, who formed a support group 
-  Parents Who Inter The Young Twice (PITY II). Pandora’s Box was 
open.’ (Bennett, 2001, p. 167)
Attention initially focused on Alder Hey, but, as Bennett suggests, it could not be 
assumed that practice there was atypical. Or at least it became important and 
necessary to discuss just what was and was not unique about Alder Hey, and 
acceptable and unacceptable about wider practices. Quite quickly, a new 
language came to be used in professional as well as public discourse, and a new 
light cast on professional practice:
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‘It is doubtful whether any physician used the term “organ retention” before 
two years ago. The study of whole organs (fresh, or preserved in jars) and 
histological slides has been an integral part of medical education for 
centuries, and every undergraduate medical school had a pathology 
museum of which it was often justifiably proud.’ (Bennett, 2001, p. 167).
What seemed relatively simple and straightforward to the medical profession and 
researchers prior to the mid 1990s became complex and fraught after Alder Hey. 
The governance of all tissue held in storage and used for research was re­
examined, in the course of which the status of human tissue was made into a 
public issue. In the remainder of this section I draw attention to two broad 
categories of analysis of or approach to human tissue that have come to the fore 
in academic and other writings on the topic, both of which elevate the status of 
tissue and demote the status of research. The first one revolves around ideas 
associated with privacy rights, the second with commodification. The two are 
linked but distinctive.
5.1.1 rights and privacy
The complexities involved in analysing privacy (and property) rights in human 
tissue have been widely discussed by a range of scholars (see, among others, 
Mason & Laurie, 2001, Skene, 2002, Harris, 2002, Brazier, 2002, Herring &
Chau, 2007, Manson and O’Neill, 2007, Price, 2009 and McHale, 2011). I discuss
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them in a little detail in section 5.3 below. For the moment though, distinguishing 
the influences of the different approaches within governance is less important 
than highlighting the fact that all the suggestions achieve the following: (1) 
elevate the status of human tissue; (2) place restrictions on research to one 
degree or another; (3) run counter to previous assumptions and presumptions 
widely held within the medical research community.
The shift brought about by the linked ideas of rights and privacy can be 
highlighted by the critical analysis of these issues by the distinguished 
philosopher Onora O’Neill, who has a long-standing and deep interest in 
philosophical, ethical and legal issues involved in medical practice and research 
and has written extensively on confidentiality and rights. Many natural science 
researchers in particular agree with much of her analysis. In a recent book co­
authored with Neil Manson (Manson and O’Neill, 2007) she outlines a defence of 
what might be called the pre mid-1990s consensus, through a critical 
examination of rights-based approaches to informed consent. Manson and 
O’Neill do not pull their punches. They begin by stating that: ‘the quest for wider 
scope, for higher standards, for better justifications and for regulatory 
reinforcement, which aimed to make consent the lynchpin of biomedical ethics, 
has created intractable problems.’ (Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 2). They 
conclude by claiming that ‘although the details are complex, we believe that 
everyday views that practitioners, patients and research subjects take of
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informed consent, and of the reasons why it matters, are closer to the picture that 
we have offered than they are to the more fashionable views that we have 
criticised.’ (Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 2).
It is important to remember that informed consent was introduced to set 
standards for invasive procedures that carry risks as well as benefits. However, 
in the last fifteen years, they note, this has been extended to secondary use of 
information and tissues. In this application, they argue, the original purpose and 
importance of consent was subverted:
‘If we think of communication as the conveyance, disclosure, broadcast, or 
even communication of information (with the conduit metaphors in play), 
we radically downplay the importance of the rich set of background 
commitments and competencies that are essentially involved in the activity 
of communication...
...Talk of conveying information from one party to another hides the 
fact that what is conveyed is not merely content, but specifically 
propositional content. We inform each other -  we convey information -  
that certain things are the case, or that certain things would be good to 
bring about, or that certain things are possible, unlikely, impossible, hard 
to countenance, and so on...
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... Much current thinking about informed consent is problematic in a 
number of ways. In particular, it does not take enough account of the ways 
in which communication rests upon a rich, but largely implicit, framework 
of assumptions of different kinds and at different levels.’ (Manson and 
O’Neill, 2007, pp. 39, 43, 48)
Concretely, so far as research is concerned, for Manson and O’Neill an agency 
model of informing and communicating provides ‘a framework for a clearer 
account of the point and the limits of informational privacy, and of the relevant 
rights and obligations. It also offers advantages in thinking about second-order 
obligations to assure respect for informational privacy, and suggests that a focus 
on norms of confidentiality may have a number of advantages over appeals to 
data protection requirements.’ (Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 99) Further to that, 
in the research context, ‘nobody has the slightest interest in making facts about 
any individual known. For example, a great deal of medical (not to mention other) 
research uses information about identifiable individuals for entirely impersonal 
ends... Yet if we think that individuate have a right against others possessing and 
using their “personal” information, such studies will be seen as breaching that 
right, and may seem to require consent from each individual whose data are held 
or processed.’ (Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 109).
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Various solutions within a, broadly speaking, rights-based system of thinking and 
governance have been proposed by those who recognise some of the practical 
and philosophical problems. Through couplets, Manson and O’Neill point to, as 
they see it, the limitations of these solutions. For example:
Those who seek to interpret individual autonomy minimally as mere, 
sheer choice may be able to show that informed consent operationalises 
autonomy conceived in this way, but will find it hard to show that this 
conception of autonomy is fundamental to ethics. Those who interpret 
individual autonomy more ambitiously as some form of rational or 
reflective choosing may be able to make a better case for thinking that it is 
fundamental to ethics, but will have difficulty in explaining how it can be 
operationalised by informed consent requirements.’ (Manson and O’Neill, 
2007, pp. 19-20).
‘It might seem that the obvious solution is to insist upon anonymisation of 
personal data, so as to ensure that it does not fall under DPA 98.
However, weaker forms of anonymisation do not satisfy the requirements 
of the Act, and stronger forms do not meet the needs of research.’
(Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 116).
Manson and O’Neill paint things in very black and white terms. In practice, 
governance regimes allow some scope for fudging things, for getting around the 
apparent strict requirements of the DPA 98 and other right-based instruments 
and procedures, or for satisfying them in ways that are not as detrimental to 
research interests as one might imagine, at least in principle. Some of these are 
discussed in section 5.3 below. Nevertheless they point to some important 
conceptual issues and to some very significant barriers to research practice. At 
the same time they highlight the significant shift that has taken place in the past 
twenty years in thinking about human tissue and research.
5.1.2 Gift, commodification and property
A related shift in thinking about research using tissue can be located in social 
science critiques of gifting, in particular gifting as understood and promoted by 
Richard Titmuss.
The idea of gifting tissue, whether for treatment or research, has been analysed 
and critiqued with reference to two notions of gifting, developed and analysed by 
Marcel Mauss and Richard Titmuss respectively. Mauss is a reference point 
because he studied gifts imbued with meaning, primarily in pre-modern societies. 
Titmuss’ focus was more recent, the study of blood donation within a welfarist 
context of mutual obligation after World War Two. Titmuss himself drew upon 
Mauss’ work while also being aware of differences in context and meaning. For
those critical social scientists that reference both writers, Mauss’ work is more 
drawn upon and endorsed than critiqued and Titmuss’ more critically examined 
and rejected, in part or in whole. While perhaps appropriate in a welfarist context, 
the argument goes, the contemporary use of Titmuss’ idea of gift by health 
services and others is problematic in today’s world because Titmuss’ idea of gift 
creates a one-way relationship when commercial entities are involved, as they 
increasingly are: the patient or the member of the public gifts their tissue to 
someone else, who in turn commercialises and makes a profit from it.
It is in casting a critical eye over Titmuss’ notion of gifting that Mauss is 
sometimes drawn upon. However, the application is often forced. Mauss 
described a world in which exchange of gifts was bound up with powerful 
meaning and symbolism; the mis-use of his work lies in the failure of 
contemporary writers to adequately acknowledge that to contemplate transferring 
ideas and conventions from that world to our own rips them out of context and 
takes away their meaning. Mauss did, in the conclusion to his study, suggest that 
the obligations that the giving and receiving of gifts in modern societies are felt to 
create carry with them an echo of social life in some pre-capitalist societies. He 
also suggested that there are virtues in this. However, the main thrust of his 
analysis was that the treatment of objects in such societies was a component 
part of a way of life and a world-view that was radically different from our own in 
modern Western societies (and he was of course writing in the inter-war period).
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In these earlier societies gifts came morally, physically and spiritually from a 
person, creating an obligation to give in return:
The thing given is not inert. It is alive and often personified, and strives to 
bring to its original clan and homeland some equivalent to take its place... 
Thus we see that a part of mankind, wealthy, hard-working and creating 
large surpluses, exchanges vast amounts in ways and for reasons other 
than those which we are familiar from our own societies... Nothing is 
casual here. Contracts, alliances, transmission of goods, bonds created by 
these transfers -  each stage in the process is regulated morally and 
economically. The nature and intention of the contracting parties and the 
nature of the thing are indivisible’ (Mauss, 1970, pp. 10, 31, 58-9).
If Mauss’ work is of limited direct relevance because he was writing about 
radically different kinds of societies from our own, an obvious alternative for those 
critical of Titmuss’ notion of gifting is Marx’s writings on exploitation and 
commodification. Under Titmuss’ scheme, argue Waldby and Mitchell (2006), the 
solicitation of an unconstrained gift of material from the patient or member of the 
public with or without general consent, allows him or her to be excluded and turns 
the body into an open source of biological material for commercial use. Or as 
Donna Dickenson puts it, the patient is the altruist, while everyone else is a 
capitalist. In short, the commodification of tissue leads to the prospect of
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exploitation of the tissue donor (Dickenson, 2009). As with Mauss, however, this 
application of a Marxist framework is at least in part historically and theoretically 
one sided, if not altogether flawed. Consider first some blindspots in an historical 
analysis.
In an afterword to her famous study of the 1832 Anatomy Act, Death, Dissection 
and the Destitute, Ruth Richardson (Richardson, 2000) covered contemporary 
issues, including Alder Hey, which was just breaking at the time of writing. She 
saw some direct comparisons between the past and the present. She was 
especially bothered by presumed consent and also the possibility that an 
international trade in tissue and organs could include not only the things we know 
about -  poor people selling tissue and organs while alive -  but worse, including 
murder. But how persuasive is her history, and of what relevance is it to 
analysing Alder Hey?
There are two significant problems with or at the very least tensions in her 
analysis of the contemporary situation, problems that run through similar 
analyses by other writers. First, the use of past practices and abuses as a 
suggestive framework to understand the present, despite an awareness of 
dramatic changes over time, and secondly a lack of clarity about just what the 
contemporary issue is, informed by a partial or particular reading of the past.
In discussing the context for and opposition to the 1832 Act, Richardson insists 
that to ‘appreciate the meaning of this material, we must come to terms with our 
own hostility to superstition... The significance of the human corpse in popular 
death culture at the time of the Anatomy Act seems to have been coloured by a 
prevailing belief in the existence of a strong tie between body and 
personality/soul for an undefined period of time after death... the result was an 
uncertain balance between solicitude towards the corpse and fear of it/ 
(Richardson, 2000, p. 7). This combination of solicitude and fear was mixed with 
strong and distinct class issues, argues Richardson, drawing on the writings of 
Marxist historian E. P. Thompson. Primarily it was the bodies of the poor that 
were gathered and stolen for research, and in some instances the poor were 
killed and their bodies sold for medical research.
Richardson suggests that this history is of some relevance to the present, in 
particular the meaning of Alder Hey. But she herself believes the context today to 
be radically different. Society’s attitude towards the corpse has changed 
dramatically: bequests came to dominate after the Second World War, and a 
marked trend towards this situation began between the wars. At the same time 
cremations became more popular. This, she says, marked a big change in 
attitudes towards the corpse:
‘More research is needed before the reasons behind this change in public 
attitudes are fully clear. That there occurs over a closely similar period an 
almost parallel rise in the popularity of cremation suggests that the social 
meaning of the corpse and its spiritual associations has changed, and that 
the key period in which this change occurred preceded the Second World 
War. Both trends bespeak a growing disbelief in the spiritual coherence of 
the corpse. The increase in bequests suggests in addition a more benign 
public view of scientific medicine. The possible influence of changing 
attitudes of government towards poverty -  particularly evident in the 
abolition of the Poor Law Board in 1929 -  cannot be ignored. Further work 
will need to be done to see whether the meteoric post-war rise in bequests 
bears an association with the establishment of the NHS in 1948, or of the 
Death Grant in 1949, as would seem to be likely.’ (Richardson, 200, p. 
260).
And while the Anatomy Act is still in force, ‘bequests of bodies now ensure that 
the social injustice it represented before the Welfare State no longer operates.’ 
(Richardson, 2000, p. 283). As is clear from these quotes, Richardson believes 
that much has changed, which must surely cast doubt on the use of the past as a 
framing mechanism for the present. But how reliable is her reading of the past, or 
rather, for she is fairly open about this, what are her biases? While drawing 
heavily on E. P. Thompson, she doesn’t much care for some of the strands of
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working class opinion that Thompson documents. Referencing chapter 16 of his 
The Making of the English Working Class she acknowledges that some working 
class radicals did not share in the repugnance towards dissection. Her dismissal 
of the radicals is rather poor. She presents them, essentially, as dupes of the 
Whigs and the Benthamites: they ‘acted effectively in support of the ruling elite in 
the successful redefinition of poverty as a crime, and the use of dissection to 
terrorise the poor.’ She goes on to praise an analysis by Roger Cooter. Here’s an 
extract from a longer passage she quotes:
“the radicals’ faith in science as a levelling resource directed against 
aristocracy and clergy was an effective source for their cultural exploitation 
by the radical bourgeois promoters of science... Failing to perceive the 
ideological power that Reason had assumed, artisans became its 
victims... destined to promote and safeguard the Reasonable bourgeois 
world.” (Quoted in Richardson, 2000, p. 153).
Of course Richardson and Cooter have a point: the Anatomy Act was loaded with 
class prejudice and can be located somewhere on a continuum with practices 
that extended to the appropriation by one means or another of the bodies of the 
poor. Nevertheless, this can be separated from the distinct point about 
superstition and attitudes towards the corpse, which was of course the radicals’ 
main point. What seems clear is that Richardson’s own social agenda and
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attitude towards the poor has some if not a lot in common with Tory paternalism, 
from which source some opposition to the Anatomy Bill came.
In addition to drawing explicitly on the past, Richardson suggests parallels 
through mentions of the categories commodification, reification and alienation, 
though she does not discuss them in detail or explain what she understands by 
them. This is not untypical in fact: one finds these terms used in a wide number 
of texts on the subject of human tissue research absent detailed theorisation of 
them (see for example Sharp, 2000, Lock, 2001). And in popular and media 
discussion too, which can lead to a process of reinforcement. As Seale, Cavers 
and Dixon-Woods observe: ‘media reporting of child organ retention scandals in 
the UK in recent years has made an independent contribution to the 
commodification of body parts, recruiting them for use in the manufacture of a 
media scandal. Ironically, the scandal was itself about the objectification of 
children’s body parts by bio-science.’ (Seale, Cavers and Dixon-Woods, 2006, p. 
37). There is an important observation in this analysis, but also a question- 
begging component: how was it a ‘scandal’ in the first place, and how did it 
involve commodification?
I discuss the social construction of the response to Alder Hey later in this chapter. 
In concluding this section I discuss very briefly the second aspect of the use of 
Marx’s writings, the use of his ideas on commodiification and his analysis of
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commodity production and exchange in capitalist societies. According to Donna 
Dickenson: ‘Marx distinguished first between attributing “use value” to something, 
objectifying it, and, additionally, making it an object of exchange, commodifying 
it.’ She goes on to argue:
‘What is wrong is making a saleable object of something that should be 
treated as having value in itself, irrespective of what use might be made of 
it. Because people have value in themselves, parts of people, you might 
think, would be particularly problematic. If it’s wrong to make people into 
objects or things -  as slavery does -  and if the body is the person, then is 
it wrong to trade in bodies and their parts?... Once the body is viewed as a 
fully-fledged commodity, we will lose our sensitivity to abuses like many of 
the cases in this chapter. Then it will become much harder to draw the 
line, as proponents of regulated body shopping want to, between rightful 
and wrongful kinds of trade in bodies. Why shouldn’t dead bodies then be 
viewed as one of the rightful objects? Or embryos ranged in a bank like 
dresses on a clothes rack? Drawing fine lines, like the one between 
“custom-made” and “ready-made” embryos, will more readily become the 
order of the day, once we admit that body tissues can legitimately become 
commodities. And some of those lines will be very fine indeed.’
(Dickenson, 2009, pp. 11; 21).
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The problem here is that Dickenson has smuggled an ethical presumption about 
tissue into the analysis without fully arguing for it. For Marx, the issue was not so 
much objectification or commodification but rather a general theoretical notion 
that a commodity must possess a use value -  it must be useful for somebody 
other than oneself -  and it must possess a value, a converted form of which is 
market price. Dickenson’s primary objection appears to be that a use value for 
others is stamped on something, tissue, which should primarily be seen as of 
personal and intrinsic value to the original donor outside of market relations. But 
why should I ‘value’ a bit of blood or some other waste material (from my point of 
view) in such a way that I do not wish it to be traded? If the issue is coercion of 
different kinds to give up and trade whole organs or a debate about the rights and 
wrongs of trading human eggs, then that should be discussed as such, rather 
being swept up in a general claim about the special status of all tissue. That 
would spoil the construction of course. In Dickenson’s and others’ argument, the 
main work is done by extreme examples, such as poor people trading whole 
organs or poorer women in particular trading eggs (Dickenson, 2009), and the 
famous case of John Moore and the very valuable cells derived from his spleen, 
reinforced by slippery arguments down a slippery slope to references to a, we 
must assume, somewhat sinister global trade in tissue and body parts (Waldby 
and Mitchell, 2006). There is something troubling if not clearly objectionable in 
the hyperbolic language and lumping that occurs in some of the commodification 
literature, such as in Sharp for example: ‘within the United States, slaves have
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been marketed as breeding stock, and athletes and their teams are frequently 
bought and sold by elite clients... The medicalization of life, the fragmentation of 
the body, and the subjectification of colonized subjects all potentially dehumanize 
individuals and categories of persons in the name of profit.’ (Sharp, 2000, p.
293).
5.2 Driving change by speaking for the public
In addition to theoretical problems with the commodification literature and issues 
of bad taste, there are steps in the argument that are in reality simply assertions, 
assertions that once examined reveal empirical failures or gaps. A key one, 
which links the commodification literature to the rights literature, is the very idea 
that the public want to be or should be asked about the use of tissue. There are 
many areas of life where we are not asked about things that are done with 
information about us, or indeed with former possessions, especially ones we 
might consider waste. That last word, waste, is a provocative one to some rights 
thinkers and social scientists in this area, because it is their contention that 
natural science researchers have treated our body parts, tissues and cells as if 
they were waste. But if they have, would it be a problem, and if so why? If I am 
not disrespected when my household waste is used by large faceless 
corporations as a part of disposal and recycling processes, why am I 
disrespected if my excised body parts, surgical tissue, spit, urine, blood, faeces
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etc are used in research and commerce without my consent? Moreover, perhaps 
I positively want the medical profession to make use of something I see as 
waste? (For a discussion of this, see Dixon-Woods, Wilson, Jackson, Cavers and 
Pritchard-Jones, 2008).
In the background then to rights arguments, some social science analysis and 
commentary covering the full range of kinds of human tissue there lurk concerns 
about coercion, medical power and commerce, and a judgement that it is not just 
about asking, it is about asking or not asking about things we might reasonably 
think are important and sensitive materials or issues. Mixed into the analyses are 
empirical claims, or assumptions, such as the idea that people want to be asked; 
want to be asked in some detail, and will soon stop donating tissue if this 
exploitation of their generosity is not curbed.
In this section I dig deeper into these issues, examine how they informed 
proposals for legislative reform and show that Government drew on them to drive 
change. In support of this argument, inter alia I discuss the key consultation 
document Human Bodies, Human Choices (HB, HC) and the responses to it.
With this document and the Government’s handling of the responses, it became 
clear that wide ranging legislative reform would take place, on a basis the 
medical profession found quite shocking.
As discussed in chapter two, Richard Tutton, like many other STS and SSK 
writers, thinks that ideas associated with the Democratic Model have had little 
impact on natural science governance. However, while somewhat equivocal, he 
thinks that in the case of human tissue research there might have been some 
impact, or at the very least he is hopeful that this might have been the case:
‘Some recent innovations in governance would suggest that policy advice 
and regulation has become more “participatory”... Created under the terms 
of the Human Tissue Act 2004, the UK Human Tissue Authority is a 
statutory body responsible for regulating and licensing the use of human 
tissue for a range of purposes from transplantation and pathological 
examination to research. The HTA emphasizes that, of its 16 members, 
the Chair and nine others are not from medical professional backgrounds 
but are individuals with experience in the voluntary sector, NHS user 
involvement and patient or public advocacy groups.’ (Tutton, 2009, pp. 56- 
57).
As Tutton suggests in this quote, we need to consider what has been done with 
the idea of participation by governance agencies in addition to thinking about the 
idea in literal terms, and we also need to think about context, for whether 
understood literally, perfomatively or as a combination of the two, patient and 
public participation does not occur in a political and sociological vacuum. The
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urge to develop such approaches and the directions taken are influenced by the 
roles played by various ideas and actors.
Human rights discourses, commodification and a critique of gift relationships as 
theorised by Richard Titmuss provide a set of principles that some think should 
guide and restrict research practices, a set of principles and ideas that also 
informed many of the proposals for participation and involvement. Michael 
Steinmann, introducing the edited collection Altruism Reconsidered, highlighted 
some of these connections in the thinking and work of the contributing authors:
‘Lenk and Hoppe suggest a normative model for the use of human tissue. 
This model relies on the special dignity of the human body. Body parts 
cannot be used without the voluntary and informed consent of the donor. 
This means that any kind of “blanket” consent has to be rejected. “The 
normative objective”, according to the authors, “is cooperation between 
researcher and patient for the benefit of research”, including the need to 
establish ways of benefit sharing. As in previous chapters of this book, the 
idea of a one-way relationship between donor and recipient is replaced by 
a more participatory notion of their relationship.’ (Steinmann, 2009, pp. 6- 
7).
Naturally, a plurality of approaches to, ideas about and analyses of particular 
issues related to research using tissue has always existed. Ethical, legal, cultural 
and sociological analysis of human tissue is one input into the public discussion 
of and a contribution to the construction of governance of human tissue research 
at any given time. But such conceptions are also the outcome of governance 
structures and the processes that construct them. Particular approaches to 
governance create a breathing space for some ideas and cut off the oxygen for 
others. Connected to this, through engagement with the political and policy 
process, the issues, ideas and questions addressed by the range of interested 
parties -  the inputs, to view the process (wrongly) in linear terms -  have in fact in 
part been framed by these ongoing processes.
Ian Kennedy, Chair of the Bristol Inquiry, had a long-standing and prior 
commitment to bringing about change in the culture and governance of medical 
research and practice. In his 1980 Reith lectures and in the book that followed in 
1981, The Unmasking of Medicine, he drew on Foucault and Ivan lllich in 
particular in making his argument that medicine is a deeply political enterprise 
with power concentrated in the hands of the medical profession, to the detriment 
of patients and the wider public: ‘the nature of modern medicine’, he argued, 
‘makes it positively deleterious to the health and well-being of the population’ 
(Kennedy, 1981, p. 26). Medical research, he added, ‘exerts a spell over 
governments and foundations and thus over the public’ (Kennedy, 1981, p. 38).
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In his view, one of the problems with research is that it presents us with a series 
of faits accomplis: ‘It is not a question of whether such and such research ought 
to continue, or to be put into practical application. It has become a matter of how 
we adapt to this development. The medical scientist and technologist has won 
the day.’ (Kennedy, 1981, p. 120). He saw it as his task to try to shatter the 
authority of the medical profession. A key means was through mobilising the 
emerging idea of consumerism in health.
Undoubtedly, one use of the idea of patient and public participation has been to 
challenge the power and autonomy of the medical and medical research 
professions. However, importantly, while some campaigners and influential 
individuals such as Kennedy have pursued a critique for many years, it was when 
Government created a political and policy space for such ideas that pressure was 
really brought to bear. Simon Denegri, Director of the voluntary organisation the 
Association of Medical Research Charities, poses it bluntly:
The Government had regulatory choices, but their political choices were 
very different. So if we go back to that time, the patient choice agenda was 
very hot off the press. The whole thing about giving patients choices, 
about empowering patients, had really surged up the agenda. So that was 
driving things. I think Milburn was completely freaked out by the stories 
behind the stories of what had happened. There was a pretty overt agenda
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at the time about wanting to smash the professions and the hold the 
professions had over the health service. So there were probably lots of 
political reasons for why they rammed it quite hard, well, very hard, from 
the outset. And there were very strong advocates for the patient voice 
within the Department -  such as Harry Cayton and Claire Rayner; these 
were people New Labour trusted from its very first days in office and had 
built strong relationships with, who were on the rise as compared with 
some of the clinical leaders.’ (Interview, Denegri, April 2011)
In the literature and in my interviews with research scientists, it is Michael 
Redfern, Chair of the Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry and politicians, in 
particular Alan Milburn, Secretary of State for Health at the time, who received 
the strongest criticism, rather than Ian Kennedy or others. They are seen to have 
created the space in which untoward ideas and approaches could gain an 
influence on law and policy at the highest levels, or indeed to have directly 
caused this to happen. The scientists believe that attention was directed towards 
those who were aggrieved, that particular responses among these individuals 
and groups were also encouraged over others, and that this was the background 
against which the governance of all tissue, not just particular kinds of tissue from 
particular groups (specifically whole organs from dead children), was recast.
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So while, as I have argued and will argue further in 5.3, a number of principles 
drawn from human rights thinking and law, and other ideas developed by critical 
social theorists were important, it was the framing of the debate by Government 
through a focus on emotionally and politically powerful questions that created the 
political space and leverage for critical ideas and proposals. For Margot Brazier, 
Chair of the Retained Organs Commission, this was in large part appropriate. 
Indeed, for Brazier, precautionary and participatory thinking was vitally important 
given what had happened. We should, she believes, extend our understanding of 
the law of negligence in relation to psychiatric injury by erring on the side of 
protecting people from actions that may so injure them: The knowledge which we 
now share about the impact organ retention has had on bereaved relatives must 
begin to build a case that families are entitled to be protected from conduct which 
may injure them.’ (Brazier, 2002, p. 567). But even Brazier, no supporter of past 
research practice, agrees, in part at least, with the scientists’ complaint that 
Government elicited certain responses and in a sense went too far:
‘I think the Redfern Report is an interesting document. It’s written in a 
highly emotional style. The Bristol Report and The Isaacs Report -  which 
covers a highly emotional issue -  are not. Because of that, first of all at a 
very basic level, it got a lot of publicity. I’m sure the Bristol Report was 
reported in the Bristol Evening News, but it wasn’t as good copy. I think 
the very passion that those who wrote the report obviously had
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themselves then fuelled the expectations of families in Liverpool.’ 
(Interview, Brazier, July 2010).
Milburn, in statements to the press and Parliament, famously said, after reading 
the Redfern Report, that it was the most shocking thing he’d ever read. This 
fuelled reaction further and deeply dismayed scientists. Brazier again:
That’s just rubbish. I mean he’d read the Shipman Report. I sympathise 
with the scientists who found that statement difficult to understand. I think 
the Redfern Report was shocking. It did reveal practices that showed 
disrespect, abysmal treatment of people as people, but Harold Shipman 
killed nearly 300 of his patients. Again I think that Milburn’s reaction gave 
rise to very high expectations, which were always going to be difficult to 
fulfil.’ (Interview, Brazier, July 2010).
To retrace our steps slightly, having established the centrality of the idea of 
patient involvement and choice, and the central role played by Milburn and 
Redfern, consider the literal issue: is this what patients and the public wanted, 
and if the Government’s approach was supported by individual patients and 
patient groups involved in decision-making, how representative were they? That 
the Human Tissue Authority has members from some patient groups as well as 
from other non-medical organisations is neither here nor there at one level. Were
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these individuals voted on with a clear mandate, and if so by whom? Are they 
better considered as special interest groups pursuing their own agendas? Or, 
perhaps the lay members of the Tissue Authority could be considered as 
carefully selected allies of New Labour and the NHS bureaucracy?
However one views the route by which they came to be on the HTA, the lay views 
that attained prominence and came to be represented institutionally tended to 
reinforce New Labour’s perspective that the professions needed putting in their 
place. This still begs the literal question though: was there a great demand for 
patient choice or patient involvement among patients? We might, crudely, 
distinguish between particular groups of patients on the one hand and the 
broader public on the other, and particularly emotive types of tissue and organs 
in particular contexts on the one hand and tissue in general on the other. The 
reality is that empirical research is thin on the ground on such issues, but there 
seems to be a consensus that the public ‘in general’ and even those members of 
the public who were concerned about particular kinds of tissue in particular 
contexts -  most notably parents whose children had died and whose organs had 
been retained at Alder Hey hospital -  were unconcerned or little concerned about 
the wider governance of human tissue about which social scientists have written 
about and over which the Government initiated action. Those involved in 
restructuring governance, from all the perspectives on the core issue of retained
organs from dead children, are agreed on this. Peter Furness, President of the 
Royal College of Pathologists, puts it like this:
‘When the Act was being developed I went to quite a few meetings and 
met the parents of children who were involved in Alder Hey and Bristol, 
and obviously there was much emotional discussion of human tissue. But I 
took the trouble of asking those parents that I met “when you talk about 
human tissue do you mean just post-mortem tissue or are you including 
biopsies, surgical resections and samples taken from the living?” Every 
one of them said to me “no, no, just post-mortem tissue.” And yet, through 
absolute rigid insistence by the Department of Health in England, the Act 
came out covering the whole of human tissue with a definition of human 
tissue that actually includes not only blood, but urine, spit, you name it; 
anything that contains human cells. That is not, explicitly not, what the 
people involved, the parents at Alder Hey and Bristol wanted, and yet 
that’s what we got, and I never understood that. Most research using 
human tissue uses tissue from the living. I still see no significant benefit in 
what the Human Tissue Authority does in covering that area, and I see lots 
of disadvantages.’ (Interview, Furness, March 2010).
Margot Brazier agrees on the specific point. When she suggested to a group of 
aggrieved parents that they might be concerned about tissue taken at surgery
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from the living (‘waste’ material’), she was told that she was ‘taking the Mick’ 
(Interview, Brazier, July 2010).
Turning, or returning, to the specific issue of particular kinds of tissue and 
particular patient groups, it would be a mistake to regard sentiment expressed by 
some groups as typical of all of those with ill children or whose children had died 
in hospital. Dixon-Woods and colleagues argue that other groups’ attitudes are 
better captured by Rose and Novas’ notion of ‘biological citizens’ working in close 
collaboration with professionals:
‘The childhood cancer community described by participants in our study 
includes a collectivity formed around a biological conception of a shared 
identity, in the form of the family members who identify themselves as 
“biological citizens” in the sense proposed by Rose and Novas (2005). But 
the community, as perceived by these family members, extends well 
beyond the confines of the biological collectivity to also include health 
professionals and scientists involved in childhood cancer. The interests of 
the community—improvements in the diagnosis and treatment of childhood 
cancer, and participation in the ‘political economy of hope’ (Novas, 2006)— 
were thus felt to be the same for all members of the community, whether 
patients, families, professionals or researchers.’ (Dixon-Woods, Wilson, 
Jackson, Cavers and Pritchard-Jones, 2008, p. 72).
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So where did the broad regulatory impulse come from? For Sheila McLean, an 
academic lawyer who was also Chair of the Scottish Independent Review Group 
on the Retention of Organs at Post Mortem, in the early stages of the debates the 
Government thought things through to an extent, but was also largely reactive 
over Bristol and Alder Hey and what should be done. The media storm and very 
fact that the Government had organised inquiries then reinforced a ‘something 
must be done’ mentality. Later, in her view, a lot more thinking and deliberation 
went into modifying the proposals to take account of the concerns of the medical 
profession:
‘I think it was thought out to an extent. I think it was thought out from the 
starting point that whatever else they did they had to get consent into this. 
That was partly I think because of the ferocious media storm that arose 
around it as well as the high profile cases, and the fact that they’d invested 
gigantic sums of money, in England at least, in two full-scale enquiries.
The only constant that came out of these inquiries was that people should 
have been asked for their consent. So I think at that point there was no 
other option. There was no way the Government was going to say 
anything else. But having done that they then did try to respond to the 
interests of the medical community and the scientific community, which in 
my view were grossly exaggerated in any case and not always particularly
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relevant. So, to that extent the Government had thought it through, but I 
think it thought it through from the wrong position.’ (Interview, McLean, 
March 2010).
However, as discussed and argued above, another reading of events is that 
Government did much to encourage the media storm. It was keen to be seen to 
be doing something about perceived public concern, but this was concern it had 
helped to create. It then took the opportunity to outline proposals for reform of 
governance that went far beyond the immediate issue of retained organs.
Redfern had not considered this wider agenda; that was not in the Committee’s 
remit. The motivation for this wider reform came from within Government, more 
specifically from the Chief Medical officer and his team. Hugh Whittall, the lead 
civil servant at the time, argues that Government took hold of ideas that were in 
the air, as well as rhetorical statements made by the General Medical Council, 
the Medical Research Council and others, and turned them into a reality:
There was not a kind of lobby group; there was not a big groundswell of 
opinion. I don’t think there was a sense of something about to erupt. But 
rather I think it was that there was a feeling that we were part of a shift in 
the relationship between individuals and health services. At the time the 
language of choice and partnership were very, very much what the 
political environment was about: about patient choice, about patient
214
partnership, about engagement, about non-paternalistic approaches to 
medicine and healthcare. And so I think this was very much kind of 
catching that wave and believing that to make assumptions about what 
people might think is OK, or to make assumptions that “because we’re 
doctors and we’re doing good things everybody will be happy with it” was 
no longer acceptable as a basis for a practice. Starting afresh you would 
say, no, bits of people’s bodies, the starting point is them, and so I think 
that it was not that there was a body of dissatisfied opinion growing out in 
the public, but rather that this would help to maintain that change in a 
much wider culture of how we relate to not just health services but health 
sciences....
... I hadn’t thought about it before but I do just want to come back to 
emphasise again this point, which is that despite all of that, and despite 
what seems to be the evidence that researchers find the current conditions 
difficult, I do think that this reminder is important, the reminder that all the 
previous guidance was as restrictive. It just was ignored. That was part of 
the background. We could not continue in a situation whereby researchers 
were continually in breach of GMC guidelines. That was just untenable. 
And MRC guidelines.’ (Interview, Whittall, May 2010).
The way forward was outlined in the CMO’s response to Redfern in January 
2001. Eighteen months later, the consultation Human Bodies, Human Choices
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expanded on this wider agenda. This was a key turning point in the debates. It 
was now very clear to the medical profession that wide ranging legislative reform 
would take place, on a basis they found quite shocking.
My own analysis of the responses to Human Bodies, Human Choices (which are 
retained by the Department of Health and to which I was granted access) is that 
out of 231 Reponses the majority could be described as neutral, though this is 
not straightforward. Some in this class consisted of a brief note on a particular 
aspect. The brevity or specificity could be taken in more than one way: for 
example as supportive of the broad thrust of the document or alternatively as a 
resigned acceptance of the broad thrust. That the brief mention of a particular 
aspect was often a defence of past practice could be taken to imply that the 
author of the note was critical of the thrust of the consultation document, or it 
could be taken to mean that they thought it was OK on the whole, but needed 
correcting on a small point. It is hard to be sure.
What is clearer is that around 50 were supportive of the proposals put forward by 
Government. Of these, some came from professional organisations, such as 
transplant societies, but the majority came from individuals, many of them 
members of the public, a good number of whom had a direct connection to the 
issue. Some if not many of these were very brief indeed; for example hand­
written comments on a leaflet issued by the Department at a meeting it organised
in Liverpool. What is also clearer is that around 40 were clearly critical of the 
proposals put forward by Government. Of these, the majority came from 
professionals or professional organisations, pathologists in particular, but not 
entirely so.
The document Summary of responses to the consultation report, \n other words 
the document in which the Government (specifically the Department of Health) 
considered the responses to Human Bodies, Human Choices, followed the 
original document closely in terms of the main themes and proposals. Moreover, 
it argued that the majority of or even all respondents agreed with the original 
document on most or all issues, including the need for a system of strict consent 
and a system of criminal penalties. Regarding the latter, it stated: ‘the response 
to the consultation suggests broad support for the approach in Human Bodies, 
Human Choices... imprisonment should be included as the most serious 
penalty... the new systems being proposed should ‘enable, not hinder, education, 
training and research.’ (Department of Health, 2003, pp. 9,16, 24)
As the Government was soon to discover when it carried these proposals over 
into the Human Tissue Bill, published in December 2003, this support was not as 
broad as suggested. But in reality, it was never really there in the responses. It 
seems highly unlikely that the Government was unaware of this. It is not simply
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that 40 of the responses were critical; some if not all of them were clearly so.
Consider the following extracts from Cancer Research UK’s submission:
The report [HB, HC\ is written within a framework based on concepts and 
principles. However, it fails almost completely to define unambiguous, 
practical guidelines for dealing with any real situation...
... The report appears to threaten both extensive regulation and 
significant penalties for “responsible individuals” if these regulations are 
not observed. While Cancer Research UK believes that everyone would 
support severe penalties for individuals who deliberately set out to flout 
agreed regulations, the suggestion of penalties for inadvertent lack of 
compliance is misconceived and likely to be very damaging...
... The question (example 2, p. 181) about penalties for a technician 
who used pathology slides for teaching when there had been consent only 
for research is another, extraordinary, comment on the mind-set that 
apparently some people have reached. What possible importance could 
there be in a distinction between anonymous sections from a pathology 
lab being used for teaching rather than research... think of the 
bureaucracy needed to ensure that all the tens of thousands of samples in 
a pathology department were clearly labelled to indicate what was 
permitted. And to what conceivable end?...
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... The discussion (section 9, 37, 9-40) [question 9k] about disposal 
of human tissue seems another example of marginal concerns obscuring 
some real issues. Can it really be helpful to spend time debating whether 
“disposal” is a suitable term? Do we really need a discussion about 
“respectful disposal” of tissue removal (sic) at operation? Blood soaked 
swabs to be given a decent burial?’
This response, while strongly put in places, was far from being exceptional. 
Another theme in some critical responses to HB, HCwas that the powerful 
emotional response of a small group was unrepresentative and threatened the 
interests of the vast majority. In his response Peter Furness reported on a survey 
that found that 99% of over 2000 patients surveyed were happy for waste from 
surgery to be used in research, even if this involved transfer of tissue to a 
commercial organisation.
The simple and obvious interpretation is that Government was attempting to 
pursue change in the face of a confused and somewhat hostile, if also slightly 
cowed, medical profession. CRUK’s submission was direct and to the point. Not 
all critical responses were so clear. That some of the more gentle or gently put 
criticisms were also ignored was to store up problems for later. Of particular note 
is the submission from the Medical Research Council. As discussed above, Hugh 
Whittall argues that the Government, in the Human Tissue Bill, was in effect
holding the research community to, among other things, MRC guidelines. There 
is something in this, and for some other organisations the MRC guidelines were 
problematic for just this reason -  CRUK described them as ‘unhelpfully 
burdensome’ and argued that ‘the zeal to explain every nuance of what would 
happen to a sample was perceived [by researchers] to lead to a consent process 
that was threatening, difficult to understand, and discouraging to the research 
participant.’ But the Government not only endorsed the MRC’s guidelines, it 
firmed them up, interpreting them in a particularly rigid and simplistic way. In its 
submission to Human Bodies, Human Choices, the MRC pointedly noted:
‘The Council welcomes the endorsement of its own Guidelines in this 
paragraph. There is one difference, though. The Consultation states: 
“Patients should be asked whether organs or tissue left over following 
diagnosis or treatment may be retained and/or used for research”. The 
MRC guidelines state: “Patients should always be informed when 
material left over following diagnosis or treatment (described as surplus to 
clinical requirements) might be used for research. Wherever practicable, 
and always when the results of research could affect the patient’s 
interests, consent should be obtained to the use of such surplus material.” 
We continue to prefer the wording in our own Guidelines.’
The more complicated explanation is that Government was subjectively and in 
many ways practically very much in favour of aspects of, if not much of, medical 
research and practice. It was, for example, around the same period, re­
organising cancer services and research in a way that included a particular 
enthusiasm for clinical research and an injection of extra money. Of a piece with 
enthusiasm for research and in tune with its centralising tendencies, New Labour 
was keen to promote a system of consent for researchers working with larger, 
organised, collections of material for research: biobanks. A number of leading 
researchers and professional bodies were closely involved in developing these 
initiatives and new structures.
The Government thought it was, or found it easy to believe that it was, possible to 
promote both medical research and an agenda of patient choice and participation 
that drew upon aspects of the Democratic Model. Keen to receive the extra 
money and to work with Government, and not known for overt campaigning, 
some of the august medical bodies failed on the whole to communicate their 
concerns about the direction of travel around tissue in a way that would make 
Government and civil servants sit up and take notice, until, that is, they felt they 
had no choice following the publication of the Bill.
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5.3 The Human Tissue Act and human tissue research
In this section the changes from the Bill to the Act, the role of the Human Tissue 
Act within the wider nexus of research governance systems and the 
consequences for research are examined. In some ways the outcome has left no 
one satisfied, at least none of those with a keen interest in radical change on the 
one hand and supporters of old systems of research practice on the other. But 
while the dissatisfaction of proponents of change suggests that the medical 
profession did recapture some lost ground during the Parliamentary debates, it 
does not, I argue, show that the profession achieved anything like a return to the 
situation prevailing prior to the controversy around Alder Hey. Change is real and 
in part at least harmful to research practice.
David Price was an academic lawyer who argued that human rights principles 
should, indeed must in some way, apply to the use of human tissue in research. 
He nuanced this with the argument that consent is always propositional and 
context specific. But when it came to who should have the power to decide what 
happens to tissue, Price was clear: the most important thing was that the 
individual patient or member of the public has the authority to decide and should 
have the opportunity to do so. He was sympathetic to the idea of individual 
property rights or at the very least favoured a rights-based framework with similar 
powers:
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‘An overarching legal and ethical framework is essential. A rights-based 
framework set against a dignitarian baseline reflects the most appropriate 
skeletal regulatory model, with individuals themselves having prima facie 
authority and control over materials emanating from their own bodies, best 
captured in the notion of property rights and donation in terms of 
(conditional) gifts. Such rights attach even to the use of one’s corpse after 
death, and reflect posthumous interests deserving of protection.’ (Price, 
2009, p. 283)
For Price and others the core issue is simple and should not be controversial: it is 
about asking people for their permission; it is a basic issue of respect for the 
individual. The Government made these and similar arguments during the 
passage of the Human Tissue Bill through Parliament. Indeed, the ‘Golden 
Thread’ running through the Human Tissue Bill was consent. Sheila McLean 
believes that ‘people are no longer prepared to be the passive recipients of 
medical beneficence or to have themselves or their families treated merely as the 
“subjects” of research.’ (Campbell, McLean, Gutridge and Harper, 2008, p. 108). 
She argues forcefully that human rights provide the bedrock-principles that must 
govern research of whatever kind. For McLean, the reaction to Alder Hey was 
driven not primarily, or not simply, by powerful emotion linked to the death of 
children and the taking of whole organs, but rather by the lack of respect shown
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by the taking of the organs, an attitude that in her opinion extended across all 
research using human tissue, from whatever source, whether from the living or 
the dead, whether large or small, whether identifiable or anonymised: ‘I don’t 
think they [researchers] can presume to know what is important to people and 
what people’s feelings are about anything, however small it might be.’ (Interview, 
McLean, March 2010).
Natural scientists, especially in the final stages of the Parliamentary process, 
pressed hard to amend the Bill, so as to, in relation to the specific issue of 
consent, break the Golden Thread. In part they were successful. Under the terms 
of the Act, it is possible to use anonymised tissue without consent, if a Research 
Ethics Committee grants approval. Natural scientists and their allies did not 
however manage to defend the possibility of using identifiable tissue without 
consent in particular circumstances, and nor did they manage to escape from 
what they regarded as the trap of consent and regulatory requirements that bore 
little relationship to real practice or the real concerns of most patients.
Nevertheless, that researchers managed to remove the need for consent in some 
circumstances when using anonymised material and more broadly that 
Government Ministers made a number of ‘pro research’ statements during the 
final stages of the Parliamentary process has led McLean and a number of legal 
and social science analysts to the conclusion that the influence of privacy rights
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and concerns about commodification on the final Act are fairly weak, and that in 
reality it is largely business as usual.
For example, reflecting on the changes that have occurred in legislation and 
governance more broadly, the problem for academic lawyer Jean McHale is 
precisely that anonymisation is allowed in some circumstances as a tool of 
research, because this subverts what she sees as the key principle of individual 
control, rights and participation in research and may indeed be dubious, on legal 
grounds. Broad change is needed, she concludes, ‘before we are forced to by 
another crisis or scandal such as Alder Hey.’ (McHale, 2011, p. 245). Or consider 
legal scholar Roger Brownsword’s overall assessment. As discussed in chapter 
four, in his Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution, he examines 
how the utilitarian, the rights and the dignitarian perspectives use and regard key 
concepts, especially consent, harm and precaution (Brownsword, 2008). 
Brownsword’s analysis, which he applies to human tissue governance as well as 
human embryology governance among other areas, is that utilitarianism, with 
some ethical and political limits, is the default position. Regarding the Human 
Tissue Act, he argues that:
‘Although consent has been proclaimed as the cornerstone of the UK 
human tissue legislation, the underlying rationale is essentially utilitarian. 
Thus, according to a House of Commons Research Paper (No 04/04 on
the Human Tissue Bill), the government believes that the effect of the 
consent provisions will be to “prevent a recurrence of the distress caused 
by retention of tissue and organs without proper consent”, to “help improve 
public confidence so that people will be more willing to agree to valuable 
uses of tissues and organs” (such as for research and transplantation 
purposes) and to “improve professional confidence so that properly 
authorized supplies of tissue for research, education and transplantation 
can be maintained and improved” (p 4).’ (Brownsword, 2010, p. 26)
Specifically on privacy and consent, for Shawn Harmon and Graeme Laurie, the 
protection of privacy that is enshrined in Article 8 of the Human Rights Act (HRA)
1998 is a basic legal fact that has to apply in some form but that need not and 
should not have particularly negative consequences for research. Like many of 
the rights protected by the HRA 1998, the application of Article 8 is a balance 
between 8(1), a clause that sets out the basic principle of protection of private 
and family life, and 8(2) that sets out qualifications to that principle. What is more, 
and again typically, the application of the law is context specific and subject to 
interpretation. For Laurie the influence of this legal framework has not led to a 
strong or powerful protection of individual control rights in the Human Tissue Act. 
If it had, he argues, the Act would recognise an intrinsic individual property right, 
whereas in fact it rejects this idea in favour of the idea that professionals can
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create a property right for themselves over the patient’s tissue through working 
on it (Harmon and Laurie, 2010, and Laurie, personal communication).
Certainly then, for critics of the pre-mid-1990s position, the usual conclusion is 
that changes to the governance of human tissue research are neither as 
extensive nor as negative for research as some natural scientists claim. What is 
more, some think many natural scientists are coming around to realising that this 
latter point is a correct and fair assessment. It is quite possible, likely in fact in 
McLean’s view, that we hear from the disgruntled, pathologists in particular, more 
than we do from the contented. McLean believes that changes are taking place in 
the attitudes of researchers, and that outside of the pathology community the 
Human Tissue Act can be, and often is seen to be by the researchers 
themselves, helpful for their work. This is based on a fairly robust view of the 
need for change in practice, as we have seen above, but nevertheless she also 
thinks that the profession is not as hostile as is often made out. To the extent to 
which there continues to be resistance to new ways of thinking, and new ways of 
working in so far as there has been change, from within the research community 
more broadly, this is perhaps best explained by generational issues:
‘There’s a whole new generation of doctors who are being educated 
differently, and scientists, who are being educated to integrate ethical and 
legal values in their education and so they don’t see themselves as just
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being stand alone, isolated from their community, people who can do what 
they want because they have this special expertise. So, I think these kind 
of objections would have faded anyway as older generations of people left 
the business.’ (Interview, McLean, March 2010).
In the subsections that follow I challenge the interpretations of McLean, 
Brownsword, Laurie and McHale. Building on the arguments of sections 5.1 and 
5.2, and drawing on Gillott (2006), interview material and an assessment of 
survey data, I argue that change is substantive and has been damaging to 
research interests.
5.3.1 Governance, research, rights and consent
The first and most general issue to highlight is the way in which research more 
than other activities was subject to particular, and critical, scrutiny. Brownsword’s 
suggestion that the focus on consent was largely formal and that the main 
concern of Government was the utilitarian one of promoting research fails to take 
account of the substantive implications of consent provisions not just in the Bill 
but also in the Act and the wider governance context of which it is a part.
At a general level Dixon-Woods and Ashcroft note that, as far as the research 
community is concerned it is the designation of an activity as research that is 
today critical to how it is controlled, not ‘the inherent “riskiness” of the activity.’ It
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is the social characterisation of the activity and, crucially, the range of institutional 
arrangements that follow from this that is the cause of the difficulties for 
researchers: The institutional risk (the one that requires the institution to be able 
to make displays of the robustness of its systems) takes priority over the risks to 
society. The social policing of ethics and governance itself reinforces this 
tendency... the practical consequence for researchers is that procedural 
compliance with regulatory requirements is inescapable.’ (Dixon-Woods and 
Ashcroft, 2008, p. 387).
Research using human tissue is isolated in this way in the Human Tissue Act. In 
broad summary, unlike other professional activities, such as audit or the sharing 
of information for clinical purposes, the activity of research using human tissue is 
considered as something apart and something especially invasive. In the Bill any 
research use of tissue, whether anonymised or not, would have required consent. 
In the Act anonymisation can be used instead in some circumstances. But the 
default expectation is that consent should be gained. Furthermore, it is consent of 
a particular kind. David Price, unlike some other academic lawyers with an 
interest in this area, proposed that a system of tacit or implied consent should be 
used more widely in the research context. Many clinical researchers think this is 
how things worked in the past and it is how they would like things to work in the 
present. However, Price recognised that this is not in fact how others see it, and 
crucially not how the drafters of the Bill and the Government intended it -  it is not
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made explicit in the Act, but it is widely thought that the Human Tissue Act is 
based on a system of explicit consent, insofar as particular activities under the 
Act require consent, which in turn reflects the political context of the Act’s 
gestation (Interview, Price, July 2010).
In a little more detail (see Gillott, 2006, for a fuller discussion), the original Bill 
proposed that all research required consent. However, before entering the Lords, 
changes were made and clarifications given in response to severe criticism from 
what Lord Warner later called the ‘medical-scientific establishment’:
‘Following extensive discussion with a range of medical research interests, 
including many eminent people in that sphere, amendments were also 
made in another place to provide for the use, without consent, of residual 
tissue from living patients in research, provided that the tissue is effectively 
anonymised and the research approved by a research ethics committee.’
(Lords Hansard, 22 July 2004, columns 369-70).
The HT Act lists, in Schedule 1, Part 1, purposes requiring consent. Included in 
the list is: ‘6. Research in connection with disorders, or the functioning, of the 
human body.’This is an extension and elucidation of general principles outlined 
at the very beginning of the Act, in Part 1. However, in Part 1 of the Act we also 
find that sub-sections 1 (7)-(9) provide:
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‘(7) Subsection (1)(d) does not apply to the storage of relevant material for 
use for the purpose of research in connection with disorders, or the 
functioning, of the human body if-
(a) the material has come from the body of a living person, and
(b) the research falls within subsection (9).
(8) Subsection (1 )(f) does not apply to the use of relevant material for the 
purpose of research in connection with disorders, or the functioning, of the 
human body if-
(a) the material has come from the body of a living person, and
(b) the research falls within subsection (9).
(9) Research falls within this subsection if-
(a) it is ethically approved in accordance with regulations made by the 
Secretary of State, and
(b) it is to be, or is, carried out in circumstances such that the person 
carrying it out is not in possession, and not likely to come into possession, 
of information from which the person from whose body the material has 
come can be identified.’
A similar couplet—stating the general principle of consent then excluding
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anonymised samples—governs genetic analysis (Part 3 ,45 & Schedule 4, Part 2: 
10). Uncertainty remains as to the circumstances in which it is expected that 
consent should be sought rather than relying on anonymisation. Lord Warner’s 
statement in the first Lords debate—on the possibility of research without consent 
using anonymised samples—was repeated several times by the government in 
response to probing by Peers. However, save reiterating that RECs would 
consider the issue, statements in the debates on this question always contained 
an element of ambiguity as to the circumstances in which consent should be 
sought.
Statements also contained an element of ambiguity as to whether and when 
consent could be broad or general, and when it should be more specific. For the 
government Lord Warner, in the first Lords debate, upheld the validity of generic 
and enduring consent in the following terms:
The Bill does not set out the form consent should take in any particular 
situation. Let me state clearly that the Bill does not require consent to be 
specific to each research project for which tissue might be used. Consent 
can be broad. Consent to research can be generic and enduring.’ (Lords 
Hansard, 22 July 2004, columns 369-70).
This same point had been made by the government in the Commons debate and
was repeated several times subsequently. In the Lords debate at Report stage, 
Onora O’Neill (Baroness O’Neill in this context), along with many other 
knowledgeable members of the Lords, welcomed such Ministerial comments.
She supported (unsuccessful) attempts to have this inserted into the Bill. Earl 
Howe explained the keenness to see the statements written into law:
‘... worries persist. They persist principally because of the requirement for 
specificity of consent laid down by many research ethics committees. They 
also stem from the fact that the Bill is silent on the whole matter. If we are 
serious about the need to maintain the momentum of medical research in 
this country, and about imposing on it the least possible administrative 
burden, there is a case for ensuring on the face of the Bill that obtaining 
generic and enduring consent will be one option open to medical 
researchers when presenting their proposals to research ethics committees 
for approval. A signal of that kind would be important for the HTA.’(Lords 
Hansard, 15 September 2004, column GC 517).
This illustrates the sometimes-perplexing character of the regulatory regime 
facing researchers at the moment. The government argues that generic and 
enduring consent is valid. The government also states that they cannot second- 
guess the decisions of Research Ethics Committees, to whom they are looking to 
make the decisions in practice. At the same time RECs often insist on specific
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and time-limited consent. They in turn look for guidance, but receive little from the 
government beyond general statements. Researchers find themselves caught in 
the middle, and increasingly feel themselves to be knocked from pillar to post.
In addition to pressing for amendments to legitimise generic and enduring 
consent, Baroness O’Neill and Earl Howe also pressed the Government to 
accept amendments that would have allowed research using identifiable tissue 
without consent subject to appropriate ethical approval. The attempt to amend 
the Bill in ways that might appear to be contradictory—reinforcing the legitimacy 
of general consent and simultaneously seeking a mechanism for the confidential 
handling of identifiable tissue without consent—further illustrates the complexity 
of the issue. At the heart of the problem is the tension between the pressures of 
clinical practice and the complexity and open-ended character of research on the 
one hand, and the ideal of express and informed consent on the other. No matter 
how often the government states that generic consent is valid, the concern 
remains that in specific circumstances it might be thought insufficient.
So, in summary on research and consent, while apparently simple, in fact it is in 
practice not always at all simple to satisfy consent requirements, or to know in 
advance what will count as satisfactory consent. Sometimes it is very hard even 
to set about gaining explicit consent, especially if someone else has already 
collected the material. All in all, typically it is not direct prohibitions that are the
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main cause for concern so much as a collection of principles and structures that 
are difficult to negotiate. Ambiguity, which in less restrictive governance 
structures can be positive for research, is at best a mixed blessing for tissue 
researchers: to this day projects founder because it is unclear as to whether they 
are service development or research (Cronin, Rose, Dark and Douglas, 2011). 
Some even find it difficult to publish results for similar reasons (Sebire and Dixon- 
Woods, 2007).
5.3.2 Waste and consent
The second issue to highlight is the basic or background one that many if not 
most people, even those concerned about the original issues thrown up by Alder 
Hey, think asking about consent to the use of waste material is, as Peter Furness 
argues, ‘not, explicitly not’, what they were concerned about. In the narrative of 
those advocating change this is not considered relevant, or is passed over to an 
extent. So, McHale may believe that anonymisation of any kind of tissue followed 
by research on it without consent risks a repeat of the Alder Hey scandal.
McLean may believe that not asking to examine a urine sample or a piece of 
waste surgical tissue and not asking to retain and examine a dead child’s heart 
both reflect an underlying lack of respect for people. But the reality is that these 
were neither the concerns of most of those involved in Alder Hey nor the 
concerns of the public more broadly, in so far as we know anything about their 
views.
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Nevertheless, focusing on Alder Hey, rather than McHale’s fears about a new 
one, governance arrangements were put in place to cover all kinds of tissue. 
Implicitly or explicitly, many of the proposals and changes relied on Democratic 
Model ideas and precautionary thinking about public opinion and concerns, as 
well as the dangers inherent in professional practice. The issue, in other words, is 
as much about starting points as finishing points: the very fact that waste material 
was drawn into an explicit governance structure represented a powerful shift in 
research governance. It was a basic aspect of the way in which research was 
isolated within governance, as discussed above in 5.3.1, and a significant 
contributor to the complexity also discussed in 5.3.1.
Of course the way in which waste material was included in the final Act might not 
have created a clear and firm right of individual control, still less, as Laurie rightly 
points out, an intrinsic individual property right. But just because the change 
wasn’t startling doesn’t mean it isn’t significant (for a critical examination of what 
a property right might mean, see Dixon-Woods, Cavers, Jackson, Young,
Forster, Heney and Pritchard-Jones, 2008, p. 144). Or, put another way, just 
because control wasn’t handed completely and clearly to the individual patient 
does not negate the fact that Government enactment of participation took away 
some control from the professions.
That some control has been taken away is clear to researchers and a source of 
some anger. In today’s world of research there is much to be gained by linking 
multiple data and tissue collections. Anonymisation is possible, but to link the 
different sets someone needs to be able to return the data and samples to a non- 
anonymised form, even if only temporarily. The idea that Trusted Third Parties’, 
perhaps collected together as a formal or quasi-government agency, should 
handle the necessary anonymisation and de-anonymisation required carries with 
it the obvious message that such parties are more trustworthy than researchers. 
This message reinforced the irritation, and even hostility, of many scientists. In 
debate on the Tissue Bill Lord Winston made the pointed observation that: ‘there 
is a deep mistrust of politicians rather than a mistrust of the medical profession. 
As every review reports, scientists and doctors are much more trusted than 
politicians. Noble Lords ought to bear that in mind when we consider these 
matters and seek to put them in some kind of focus.’ (Lords Hansard, 22 July 
2004, column 385).
5.3.3 Consequences for research: scientists’ views
The third point to highlight is the breadth and depth of frustration amongst 
researchers, especially those researchers not working on specific projects linked 
to well-organised samples of tissue. Sheila McLean, as we saw above, thinks it is 
mainly the older generation, and pathologists in particular, who are unhappy. 
However, John Burn, a clinical geneticist rather than a pathologist, and not quite
237
so old as to need to leave the business for some while yet, concluded my 
interview with him on a critical note about a number of regulatory structures, 
those governing human tissue research in particular:
‘One of the downsides of the British system is that they do create these 
most elaborate [regulatory] structures, the most dramatic of which is the 
Human Tissue Authority, which has grown out of that mad Dutchman in 
Liverpool and a misinterpretation of the Bristol inquiry. We get a knee-jerk 
response from a few politicians and suddenly we’ve got a Royal 
Commission and suddenly we’ve got a Human Tissue Authority. We’re 
being searched; every office in the NHS was searched for body parts at 
the height of that nonsense. And now we’ve got this huge, elaborate 
employer of people who come round and inspect all our processes for 
handling tissue samples. They charge us thousands upon thousands of 
pounds for our licence. If it all went away nothing would happen. It’s just a 
process to make somebody feel better.’ (Interview, Burn, July 2008).
Importantly, it is not just the Human Tissue Act that needs to be considered in 
this context. As researcher Richard Sullivan (another relatively youthful non­
pathologist) argued in interview:
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‘Overarching this, you’ve got to remember that a researcher is not just hit 
by tissue legislation. There’s been a huge increase in governance: at local 
level, NHS Trusts, in universities, and then there are the forms people now 
have to send: internal review processes, Clinical Trials Directive, data 
protection legislation despite Section 60 and tissue. There is this 
magnifying effect. The governance environment now for research is highly 
oppressive, I would argue. We’ve over-regulated the system, and that’s 
been a fault of the research funders, it’s been a fault of Government and 
it’s been a fault of the host institutions, both the NHS and the universities, 
and they’ve all fed into each other; there’s very little coherence. There 
have been attempts to get coherence in various areas, research ethics 
committees etc, but the overall weight of what you have to do now is 
huge.’ (Interview, Sullivan, April 2010).
But beyond individual opinions, what do we know about the views of researchers, 
and what do these tell us about the consequences of governance for research? 
onCore UK (2009), and the HTA itself (2009) have conducted surveys. The HTA 
has also commissioned surveys of researchers (one of which is Ipsos Mori,
2010), to assess researchers’ views on research governance. The trigger for 
these was a sense that researchers were unhappy about a number of issues, 
and the surveys do indeed bring this out. At a general level, respondents found it 
hard to separate issues arising from specific governance structures for tissue
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research from issues arising from the complexity of governance in general. 
Typically, the multiple forms of governance under which they work, including the 
HT Act and the HTA, Research Ethics Committees, NHS R & D structures and 
hospital governance arrangements (if applicable), were highlighted as the most 
frustrating thing. Many hoped the overall system could be simplified. At a 
pragmatic level, or as a second best, what many wanted was a clear guide to the 
system -  something and someone to lead them through it (onCore UK, 2009).
Regarding tissue governance as such, the striking issue is not so much that 
researchers have a negative view of how the staff of the HTA go about their work 
(Ipsos Mori, 2010), though there were criticisms, but more that they disagreed 
with the HTA’s claims that the law and regulatory bodies have made a positive 
contribution to research practice. On the whole, researchers took and take the 
opposite view, with those working in the NHS and pathologists in general being 
the most critical; (by contrast those working in biobanks were more positive). 
Overall, only 20% of respondents thought that regulation and governance did not 
hold up research unnecessarily. When asked to comment specifically on human 
tissue legislation and its required implementation by the HTA, the majority of 
participants thought that ‘human tissue legislation and subsequent regulation by 
the HTA had a negative impact on the sector.’ The key overall statistics were:
59% thought the overall impact was negative; 26% thought it positive; while the 
rest were undecided (HTA, 2009).
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As I noted in chapter three (section 3.4), care is needed in interpreting results 
and findings. James Ironside, a leading researcher into vCJD in particular and 
human brains and related tissue in general, is less critical than Burn and Sullivan 
of the Human Tissue Authority and some other governance structures. More than 
this, he is critical of his colleagues, especially the older and more senior ones, 
who he believes have encouraged the spread of unreasonably negative 
perceptions about the Act and the Authority:
‘I don’t have a lot of sympathy with those point blank negative judgements. 
My experience is that there is a substantial body of professional people 
who were opposed to the Act, the wording of the Act, even after the 
changes following consultation, and they will never change their minds, I 
don’t think. And unfortunately what’s happening, I think, is that this 
negativism is seeping downwards, from the head of the unit to the 
research teams, and so this negativism is being if you like cultured and 
disseminated locally. It doesn’t happen everywhere, but it does happen in 
certain places... I think it’s much easier to find people who are negative. If 
you’ve been working for years without any perception of regulation and 
then suddenly this regulatory body is created; it’s telling you what to do, 
and charging you money for doing it, then you don’t like it. And the idea of 
penalties is something else that people don’t like. These reactions don’t
241
encourage younger researchers to view the Act and the Authority in a very
positive light.’ (Interview, Ironside, March 2010).
Perhaps, as Ironside suggests, such generational, structural and cultural issues 
are involved. But such considerations cut both ways. Ironside runs a large brain 
bank in Edinburgh, Scotland. He has also worked closely with the HTA and 
Government over the years (he was for a while on the HTA). In general, the 
research suggests that those who work in, or in close collaboration with, large, 
organised biobanks of one kind or another and those who work in a leadership 
position in such bodies in particular, tend to be more supportive of the new 
governance structures than those who do not. Or more accurately, they tend to 
be less critical, for in the research undertaken by onCore UK and the Human 
Tissue Authority, no sub-group contained a majority who saw the impact as 
positive on the whole. In general, more than half of those working in the NHS 
classed the impact as being very negative, and bench researchers, the rank and 
file if you like, were the most critical (HTA, 2009). Interestingly, while the same 
survey noted that on the plus side more than half of researchers thought that the 
HTA had raised standards of research processes and tissue storage, ensured 
donors give informed consent and led to clearer guidance on what can and 
cannot be done legally, at the same time on the minus side more than half of 
researchers thought that the Act and the Authority had led to researchers
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changing their plans, made it harder to get hold of samples and led to potentially 
valuable samples being disposed of.
The HTA itself argues: The HTA licenses organisations that store human tissue 
for research. One of our key aims is to ensure that research continues to thrive in 
the UK. We believe that good regulation supports good science, which in turn 
leads to improved healthcare.’ (HTA website). In interview however, the HTA’s 
Shaun Griffin was prepared to acknowledge that the researchers might be right, 
but if they were, that was the way it should be:
‘A lot of this is my personal view. I do think that that’s the way it is. It’s very 
hard for people who’ve been used to, and I think this is also a generational 
thing, are used to doing what they want to, to actually change their 
approach. But I think for me it’s doing the right thing: you’re using people’s 
tissue and they should be properly informed, and with the notable 
exception of the exemptions under the Act, I don’t think anybody has got 
the right to take a piece of tissue and do some research on it without 
somebody’s consent. I do feel really strongly about that. OK, it might be 
more difficult, but it’s difficult for a reason. That regulation is there to 
protect public and professional confidence, and if you don’t have this 
public confidence then you’re not going to have people donating. The 
regulations are there in the pubic interest and we know that if people know
the regulation is in place then they’re more likely to donate. So yes, some 
people have got concerns about the need to take consent, but it’s the right 
thing to do and it’s the will of Parliament.’ (Interview, Griffin, May 2011).
5.4 Conclusion: the changing governance of human tissue research
While some campaigners and influential individuals such as Ian Kennedy have 
pursued a critique of the medical profession for many years, it was when 
Government created a political and policy space for such ideas that pressure was 
really brought to bear. Through highlighting the offence caused to some parents 
in particular and through the mobilisation of and performance of the idea of 
patient and public participation in general, Government recast the governance of 
all tissue. This is why, in the literature and in my interviews with research 
scientists, Alan Milburn, Secretary of State for Health at the time, is singled out 
for especially strong criticism.
The Government thought it was, or found it easy to believe that it was, possible to 
promote medical research at the same time as promoting an agenda of patient 
choice and participation that drew upon aspects of the Democratic Model. Keen 
to receive the extra money and work with Government, and not known for overt 
campaigning, some of the august medical bodies failed on the whole to 
communicate their concerns about the direction of travel around tissue in a way
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that would make Government and civil servants sit up and take notice, until, that 
is, they felt they had no choice following the publication of the Bill.
In some ways the outcome has left no one satisfied, at least none of those with a 
keen interest in either radical change on the one hand or supporters of old 
systems of research practice on the other. But while the dissatisfaction of 
proponents of change suggests that the medical profession did recapture some 
lost ground, it did not achieve anything like a return to the situation prevailing 
prior to the controversy around Alder Hey. Change is real and, as far as one can 
tell from subjective survey data, at least in part harmful to research practice.
As Manson and O’Neill argue, in the research context, ‘nobody has the slightest 
interest in making facts about any individual known... a great deal of medical (not 
to mention other) research uses information about identifiable individuals for 
entirely impersonal ends... Yet if we think that individuals have a right against 
others possessing and using their “personal” information, such studies will be 
seen as breaching that right, and may seem to require consent from each 
individual whose data are held or processed.’ (Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p.
109).
Many scientists have struggled to come to terms with these ideas and changes. 
Beyond the formal aspect of consent, many natural scientists and doctors believe
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that the real content remains a confidential relationship between patient and 
doctor / scientist, based on trust that professionals are behaving ethically and in 
the public interest. Part of that trust is an understanding that doctors and 
scientists will handle sensitive information and tissue in confidence. Approaching 
the issue from the perspective of anonymisation, scientists wonder why they 
should invest a lot of time and effort, and maybe lose important information in the 
process, for little gain, when a system of qualified confidentiality has served them 
and the public well for many years. And aware in particular that most if not nearly 
all people have little concern about the use of waste material in particular, natural 
scientists have struggled to come to terms with the application of privacy 
arguments and law to research using human tissue and data.
Some researchers have tried to claim or assert a ‘right to research’, which, 
correctly from a legal perspective, has failed -  as the distinguished legal scholar 
David Feldman pointedly told The Academy of Medical Sciences: under UK law 
the question should not be whether there are disproportionate interferences with 
the capacity to conduct research, but whether research disproportionately 
interferes with the right to private life (The Academy of Medical Sciences, 2006, 
p. 7). More fruitfully, working within a rights framework, some researchers 
advocate a public interest defence to justify limiting privacy claims. This defence 
is in effect used to support research using anonymised data (it is a defence to 
claims that the privacy interests that remain after anonymisation should rule out
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this kind of research). However, overall, the interaction of the political debate with 
the creation of regulatory structures that were insensitive to the subtleties of 
research, including the implicit rules that allowed systems of research to function, 
led to complex structures and has, to this day, set limits to the practical use of the 
public interest approach as a means to finesse barriers and maintain or recreate 
a space for professional discretion.
Roger Brownsword’s analysis, that utilitarianism, with some ethical and political 
limits, is the default position, has obvious appeal. However, the discussion in this 
chapter suggests that a different reading is more plausible. Taking a more 
political and sociological approach to the issue, taking account of New Labour’s 
centralising and instrumental approach, one at odds with the inclinations of many 
on-the-ground researchers, and taking account of the way in which ideas linked 
to rights and commodification actually play out in the contemporary governance 
context, leads to a more complex and less ‘research friendly’ picture.
Of course Brownsword does note the issue of complexity, and indeed the 
difficulty of addressing it. But it does not occupy too much of his attention 
because at root his concerns lie elsewhere -  in the dangers of amoral 
governance and an acceleration of scientific research touching on core aspects 
of human nature. At times Brownsword is prepared to step back from formal 
statements containing rights based or dignitarian thinking to detect a utilitarian
calculation. At other times he takes formal statements at face value when they 
proclaim an essentially utilitarian calculation. The result is an overall assessment 
that is biased towards detecting utilitarian thinking. Brownsword’s focus on 
philosophical ideas and mechanisms of regulation is not sensitive enough to the 
political context of governance and the social and sociological ideas in play.
As I argued in section 2.8, there is nothing wrong with wanting to change the 
culture around science or having broader political and cultural ambitions. Many 
people have such aims and aspirations to one degree or another (in varying 
directions of course). But there is something deeply unreflexive about some of 
the critical social science and right-based analysts. They find it hard to put 
themselves in the picture, to consider their own influence, to consider the way in 
which they bring or attempt to bring meanings and interpretations to bear on 
debates and processes, to consider that what from their point of view might be a 
limited influence amounts to a great deal more from other perspectives.
In a number of recent articles, bioethicist turned bioethicist /  sociologist Adam 
Hedgecoe is critical of his bioethical colleagues for becoming trapped by some 
natural scientists’ framing of the issue in areas of genomics he’s interested in 
(pharmacogenetics, especially). He sees them, like some campaigners, as rolling 
around the bottom of what Donald MacKenzie dubbed The Certainty Trough:
‘in the case study presented here, the confluence of these three themes -  
the timing of pharmacogenetics, the internal issues concerning quality in 
bioethics and regulatory capture -  has produced a debate about the ethics 
of pharmacogenetics that stays within strict boundaries and that serves to 
support the kinds of expectations being generated about this technology 
by industry and by academic scientists. Drawing on wider ideas within 
STS, we can place bioethicists at the bottom of Donald MacKenzie’s 
“certainty trough”, along with those people “committed to the institutional 
and research programme” who are not directly involved in research but 
who may well use, comment on or manage its results; people who have 
low uncertainty about the technology concerned (MacKenzie, 1990:372). 
MacKenzie drew up the certainty trough in an attempt to outline people’s 
attitudes in his research on nuclear missile guidance systems, and nuclear 
weapons provide a useful way of thinking about bioethicists and the role 
they should play with regard to scientists’ expectations and hopes.’ 
(Hedgecoe, 2010, p. 179).
Some social scientists, focused as they are on pursuing a critique, paid 
insufficient attention to the subtleties of, and tacit rules guiding, natural science 
research practice in the areas discussed in this chapter. Like the bioethicists 
criticised by Hedgecoe, and the campaigners commonly criticised by social 
scientists, some critical social scientists have also been guilty of bringing a high
degree of certainty to a messy area of practice. Relatedly, at issue is the tension 
between analysis and commitments (see Jasanoff, 1996, Williams, 2006) and the 
role of social scientists in the many forms of policy processes and debates, such 
as, for example, upstream engagement (see Williams, 2006, Tait, 2009, 
Hedgecoe, 2010). I return to these themes in the concluding chapter of this 
thesis. But first I consider the second case study, research using human 
embryos.
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Chapter 6: Engagement, pluralism, deliberation, embryos and research
‘We need to be attuned’, argues Duncan Wilson in his ‘Creating the “ethics 
industry”: Mary Warnock, in vitro fertilization and the history of bioethics in 
Britain’, ‘to the central role that putative bioethicists played in generating and 
harnessing the demand for bioethics in Britain, as much as they reacted to it.’ 
(Wilson, 2011, p. 124). Ian Kennedy, who as we saw in the last chapter, went on 
to play a role in the generation of the retained organs scandal nearly two 
decades later, led the call in the early 1980s for an outside chair to be appointed 
to a committee to investigate IVF and embryo research. This duly happened with 
the appointment of Mary Warnock to the position. As Wilson argues:
‘Once selected as chair of the government inquiry, she became a strong 
advocate of what became known as ‘bioethics’: criticising biomedical 
paternalism and extolling the benefits of external oversight. Like Ian 
Kennedy, her rhetoric was not simply a reaction to the growing calls for 
oversight in this period, but was fundamentally constitutive of it.’ (Wilson, 
2011, p. 136).
Wilson observes that the appointment of Warnock was consistent with if not of a 
piece with the 1980s Conservative Government’s attack on professional
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autonomy, a trend that was to continue, and intensify, under New Labour in the 
1990s and beyond: ‘successive New Labour Governments have increased the 
trend toward public scrutiny and accountability in many areas.’ (Wilson, 2011, p. 
137). But at the same time, bioethics and the new governance structures 
provided a form of legitimation for research, and in this sense bioethics acted as 
an intermediary between science and society. This, argues Wilson, is bioethics’ 
key role today, and the source of its enduring influence:
‘this reaffirms Rosenberg’s claim that, contrary to its “origin myths”, 
bioethics is not, and has never been, a “free-floating, oppositional and 
socially critical reform movement” (1999, p. 38). In Britain, as elsewhere, it 
was ultimately about bridging divides, not exacerbating them: deriving 
workable solutions without fundamentally questioning the forms of power 
or control invested in modern biomedicine.
Some predict this lack of critical edge will spell bioethics’ downfall, 
but I would argue precisely the opposite (Cooter, 2004). If we see 
bioethics as a “mediating element” between politics, the public and 
science, then contemporary society provides it with fertile ground 
(Rosenberg, 1999, p. 38). The biomedical sector is increasingly seen as a 
prized component of the so-called “knowledge economy”, with politicians 
and private investors placing great stock in the progress of research 
(Rose, 2007).’ (Wilson, 2011, p. 137).
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This observation is an important one. In this chapter I examine in detail some of 
the issues that Wilson addresses in respect of governance and bioethics. But 
instead of examining IVF I focus on research pretty much exclusively (though 
they are of course related), and instead of simply focusing on the role of bioethics 
I extend the analysis to consider the role of STS /  SSK and Democratic Model 
ideas in governance. As such this chapter addresses both of my research 
questions. A third difference is that instead of locating governance within a 
market process first and foremost, I consider some other aspects alongside this, 
specifically the non-economic political motivations and considerations behind 
New Labour’s embrace of new modes of governance, and look at the 
consequences of this for research practice in the more recent period. In the next, 
concluding, chapter I make some critical observations about Wilson’s analysis 
when reflecting on the overall thesis of the changing governance of science.
Alder Hey is the dominant incident in the contemporary refashioning of human 
tissue governance. It provided a jolt and the background against which the 
Government crafted and justified a wider change in the governance of human 
tissue research. The contemporary, that is the most recent, refashioning of 
human embryo research governance is less dramatic, which is not to say that 
embryo research is uncontroversial or of less interest to the public and the media. 
Far from it in fact -  the issue is rarely out of the news. But at the level of form and
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presentation at least, the Governmental discourse during the most recent 
Parliamentary discussion leading up to the passage of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 2008 was primarily about the need to update legislation, to 
ensure that new developments fell within the framework developed in the 1980s 
and enshrined in the HFE Act 1990, which, it was often claimed, was of proven 
worth, the envy of the world in fact, and widely accepted within the UK, even if it 
had its well-known Pro-Life critics.
In outlining the refashioning of embryo research governance I use my data to 
observe and analyse continuity and change, and within both continuity and 
change I examine the role of Democratic Model ideas, for it is not just in relation 
to change that new approaches to governance have had an influence and come 
to play an important role. I argue that a contribution to continuity with the 1980s is 
that by adding to the external oversight role of bioethics, Democratic Model ideas 
both limit professional autonomy while also, within limits, legitimising embryo 
research. A contribution to discontinuity with the 1980s is that Democratic Model 
ideas fit in with and bring their own distinct twist to novel aspects of more 
contemporary patterns of, new modes of, governance, with specific 
consequences for research practice. Overall, Democratic Model ideas have 
reinforced a move away from an embryo-centric form of governance to a more 
pluralistic and also occasionally chaotic one.
I begin, in 6.1 and 6.2, with an analysis of the nature of law and governance of 
embryo research from the 1980s to the present. In 6.3 I develop this analysis and 
look at some of the consequences for researchers through a discussion of 
engagement, pluralism, deliberation, embryos and research. Section 6.4 fleshes 
out the earlier sections and highlights the distinctive character of what I term 
Government through new modes of governance, via a brief re-telling of the hybrid 
embryo research debate in the UK. Taken together sections 6.1 to 6.4 contain an 
implicit and sometimes-explicit discussion of the changing governance of embryo 
research, weaved into a narrative style of presentation that aims to capture, as 
with the tissue story in chapter five, the development of governance as the 
outcome of conflicts over governance. In 6.5 I explicitly reflect on continuity and 
change in governance, and others’ analysis of similar issues.
6.1 Embryo research: a permissive trend and its limits
Wilson quotes Warnock as arguing that the public were ‘“entitled to know, and 
even to control” professional practices’ (Wilson, 2011, p. 124), and indeed the 
Warnock Report stated that this applied in particular to research, because unlike 
with fertility treatment where ‘there was a fairly strong view that the freedom of 
the individual to take what steps he could had to be respected’ in the case of 
research, on the other hand, ‘there was general agreement that the issue of 
individual liberty did not arise.’ (Warnock, 1985, p. xiv).
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This underlying assumption is clearly present in the legal and regulatory 
framework advanced by Warnock. In the UK research on human embryos in vitro 
is permitted subject to certain restrictions and controls. These include: some 
specific prohibitions; broad categories under which a particular project must fall; 
and the need for the researcher to obtain a license from a regulator established 
by statute, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). This 
pattern of regulation was first established by the passage of the HFE Act 1990. 
The categories of permitted research were extended in 2001 through a 
modification to the 1990 Act, and then extended further as a part of a more 
general overhaul of the legislative framework in the shape of the HFE Act 2008, 
an Act that also removed some of the specific prohibitions contained in the 1990 
legislation, most notably, perhaps, the prohibition on the genetic modification of a 
research embryo.
In a little more detail, in the most recent Act it seems clear that the Government 
tried to ensure that most foreseeable research projects using embryos could be 
licensed. The relevant section of the 2008 Act is this:
Licences for research...
(2) The principal purposes are—
(a) increasing knowledge about serious disease or other serious medical 
conditions,
(b) developing treatments for serious disease or other serious medical 
conditions,
(c) increasing knowledge about the causes of any congenital disease or 
congenital medical condition that does not fall within paragraph (a),
(d) promoting advances in the treatment of infertility,
(e) increasing knowledge about the causes of miscarriage,
(f) developing more effective techniques of contraception,
(g) developing methods for detecting the presence of gene, chromosome 
or mitochondrion abnormalities in embryos before implantation, or
(h) increasing knowledge about the development of embryos.
But while the categories (i.e. purposes) are broad and fairly comprehensive, the 
list of purposes is preceded in the most recent Act by a range of conditions and 
qualifications that remains essentially unchanged from the 1990 legislation:
Purposes for which activities may be licensed under paragraph 3 
3A (1) A licence under paragraph 3 cannot authorise any activity unless 
the activity appears to the Authority—
(a) to be necessary or desirable for any of the purposes specified in sub- 
paragraph (2) (“the principal purposes”),
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(b) to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of providing knowledge 
that, in the view of the Authority, may be capable of being applied for the 
purposes specified in sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b), or
(c) to be necessary or desirable for such other purposes as may be 
specified in regulations.
That broad categories of embryo research are permitted in the UK, and that the 
trend has been for these categories to expand over time, is taken by a number of 
analysts as a marker of the research-friendly character of the UK regulatory 
system (see, e.g., Walters, 2004, and Salter, 2007). More holistically, in other 
words taking the two aspects together, the purposes and the conditions and 
qualifications, Ruth Deech, a member of the House of Lords and a former Chair 
of the HFEA, also thinks that the UK system of regulation is essentially a 
research-friendly one. More than this, while acknowledging that the UK system 
can be bureaucratic, she believes that it has allowed the progressive 
development from the 1990 Act to the 2008 Act to occur and has put the UK at 
the forefront of research internationally:
‘Extensive legal regulation has drawbacks: expense, bureaucracy and a 
struggle for domination between politicians, churchmen, scientists, 
clinicians and the public. Yet I feel that its existence in Britain put this 
small country at the forefront of research and gave it an authoritative voice
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in international discussions on embryology. Regulation has enabled 
progress to be made in tandem with public acceptance and in a safe zone 
for clinicians and scientists who follow the rules.’ (Deech, 2008, p. 281).
Many opponents of embryo research do not disagree with Deech’s description of 
the historical development of regulation and research as such. They rather 
accept aspects of her description but draw different conclusions about its 
inherent character and morality. As we saw in chapter three, back in the 1980s, 
some scientists challenged the framework of governance and regulation 
proposed by Warnock, the framework that in large part became the HFE Act 
1990, on the grounds that it was too restrictive and based on hysteria and 
unscientific approaches to the human embryo. David Albert Jones, a critic of 
embryo research from a Pro-Life perspective, argues that scientists have come 
around to endorsing Warnock because it has given them everything they need: 
‘the explicit “no status” view is now redundant. Warnock’s approach is more 
powerful as it uses status language to strip the embryo of status while offering a 
mechanism to manage public concerns.’ (Jones, 2011). That the Courts have 
tended to find in favour of clinicians and researchers when cases have been 
brought, and against Pro-Life campaigners, using purposive interpretations of the 
legislation in some cases, has only added to the latter’s frustration, and their 
assessment of the Warnock approach.
The policy, political and legislative debates stretching from 2004, when the UK 
Government announced it was to update the HFE Act 1990, through to the 
passage of the new Act in 2008, certainly confirm that the broad balance of 
forces established by 1990 Act and the conflict that preceded it remain 
unchanged. This is unsurprising. The UK has a long history of internationally 
respected research in genetics, embryology and assisted conception. 
Controversies have erupted over specific issues, but during the 1980s a pattern 
was established of scientists and patient groups pitted against largely religious 
and to an extent conservative (with a small and large c) groups, with less 
influential criticism coming from other quarters, such as feminism (see, e.g., 
Spallone, 1989, and Fox, 2009). The former projected, and project, a responsible 
image and offered and offer the hope of medical benefits, and by and large they 
won the argument and continue to do so.
In the course of my doctoral research I interviewed politicians, campaigners, 
scientists, academics, civil servants, policy makers and others. On this basic 
point, about the balance of forces, there is much agreement, from all sides in the 
debate. And indeed, based on this, there was a consensus among the 
interviewees that the outcome of the most recent Parliamentary process was in 
broad terms predictable. For example, from opposite sides of the debate, 
Josephine Quintavalle and John Burn not only agree that the outcome of the 
Parliamentary consideration of embryo research (specifically admixed human
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embryo research) was predictable; they also agree on a key reason, the medical 
benefit argument, using strikingly similar phrases and categories to describe the 
process by which opinion was shaped, though differences in moral assessment 
are of course apparent:
‘You’ve only got to line up 200 people in wheelchairs who’ve been told 
they’re going to be cured and it’s a losing battle... At the event organised 
by Evan Harris outside Parliament [in April 2008] the BBC interviewed 
people in wheelchairs in favour of hybrid embryo research but not people 
in wheelchairs opposed. I was deeply upset to see them interviewing a 
young child to make the case. We need to be extremely cautious about 
promising a child that he’s going to be cured of anything, when the reality 
is that there won’t be cures in his lifetime.’ (Interview, Quintavalle, July 
2008).
‘What I found dramatic about the 2001 stem cell debate, which mirrored 
this one exactly, was that the Lords voted 2:1 in favour. I thought they 
might be more vulnerable to persuasion. When it came down to health 
benefits the Lords voted 2:1 in favour. So I was never in any great doubt 
that it would win through on this occasion. In some ways, because I 
thought it would go through, I feel a greater sense of responsibility, 
because I think you’ve basically got a predictability about these debates.
People who want health related things to go through can pretty well 
guarantee to get them through if you get somebody in a wheelchair to go 
on the television and their mum and dad say “we really hope they can 
make a treatment”. The general power of those arguments is 2:1 against 
the religious lobby. But that doesn’t mean the religious lobby is always 
wrong. So I think we have to use that power with care, because we are to 
some extent in a one party state when it comes to health benefits.’ 
(Interview, Burn, July 2008).
But what is less clear is what we should make of the claims made by Salter, 
Walters, Deech and Jones among others about the nature and consequences of 
the UK system of governance and regulation. Regarding the nature of 
governance and regulation, embryo researcher Martin Johnson, who trained 
under IVF pioneer Robert Edwards, who was a member of the Progress 
campaign in the 1980s that helped to steer the original Bill through Parliament 
and who more recently served as scientific advisor to the joint Parliamentary 
Committee (Commons and Lords) set up to scrutinise the draft Bill published by 
Government (hereafter called the Scrutiny Committee), expressed the hope, as 
the latest debate was getting going, that scientists might be ‘Escaping the tyranny 
of the embryo?’ (Johnson, 2006). A strong sense of the ‘inevitability of the in vitro 
embryo becoming a child permeated discussions in the 1980s’ he argued. ‘There 
was confusion between the embryo perse and the embryo as child-to-be, and
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these two interconnected strands of thinking were often not separated 
effectively.’ He detected a shift since the 1980s, implicit rather than explicit, in 
regulatory and legal judgements, towards making the distinction clearer, one he 
wanted to push to a logical conclusion by distinguishing between two kinds of 
embryos: the embryo destined to become a child (or to be given a chance of 
such an outcome), in other words the IVF embryo; and the research embryo, 
destined for destruction (Johnson, 2006, p. 2757).
The HFE Act 2008 makes such a distinction, but how significant is this change as 
a marker of change in the whole pattern of embryo research governance? 
Johnson thinks it is significant, but that it is also hard to discern this on account of 
ambiguity and confusion about the nature of the framework itself, as well as 
political calculation. Discussing the issue while the recent Bill was going through 
its final stages, he put it like this:
‘I think there is some ambiguity in the Bill because I think the Government 
was frightened of straying too far from Warnock. The fact that the Scrutiny 
Committee and in fact the Department [of Health] really and people in 
Parliament have said effectively that Warnock still provided the moral 
basis for how we treat the embryo is questionable. Mary Warnock herself 
when we interviewed her more or less agreed with that, she said it wasn’t 
really about the moral status of the embryo, that was the one thing they
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could never agree on, what they could agree on more was on how you 
treat the embryo. It was a very practical utilitarian approach. So to that 
extent I think the current Bill does embody the Warnock principle, but not 
at the level of ethics in the strict sense of the word... I think that the current 
Bill, in bringing in the concept of the permitted embryo goes a long way 
along the route I’m talking about.’ (Interview, Johnson, July 2008).
Regarding the consequences of governance and changes in governance, as far 
as some research scientists are concerned the conditions and qualifications 
contained within the Act are far from trivial, and in practice they have helped to 
create a complex system of governance that has hindered innovative research. 
As it was becoming clear what would and would not change with a new Act of 
Parliament, and reflecting on the recent history of decisions by the regulator, 
Robin Lovell-Badge, a if not the leading spokesman for the research community 
during the passage of the Bill, argued that:
‘It is often said that the UK laws are permissive, but this is not strictly true. 
It is a regulatory system in which nothing is allowed without a licence from 
the HFEA, and the penalties of proceeding without a licence or breaking 
its conditions are severe...
... this and future governments need to retain the close links with 
scientists and to act fast when the need arises: there will continue to be
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advances, some from the United Kingdom, but many from other countries 
without the same regulatory constraints. In fact, most of the delays to 
research in the United Kingdom have not been due to a slowness on the 
part of scientists to appreciate what is on the horizon or to warn the 
regulators, but from political accommodation.’ (Lovell-Badge, 2008, pp. 
998-1003).
Contrary to David Albert Jones’ view, and that of others of who are critical of 
embryo research, for some research scientists the fact that in the first decade of 
the twentieth century a number of issues were taken to Court, some as far as the 
House of Lords, is a sign not just that regulation under the old Act was struggling 
to keep pace with developments, but also a problematic consequence of the rule 
that everything is forbidden unless explicitly permitted. Specifically on 
international comparisons and Ruth Deech’s argument about the role of the 
HFEA: as we saw in chapter three, during the Scrutiny Committee discussions 
Lord Winston, PGD pioneer Professor Winston with his researcher and clinical 
hat on, disagreed with her on this point. His voice appeared to be a singular and 
somewhat contrarian one. However, as we also saw in chapter three, his 
observation that ‘America has an unregulated scientific community and yet it is 
producing by far the most effective and most published and most respected 
papers in stem cell biology in the world, even though of course it has a President 
[George Bush Jnr, at the time] who is set against it’ (Joint Committee on the
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Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, 2007, p. 66) is supported by researcher 
Austin Smith, who is also forthright, derisive even, about Deech’s claims on this 
issue:
They [Government and the HFEA] still seem to be obsessed by the idea 
that somehow we’re ahead of the US because of the Federal ban on 
funding. Any idiot could just look at the amount of funding from other 
sources going into this area in the US, the number of researchers, any 
metric you want to use -  it’s clear. (Interview, Smith, July 2008).
It is quite possible then that the research framework is becoming or has become 
less ‘embryo-centric’ without that implying that researchers have got everything 
they want.
An assessment of continuity and change in the governance framework for 
embryo research, and its consequences, will depend on what is considered to be 
the essence of the original and the contemporary framework, and what makes an 
assessment of the changes difficult is that, as Johnson hints at, it is far from easy 
to pin down the essence of the framework itself. The framework has a 
philosophical aspect to it, but it is also quite subjective and highly political both in 
its foundation and in its use. It is common to find the framework criticised but also 
held up as an ideal. Accordingly, statements made about it require interpretation.
Undoubtedly, as Johnson believes, it contains a strong utilitarian dimension, but if 
researchers are ‘escaping the tyranny of the embryo’, what, more precisely, are 
they escaping from, and to where or what?
As discussed in chapter four, in his Rights, Regulation, and the Technological 
Revolution (2008), Roger Brownsword argues that we should understand the 
category of regulator narrowly but regulation and governance broadly. This is a 
fruitful way to begin to examine the changing governance of embryo research. 
Governance is a set of principles, ideas and objectives that provide the basis for 
steering activity, or its ‘top-down’ aspects do in particular (captured by the 
Warnock framework in the 1980s); it is typically the outcome of or is influenced 
by a battle for influence and control; and it incorporates modes or methods of 
governance.
6.2 From Warnock to ?
In practice of course the three aspects (and others) interact. But consider, rather 
schematically, the first aspect -  a set of principles for steering activity. Mary 
Warnock, architect of the framework that was substantially integrated into the 
1990 Act, argued that in vitro embryos should be accorded some respect and 
protection in law, but not the absolute protection we grant human life after birth.
In proposing to allow research, Warnock rejected the Pro-Life position. Less well
known is that she also rejected the argument from potential. This is a 
complicated subject, not least because there are several arguments from 
potential and also because the arguments presented by Warnock are in her own 
introduction to the report rather than the report itself, leaving the question of what 
Committee members thought somewhat open -  as Michael Lockwood pointed 
out shortly after the report was published, in the body of the report we are given 
‘arguments for and against various positions, and we are given conclusions. But 
the relationship between the two often remains obscure.’ (Lockwood, 1988, p. 
187). Nevertheless, it seems fairly clear that Warnock herself argued that the 
embryo had to be judged on what it is rather than what it would or could become, 
and what is more she argued that this was the view of the majority on the 
Committee:
‘The majority of the Committee was not moved by the argument that these 
cells could, if certain conditions were satisfied, become human beings. 
They did not rely, that is to say, as the minority did, on ‘potentiality’, but on 
the consideration of what the embryo was at a particular time, its actual 
mode of existence immediately after fertilisation.’ (Warnock, 1985, p. xv).
This might seem clear and definitive enough. Warnock however advanced a 
second line of argument, or a second order argument: within society, sentiment 
attaches to such embryos and at a fundamental level sentiment is the basis of
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morality (Warnock, 1985 and 1987).2 This view has been criticised by a number 
of philosophers, notably John Harris. How is this, he asks, a moral argument? 
And how is sentiment to be judged -  should we respect prejudice on this basis? 
(Harris, 1998). However, the key to Warnock’s success was and remains that in 
the realm of practical politics it worked well; it facilitated and legitimated the 
process leading up to a vote insofar as the vote in Parliament was an expression 
of the sentiment of MPs and the conflicting desire to harmonise scientific 
advance with morality, specifically, back then, support for the traditional family.
Clearly, there are a number of issues in play. Reflecting on the 1980s debate, 
Michael Mulkay was of the view that the Warnock Report argued for external 
regulation of embryo research by reference to ‘the need to protect the human 
embryos used for experimental purposes, the need to safeguard the public 
interest and the need to allay widespread anxiety.’ (Mulkay, 1997, p. 20). Writing 
in 1999, Margot Brazier, an opponent of embryo research, gave emphasis to 
allaying public concerns and appeasing opponents of the work. But, she 
suggested, in reality the embryo used in research was accorded no status: ‘Are 
embryos in reality now treated any differently from laboratory artefacts, and 
treated with caution only because of their tendency to generate moral panic?’ 
(Brazier, 1999, p. 187). More recently, Ruth Deech outlined, in the context of
2 Lockwood argued that Warnock’s rejection of the argument from potential was at odds with the 
views of the Committee expressed in the report. I disagree with this. She may have argued 
differently from some of the Committee, though for the reason given concerning the nature of the 
report this is hard to judge. But there is no contradiction as such. The key point is to distinguish 
between arguments based on potentiality and arguments based on the sentiments that people 
may hold about, among other things, the potential of the embryo.
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discussing embryo stem cell research using fully human material, several 
reasons that may underlie the decision to regulate and restrict embryo research: 
a loss of potential for development; the symbolic harm to society resulting from 
embryo destruction -  ‘if this is the way we are willing to treat the most vulnerable 
and helpless members of the human species, what does it say about us as moral 
beings?’; to appease those who feel the research is wrong; and out of respect for 
the effort taken to secure the material on which research is conducted. (Deech 
and Smajdor, 2007, pp. 195-6).
Taken as a whole these analyses and the emphasis given to different aspects 
seem to point not simply to an evolution of the governance framework, but also to 
a shift in focus -  away from the status of the embryo as such to other rationales 
for regulation and restriction of research. The move away from an embryo-centric 
perspective makes further sense when we consider that the broad political and 
policy context in which all groups operate today is different in some key regards 
from the 1980s. Back then, Pro-Life views were influential in society, and were 
very well represented within Parliament. This constituency has less influence 
today, in part due to the decline in traditional conservative views. So, whereas in 
the mid 1980s a majority of Parliamentary and public opinion was opposed to 
embryo research (Mulkay, 1997), this is no longer the case today: in The 
Commons vote in 2000 on extending the purposes for which research is allowed 
and in The Commons vote in 2008 on the general question of creating admixed
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embryos for research, MPs divided 2:1 in favour (the figures are, respectively, 
366:174 and 336:176). Public opinion today divides in roughly the same way 
(YouGov Daily Telegraph, 2005), and indeed public attitudes towards the creation 
of cloned embryos and admixed human embryos follow the same pattern, if the 
question is asked in the context of developing therapies for serious diseases 
(Shepherd et al, 2007; HFEA, 2007), as it usually is, implicitly or explicitly.
Certainly, it is the self-perception of Pro-Life campaigners that they have lost 
influence and that governance has changed accordingly. Josephine Quintavalle 
believes that:
‘In 1990 certain protections for the embryo were taken seriously, and there 
was a big battle, and the clause about embryo research having to be 
necessary is still a part of the law. With animal-human hybrids our view is 
that they are not necessary. There’s a great difference between 1990 and 
now, and our battle should have been stronger in 1990. Certainly, the 
conscience of the nation has dulled. There hasn’t been any further focus 
really on the rights of the embryo or the value of the human embryo, which 
I find extraordinary in the light of how much we know about the human 
embryo. The likes of John Burn at Newcastle is happy to repeat endlessly 
that the human embryo is just like a lump of semolina. I think he’s just 
reinforcing the sense that I think many people in the country have about
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what the embryo is about, which is I think extraordinary.’ (Interview, 
Quintavalle, July 2008).
Calum McKellar, Director of Research, Scottish Council on Human Bioethics, 
broadly agreed with this assessment, and indeed explicitly contrasted aspects of 
the 1980s to the present:
‘In the 1990 Act you still had the influence of the Warnock Report, which 
really was quite strongly in favour of this special moral status of the 
embryo. Whereas in the current Bill I don’t think the special moral status is 
mentioned much at all. Basically everybody is considered as a pile of 
cells... In the 1990 debate, some people believed that they were piles of 
cells, but the debate was still around the special moral status... It is more 
research friendly now. There are different MPs, and people’s views have 
changed.’ (Interview, McKellar, June 2008).
As McKellar suggests, at no point in the recent debates was there a substantive 
or explicit argument or discussion of the merits of embryo research using fully 
human material. This amounted to a process of normalisation which was further 
strengthened by the fact that often the issues considered in the debates on 
hybrids were more to do with human dignity and slippery slopes on the one side, 
and medical benefits on the other, than they were to do with the destruction of
what some still regarded as potentially viable life (though this is in fact very 
doubtful). These themes are present in the academic literature as well as in 
popular discussion. Concern about human dignity is central to Francis 
Fukuyama’s Our Posthuman Future (Fukuyama, 2002). Fukuyama takes 
Huxley’s Brave New World very seriously; it is not, as it is for many people, a 
dystopian novel not to be taken too literally, but rather a prescient analysis of one 
distinctly possible future. Such is the threat posed by the biotechnology 
revolution, argues Fukuyama, that it might change human nature and re-start 
history (recall his famous book, The End of History and the Last Man). Fukuyama 
does not however oppose embryo research entirely and indeed in Beyond 
Bioethics: A Proposal for Modernizing the Regulation of Human Biotechnologies 
(Fukuyama and Furger, 2006) it is hybrid embryo research in particular that he 
thinks should be totally blocked rather than human embryo research as such.
The danger of instrumentalising embryonic life is the dominant theme in Jurgen 
Habermas’ The Future of Human Nature (Habermas, 2003). Habermas’ concern 
is that once we start instrumentalising the embryo there is no stopping 
(Habermas, 2003, p. 71). Today’s choices have to be assessed in the light of 
future possibilities, and these include, he fears, a fully eugenic future, in which 
parents genetically design their children. This is particularly problematic, he 
believes, not so much because a particular genetic constitution is better than any 
other, but because for a person to engage with others they must feel that they are
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inexchangeable, and this in turn requires that their body is experienced as 
something natural and non-designed.
In their different ways both Fukuyama and Habermas express strong concerns 
about embryo research without invoking ideas based on the sanctity of 
embryonic human life. In the UK context at least, proponents of these and related 
ideas struggle to make a case against concrete research proposals that carry the 
political punch Pro-Life arguments made in the 1980s and still do to some extent 
today. As discussed in chapter two, Fox (2009) complains that objections other 
than those based on Pro-Life views are squeezed out by a continued focus on a 
binary research interests versus sanctity of life framing of the debate. As also 
discussed in chapter two, an alternative analysis is that Pro-Life views lack the 
purchase and power they had, while non Pro-Life critical theorists and activists 
find it hard to develop politically persuasive objections to concrete proposals, 
which formally if less substantively leaves old framings in place.
So, if it is plausible if hard to be precise about the idea that researchers are 
‘escaping the tyranny of the embryo’ does this mean that Pro-Life and other 
critics are right to argue that governance today simply amounts to letting 
scientists do pretty much what they want within one of the most research friendly 
environments in the world? It does not. This brings us to the second and third 
aspects of governance raised above: it is typically the outcome of or is influenced
by a battle for influence; and it incorporates modes or methods of governance. In 
the next two sections I look these two aspects of the contemporary governance 
of embryo research.
6.3 Engagement, pluralism, deliberation, embryos and research
As far as many critics of embryo research are concerned, scientists, Government 
and regulators, in broad alliance, are firmly on top. But this ‘alliance’ bears critical 
examination. The critics’ perspective is a one-eyed one, too much influence by 
the critics’ own aims and frustrations. The reality is more complex, and the 
outcome less research friendly that is often appreciated.
When Government, in publications, and Government Ministers, in debate, did 
address the specific issue of the status of the embryo in the period 2006 to 2008 
they tended to stress the idea of setting boundaries to respect a plurality of 
views, a respect that it was perceived would be undermined if too much weight 
was given to vocal, but minority, perspectives. They did this, they argued, in 
order both to support research and reflect public concerns (see, for example, 
Department of Health, 2006, p. v and Alan Johnson’s speech introducing the 
Second Reading of the Bill in the Commons, 12 May 2008).
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In this spirit, Government consulted and tested the water with a White Paper 
published in December 2006. It established a joint House of Lords and House of 
Commons Committee to scrutinise the Bill. And of course the issues were 
debated in Parliament. On each of these occasions Government made it clear 
that, while some issues were up for discussion, others were not. This did not as a 
matter of principle prevent interested parties from raising any issue they wished, 
but it certainly had the effect of channelling debate and of setting some 
parameters that could only be changed through a great deal of effort.
In a more focused way the HFEA took a similar approach when it organised a 
consultation on hybrid embryos in 2007, a consultation that involved public 
survey work, a public consultation document (HFEA, 2007) as well as detailed, 
deliberative, discussions with selected audiences. Questions were asked about 
people’s views on research using fully human material, but it was made clear that 
this work was already legal and would remain so. Primarily, the answers were 
used to categorise those opposed to and those in favour of hybrid embryo 
research (see HFEA, 2007a, paragraphs 5.1. to 5.4 in particular). Specifically, the 
HFEA contextualised the predominance of opponents of hybrid embryo research 
in the written responses to the consultation document by pointing out that most 
were also opposed to research using fully human material. Furthermore, by the 
time the HFEA organised the consultation it was becoming clear that Government 
was open to the idea of research using hybrid embryos and that the HFEA itself
was keen to support the work. Quite reasonably, this has led to criticism of the 
idea that the process was in any sense neutral, and also reasonably, at a more 
general level, it is suggested by others that this kind of scenario is quite typical, 
such that neutrality within such processes is often or always an illusion, or is at 
best significantly circumscribed (see, e.g., Baylis, 2009).
What role did the process play, beyond allowing the regulator and Government to 
move from the proposal to ban hybrid embryo research to licensing it under the 
1990 Act and explicitly allowing it under the 2008 Act? In her analysis of the 
HFEA public consultation on hybrids and chimeras (now all classed together as 
admixed human embryos in the language used in the HFE Act 2008), 
commissioned by the HFEA itself, Diane Warburton, while acknowledging the 
importance of the medical benefit argument, placed a great deal of emphasis on 
the power of deliberation in the narrow or strict sense of the term over and above 
anything else. As she stressed during an interview I conducted with her:
‘When people first think about hybrids many can’t help thinking about 
people’s heads on animal’s bodies. It was the medical benefits idea that 
shifted it. But I think it wasn’t just that, I think it was familiarity, in the 
deliberative process... It is the three things: the medical benefit; seeing 
that the scientists are reasonable people; and just having the time to think 
about things. With deliberation, because it engages you rationally, logic
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and all those sorts of thing come in, and you’re talking to other people.’
(Interview, Warburton, July 2008).
However, what is striking about the data is that there was as big a shift in opinion, 
in fact a slightly bigger one, in the opinion poll results as there was in the results 
from the more intense deliberative process. In the opinion polling this shift was 
achieved by simply changing the question to stress medical benefit: no 
discussion or background material was involved. When people were asked: To  
what extent do you agree or disagree with scientists creating an embryo which 
contains mostly human with a small amount of animal genetic material purely for 
research?’ 34% agreed or strongly agreed, while 48% disagreed or strongly 
disagreed. However, when people were asked to comment on the following 
statement: ‘I agree with creating embryos which contain mostly human and a 
small amount of animal genetic material in research if it may help to understand 
some diseases for example Parkinson’s or Motor Neurone Disease.’ 61% agreed 
or strongly agreed and 25% disagreed or strongly disagreed. (This material is 
taken from a HFEA Authority Paper titled ‘Hybrids and Chimeras: Findings of the 
Consultation’, Appendix F, Figure 6, authored by Helen Coath and presented to 
the Authority at its 5 September 2007 meeting). The 61% figure is, unsurprisingly, 
the one more commonly referred to by the HFEA. (In passing it is worth noting 
that the gulf between the two questions is artificially wide: neither represents an 
accurate picture of the nature of research, one being too far to one side (blue
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skies research); the second too far to the other side (an instrumental conception 
of the nature of research)).
These figures and the centrality of the medical benefit argument reinforce the 
point made by Quintavalle and Burn, that the debates have a predictability to 
them, that, roughly speaking, in Parliament and in society during the New Labour 
years there was a 2:1 majority in favour of embryo research. This in turn could, 
quite reasonably, be taken as evidence of continuity in governance, of the limited 
importance of engagement and deliberation as compared with more direct and 
well-established narratives.
Furthermore, the importance of the medical benefit narrative also puts into 
context the lobbying efforts of all concerned. For example, the Science Media 
Centre are wrong to grant themselves and their allies such a central role in 
turning around public opinion on admixed human embryos in comparison with the 
failure of scientists to get their message across around GM crops and the MMR 
vaccine (Watts, 2009). In reality, the overall balance of forces, specifically the 
power of the medical benefit argument as marshalled by scientists and patient 
support groups, meant that they were pushing at a door that could fairly easily be 
opened.
Finally, if the medical benefit argument is important in explaining the success of 
the campaign in favour of allowing admixed embryo research to take place, it is 
also important in understanding the hype around the work and the subsequent 
disappointment and confusion among some of the supporters of the work when it 
was refused funding. As I discuss in more detail in the next section, many 
scientists involved in the campaign were aware of the distinction between the in 
principle importance of allowing the work to continue, and the belief on the other 
hand that the specific research tool itself was vital to stem cell work as a whole 
(Interviews, Smith, July 2008 and Minger, March 2009). More than this, some 
researchers worried about hype (Ian Wilmut has for example warned about this 
and suggested that it will be decades rather than years before therapies for all 
but a few conditions are developed using stem cells (Wilmut, 2011)). But in what 
would appear to be a classic example of MacKenzie’s ‘certainty trough’ in action, 
some others involved in the campaign were surprised and bitterly disappointment 
when the work was refused funding in the UK in 2008 and 2009, because, it 
would appear, they really had come to the view that this particular research tool 
was vital to the field as a whole and they had missed the other issues in play: 
Two of the three licence holders for admixed embryo research have not 
been able to get funding, with the third licence holder not having applied 
yet. Many are surprised by this considering the support this research 
has had during the passing of the Bill’
[Beth Graham, Institute of Biology Policy Team]
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‘I find it remarkable given the unprecedented level of support for this 
research across the scientific community’
[Fiona Fox, Director, Science Media Centre]
‘It is difficult to believe that there is no hybrid embryo researcher in Britain 
good enough to warrant a grant, so this episode prompts an obvious 
question of the tight-lipped funders: why have these scientists been turned 
down?’
[Editorial, The Independent1
However, having said all this, the centrality of the medical benefit argument both 
in the past and more recently does not in itself detract from the importance and 
significance of deliberative processes. On a general level, as one might expect 
from the theory of Rawls (2005), structuring the renewal of the HFE Act as a 
deliberative process encouraged all the protagonists to move away from 
arguments based on core principles and world views to stressing a limited set of 
arguments. Specifically, in relation to research, in one sense all the protagonists 
were pushed to debate admixed human embryos because that was the main 
issue that the process appeared to ‘allow’ debate on -  Quintavalle, for example, 
may complain about the lack of discussion of the status of the fully human 
embryo, but then the Pro-Life critics to a large extent accepted that they had lost
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that argument and didn’t press it. Their complaint was often or more often about 
being excluded by a process rather than a substantive one about human 
embryos being used in research.
Irwin makes the important point, and he puts it strongly, that ‘far from being a 
simple input to decision-making processes, public opinion should more 
accurately be seen as an output from particular institutional frameworks and 
forms of social construction.’ (Irwin, 2006, p. 317). This can be extended to cover 
all opinion, including what counts as scientific opinion in deliberative policy 
debates. The more critical strands within STS and SSK may regard deliberative 
processes as tame, usually top down, affairs, more likely to reinforce than to 
challenge the status quo (Brown, 2009, chapter nine). But we need also to 
consider all sides of the framings, boundaries and channels they create. As Horst 
and Irwin suggest, it is true that typically the more radical views are shut out, that 
is that critical social, ethical and environmental arguments are ruled out and 
narrower and technical points ruled in. But that is not the whole story, or it might 
not be:
‘For Wynne, talk of consensus characteristically obfuscates more 
fundamental cultural, political and epistemological questions. We would 
suggest that as a topic for social analysis we should investigate the 
performativity of consensus governance in a way that is less about
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endpoints than it is about process and less about making explicit policies 
based on consensus than about identity-formation in a broader political 
context. When exploring the nature of consensus, the central issue thus 
shifts from who controls what resources to who participates in the process, 
and on what terms. In this, adversarial and consensual politics may have 
more similarities than differences. Meanwhile, the point must be made that 
consensusing functions both as a democratic ideal and as a mode of 
problem-solving.’ (Horst and Irwin, 2009, p. 121)
The most significant thing about the HFEA consultation on hybrids in 2007 was 
the framing of the debate in the light of some existing commitments and policy 
frameworks. With an eye to this, attention has tended to focus on the exclusion of 
Pro-Life views from the debates in the sense that their contribution was 
discounted in advance (opponents of hybrid embryo research who also opposed 
all human embryo research were regarded as ‘the usual suspects’ (see Moore, 
2010; Jones, 2011). However, those who do not see the need for specific 
governance arrangements for embryo research and specifically those who saw 
no need to be concerned about research using hybrid embryos were also 
excluded.
In practice, the construction of what we might call the representative scientists’ 
view, that hybrid embryo research should be controlled by a competent authority
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to reflect the ethical seriousness of the undertaking but allowed in principle on 
account of its importance to developing cures for human diseases, was not 
obvious, since most of those who dissented from this package were less visible. 
Behind the scenes though, as discussed in section 6.4 below, many were 
alternatively bemused and annoyed at the terms of the debate. And they were 
annoyed not simply on ethical and philosophical grounds but also because of the 
practical consequences of the terms of the debate -  from a researchers’ 
perspective the process of deliberation and debate can seem like an extended 
series of hoops and hurdles.
So, in summary, while the medical benefit argument was central, this was 
developed and played out in the deliberative processes broadly conceived. 
‘Medical benefit’ did not trump or over-ride deliberation, but rather played a role 
within deliberative processes. Partly as a result of this these processes tended to 
select scientists who thought the work scientifically important and perhaps 
medically useful. The substantive success of research scientists in securing 
permission to pursue a greater range of activities can be located in a decline in 
the influence of Pro-Life critics of embryo research and a commitment by 
Government to allow such work. But at the same time, distinct non-Pro-Life 
ethical and cultural criticism discussed at the end of section 6.2 combined with 
new forms of governance centred on deliberation discussed in this section have 
contributed to regulatory complexity in ways that research scientists find
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frustrating and difficult to navigate, especially those interested in some 
controversial and innovative areas. In the next section I flesh this out through a 
re-telling of the hybrid embryo story, and add in a distinct component to the 
governance story: New Labour’s approach of Government through the new 
modes of governance.
6.4 New Labour and new modes of governance: a (very brief) re-telling of 
the hybrid embryos story
As discussed in chapter three and as outlined at the start of this chapter, the 
Warnock framework entailed a rejection of medical autonomy in relation to both 
treatment and especially research. This was not accepted without a struggle with 
and within the natural science research community, and arguments continue 
despite the often very positive words spoken and written about the UK system of 
governance by leading UK scientists. But of course, as with the complaints and 
assessments of individual human tissue researchers, the important issue is to try 
to make an overall assessment rather than relying on individual opinion and 
anecdote. A discussion of the third aspect of governance, modes of governance, 
in part through a discussion of the issue that dominated discussion of embryo 
research during debates on the recent Bill, hybrid embryo research, later re­
named admixed human embryo research, helps further to develop the analysis of 
the changing governance of embryo research and its consequences for research.
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The Government’s initial position was that the research should be banned. Two 
years later Prime Minister Gordon Brown considered it essential for the future of 
stem cell research as a whole (Brown, 2008). There are a number of reasons 
why hybrids became such a dominant issue, some or many of them quite far 
removed, perhaps, from their intrinsic importance as research tools. But one 
thing is clear, for the campaigners against and in favour of the work (see, e.g., 
Watts, 2009) the publically declared assessment is that the final decision to allow 
the work was a triumph for the researchers and their supporters. That the work 
was subsequently refused funding and its leading UK scientific proponents have 
either abandoned the work, left academia, or left the country does not, on its own, 
suggest that this conventional reading is wrong. What is ‘hot’ (or simply 
fashionable) can change rapidly in scientific research. But it is consistent with a 
different reading of events.
Two reasons to create cybrids featured prominently in debate: first, in order to 
study how embryonic stem cells can be derived from an adult cell nucleus, with 
the long-term aim of using embryonic stem cells as the basis for developing stem 
cell therapies for a wide range of diseases and traumas; and secondly, to study 
genetic disorders through creating embryonic stem cells from an adult cell 
nucleus with the relevant mutation. However, while Parliamentary debate was still 
ongoing, Ian Wilmut, ‘father’ of Dolly the cloned sheep, abandoned the field of
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cloning research in 2007 and switched all his efforts to a new approach, 
developed by Japanese researcher Shinya Yamanaka, called induced pluripotent 
stem cells (iPSCs) which does not rely on the use of egg cells at all. This new 
approach used viruses in the first instance, and later other mechanisms, to 
directly re-programme the nucleus of a cell (Wilmut et al, 2011).
The ten and more years between the birth of Dolly and this move away from 
cloning was characterised for Wilmut and others by a struggle to make cloning 
research using human material work, caused in part by the burdensome and slow 
moving nature of the UK political and regulatory system. There are other 
complications as there often are in science: scientific competition is involved and, 
as Wilmut freely admits, he was also struggling to cope with an industrial tribunal 
case and new administrative responsibilities. As he said: ‘it’s a tale of human 
frailty, and of the complications of research really.’ (Interview, Wilmut, July 2008). 
In the outline that follows, the story of research scientists’ attempt to advance 
cloning-related research is of necessity somewhat abbreviated. But one thing it 
does not obviously appear to support is a scientific free for all, uninhibited by 
regulatory and governance structures.
Wilmut’s view is that while there are still worthwhile experiments to perform in 
cloning, it is likely to be judged as a footnote in the history of research into
embryonic stem cells. Austin Smith, who, unlike Wilmut, has never been a great 
enthusiast for the merits of cell nuclear replacement research, shares this view:
‘Yamanaka’s work is the way forward, almost certainly. It’s clearly where 
all the major effort will go. Now, it’s always possible in science that some 
roadblock will come up that people haven’t envisaged. So you never put all 
your eggs in one basket. It is also possible that things could be learnt from 
cybrid embryos. But it’s not obvious why you’d necessarily have to use 
human donor cells; though there could be arguments for it. IPS cell 
technology doesn’t mean scientists shouldn’t do nuclear transfer. It just 
means that we’ve moved from a position where that was the only 
foreseeable route and everyone knew it was deeply unsatisfactory to a 
position where we can now see a much simpler and cleaner route. So it’s 
just obvious where you put most of your money.’ (Interview, Smith, July 
2008).
John Burn at Newcastle doesn’t necessarily disagree with the point about the 
footnote, but he thinks all research tools might turn out to be footnotes. This is 
where scientific competition enters the story:
‘Induced pluripotency is a good example of eleven year olds playing 
football. One in goal and ten chase the ball. As soon as iPSC came along
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it was “let’s all rush over there” before they’d had a chance to look at the 
outcome... Edinburgh were not well placed to pursue the human 
embryonic route, so inevitably Ian Wilmut’s going to say “we’ll try this one” 
[iPSCs] because it plays to their strengths. The embryonic one plays to 
our strengths. So we’re going to major on that because it gives us an edge 
when it comes to competing for research funds. But that’s not to exclude 
everything else.’ (Interview, Burn, July 2008).
However, what Wilmut and Burn agree about is that the best argument for 
pursuing hybrid embryo research, cybrids in particular, is or was to compare and 
contrast hybrids with fully human material, or with material from the same species 
(later, Stephen Minger was refused funding for a study to investigate and 
compare iPSCs and cells derived from cybrid embryos (Connor, 2009)). Burn 
believes Newcastle scientists were set up well to do that. Wilmut on the other 
hand believes that the time when cybrids embryos were most relevant from this 
point of view was around 2004 or 2005:
To me the significance of the hybrid embryos, if we call them that, is 
probably about three or four years ago... There was a time when the cells 
produced in Shanghai by Professor Sheng and her colleagues were the 
only cells which were approaching being equivalent to embryo stem cells 
that had been produced with a human nucleus, and they were produced
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by putting human nuclei into rabbit oocytes. So it seemed important to 
follow that up. The second reason for doing it was that if you contrasted 
what happened during the first 24 hours if you put a human nucleus into a 
rabbit oocyte and a rabbit into a rabbit you might learn something about 
the differences between the species which were at that time believed to be 
unknown but causing the failure of primate nuclear transfer. So at that time 
it seemed a very appropriate thing to think of doing, and for that reason it 
may still be appropriate in order to learn about the cloning process but I 
don’t see nuclear transfer in this way as having a big impact any more.’ 
(Interview, Wilmut, July 2008).
It was his attempts to do the comparison at the time that brought Wilmut up 
against practical barriers, as Burn suggests, but also regulatory and political 
ones. Wilmut makes the following observation, linking his views on the time 
period in which the work was most relevant to his views on the political process:
The political system was slow to deal with this in this country, so that by 
the time that Parliament was debating it we already knew from work in 
Boston that the procedure [admixed cnr] was not going to produce embryo 
stem cell lines very efficiently, if at all. The thing which was critical to do 
was to try to repeat Sheng’s work and to see if it could be improved. The 
evidence so far is that it’s difficult to repeat and there’s no evidence of
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improvement. But at that point, in the absence of Yamanaka’s work, it was 
an important thing to follow.’ (Interview, Wilmut, July 2008).
When he tried to investigate fully human cloned embryos and hybrids in parallel, 
first one leg of the procedure proved difficult to implement, then the other was 
blocked. He had invested a lot of energy in developing a collaboration with the 
South Korean scientist Hwang, who appeared to be doing better work in human 
cloning research than anyone else. When it was discovered, in 2005, that many 
of the results had been faked, it was quite a body blow to Wilmut for a whole 
number of reasons. Not the least of these was that he had already spent four 
years negotiating the regulatory and scientific hurdles in an attempt to get to the 
point where he could start to work on cloning using fully human material. But he 
picked himself up, and began discussions with colleagues locally about securing 
a supply of fresh human eggs, only for the other leg of the process to be blocked 
by Government:
‘I went across to the clinic one morning, I thought I’d got animal oocyctes 
in the bag at that point, we were likely to get permission... We came up 
with an algorithm [for the procurement of human oocytes] that said roughly 
that the first six oocytes would go to the couple, and then progressively as 
it went on past that we would get more. That conversation was 11 o’clock 
one day. At one o’clock that day I got a phone call from someone in the
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HFEA to inform me that the Government had just announced that it was 
minded to ban the use of animal oocytes... it was probably November
2006 .1 thought “oh bugger this” and sort of lost patience and kept on 
doing other things.’ (Interview, Wilmut, July 2008).
One year later his interest ended altogether. Smith picks up the story of what 
happened when the Government announced that it planned to ban work using 
hybrid embryos late in 2006:
The Government White Paper saying they would ban this area was just 
gob-smacking... If you talk to the public, and ask, is it better to put a 
woman through hormonal stimulation to get human eggs or should you go 
down to the abattoir and get cow eggs? It’s a no brainer. So why do we 
get so exercised? It’s just a very, very bizarre place to be in I think.’ 
(Interview, Smith, July 2008).
In response to this, says Smith, scientists had to make a number of pragmatic 
decisions. One was to work within the framework of UK law, though he demurs at 
the suggestion that this entailed expressing strong support for the HFEA:
‘You’re faced with the reality of UK law, that the way to deal with that 
situation is to get these things recognised as human embryos so they can
be licensed for research. If you don’t do that, there’s a problem... From the 
point of view of the scientists you just want to do the bloody experiment. 
When these kinds of situations arise, and you suddenly find there’s some 
political threat, some regulatory threat, then all you’re interested in is 
finding your way round that... the key thing was to have these entities 
recognised as human embryos and therefore covered by the Act, and 
unfortunately that means we have to take the HFEA as well! So it was a 
marriage of convenience I suppose. I guess that may also be why any 
criticism of the HFEA was rather muted, because the key point was to 
have these entities recognised under the Act, and therefore it would be 
difficult to argue at the same time that we should get rid of the HFEA, 
although I still think logically that you could have argued that, but 
apparently not to politicians.’ (Interview, Smith, July 2008).
Smith also makes a distinction, to explain who was defending what during the
discussions in the first half of 2007:
‘For me it [hybrid embryo research] was symbolically important to protect 
but not practically. Many of the other scientists started off from the position 
that this was practically important to protect. This was a rapidly changing 
time in science. The implications of Yamanaka, people just hadn’t 
realised.’ (Interview, Smith, July 2008).
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Yamanaka’s work is mentioned only very briefly in the hearings. Developing the 
point about defending the principle as opposed to defending the actual research, 
in Smith’s view there was a reason for the low profile given to Yamanaka’s work 
beyond the fact that his work using human cells had not been published at the 
time:
The context of the hearings was to defend this area of research [hybrids] 
so you didn’t actually want to say at this point, well, you know, here’s a 
new technology that is the way forward so we don’t need this any more 
because, you know, you’d be shooting yourself in the foot.’ (Interview, 
Smith, July 2008).
It was not just that scientists rebelled against the idea of banning research and 
wanted to fight for the principle that research that carried no risk of harm should 
be allowed. Instinctively scientists were also unhappy because they felt that 
complete ignorance of biology was leading to an attempt to impose rigid notions, 
rigid categories, on complex biological phenomena. Professor Martin Bobrow put 
it succinctly, and a little tactfully, during an evidence session to inform the 
Science and Technology Committee’s inquiry on the subject:
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‘There is a huge gradation of everything from a single gene in an 
otherwise completely mouse cell to the reciprocal, and somewhere along 
there we have to draw a line. The definitions of humanity that I know about 
all apply to things that walk upon the earth rather than things that live on 
the bottom of the Petrie dish and I am not sure that there is a 
straightforward answer [to the question of whether hybrids are human or 
not].’ (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2007), p. 
Ev 38).
A counter discourse to the political view that hybrids are a distinct category 
requiring clear definition and sensitive treatment became somewhat public in this 
way and in particular through The Academy of Medical Science’s publication 
Inter-species embryos (The Academy of Medical Sciences, 2007) produced by a 
Committee chaired by Bobrow. This was wrapped up with many scientists’ desire 
to carve out a publicly recognised space for their expertise and autonomy. The 
convergence of the two strands, the mediation of them, was through the Scrutiny 
Committee’s idea that discretion should be given to the regulator to work with 
scientists in licensing novel applications, and that in principle most conceivable 
forms of human or admixed human embryo should be able to be created for 
research purposes. Further public and Parliamentary controversy was to follow, 
but at the level of political deal making this resolved the issue.
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Commenting around the same time on the renewal of the Act, and related 
matters, Mary Warnock argued:
‘One may generalise from the case of IVF to other cases where it is feared 
that dedicated and ambitious scientists and doctors may pursue research 
that some members of society find repugnant. Examples include 
embryonic stem-cell research, therapeutic cloning and the construction of 
mixed-species embryos for research purposes. But it is essential that 
ignorance and prejudice should not be allowed to dictate the outcome. 
Everyone should be educated so as to have a broad understanding of 
science and an appreciation of its potential for good. Without this we 
cannot responsibly erect barriers to scientific advance.’ (Warnock, 2007).
This is, by modern standards an old fashioned way of putting things, though it 
remains of course a distinct strand in contemporary governance. Bobrow and the 
Scrutiny Committee, with greater delicacy of language perhaps, had managed to 
inject some of this thinking into consideration of the Bill by this point in time, and 
no doubt Wilmut may have wished that a larger dose of that thinking had guided 
the regulator in the years prior to 2007. That it hadn’t is at least in part because 
other ideas, associated with new modes of governance, were and are in play. As 
discussed in chapter one, Lyall et al describe some of these and the problems 
that they give rise to:
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‘Salamon (2002a, 37) describes the result of the “paradox of third-party 
government” where policy-makers seem to be under increasing political 
pressures to select those tools of public action that are most difficult to 
manage and the hardest to keep focused on their primary objectives. 
Indeed, many of these new tools of governance are horizontal (Ringeling 
2002, 588-9) -  communication / public information; networking; public- 
private partnership -  and not based on a view of government controlling 
the actions of others.’ (Lyall, Papaioannou and Smith, 2009, p. 9).
And as discussed in chapters four and five, while New Labour, like and in some 
ways more than the previous Conservative Government, put a great deal of 
resources into natural science research, at the same time it was keen to take on 
board or show it was listening to public concerns, real or imagined. Initiatives that 
met both objectives were very appealing. To put the point slightly more strongly, 
New Labour’s approach to securing licences to practise, or its way of 
encouraging others to do so, ran alongside and included an activist and populist 
approach to engagement and governance, which gave a particular twist to the 
interaction of traditional elite approaches to governance as advocated by 
Warnock and the new modes of governance outlined by Lyall et al. This is 
perhaps the best explanation of the Chief Medical Officer’s decision in the year
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2000 to recommend a ban on hybrid embryo research and the Government’s 
commitment to enact such a prohibition in primary legislation.
Three years after the public announcement of the birth of Dolly the cloned sheep, 
the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group and the Government, wildly 
optimistically as it turned out, thought that maybe 12 or 13 human eggs on 
average might be needed to produce an embryo stem cell line for therapeutic 
research by the same method of cell nuclear replacement. This, they believed, 
was highly desirable and important enough to prompt a change in the law to 
make it possible. But for no plausible scientific reason they also saw fit to create 
what turned out to be a striking hostage to fortune:
The Expert Group concluded that the use of eggs from a non-human 
species to carry a human cell nucleus was not a realistic or desirable 
solution to the possible lack of human eggs for research or subsequent 
treatment.’ (Department of Health, 2000, para. 31).
The Government agrees with the Report’s conclusion that the mixing of 
human adult (somatic) cells with the live eggs of any animal species 
should not be permitted. Primary legislation to give effect to this 
recommendation will be brought forward when the Parliamentary timetable 
allows. In the meantime the Government calls on bodies funding research
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to make it clear that they will not fund or support research involving the 
creation of such hybrids.’ (Department of Health, 2000a, para. 8).
In the end, sections of the scientific community and its allies managed to turn this 
around, but at the cost of a considerable expenditure of energy on a topic Smith 
described as a ‘no brainer’, only through reinforcing patterns of bureaucratic 
regulation some had hoped to change, and too late in the day, in the opinion of 
Wilmut at least, to perform relevant and timely experiments.
6.5 Conclusion: the changing governance of embryo research
Formally speaking the underlying philosophy of the 2008 Act is the same as the 
1990 Act, which was based on the work of the Warnock Commission in the 
1980s. But appearances can be and in this case are slightly deceptive. In 
particular, while there is much continuity between the 1980s and the present, 
there are also some key differences. Democratic Model approaches and ideas 
have come to play a role alongside bioethics in reinforcing and creating both 
continuity and discontinuity.
Sarah Franklin argues that ‘social anthropologists would agree there is no such 
thing as “an absolute truth about the moral status of the human embryo”.’ 
‘Scientifically’, she suggests, ‘“embryo” is a basket category -  like “clone”, it is
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famously imprecise. Legally, it is an equally indeterminate appellation, and 
philosophically it has been the subject of debate for more than two millennia 
(Dunstan, 1990)’ (Franklin, 2010, p. 505). Franklin goes on to argue that:
‘Warnock and her committee did not make new laws, they were supposed 
to advise ministers with a view to later legislation. Indeed the legislation 
was much later -  six years in fact. The exceptional difficulties that needed 
to be overcome in the process of successfully enacting viable UK 
legislation in the area of human fertilization and embryology is confirmed 
by the near complete absence of a similarly detailed legislative 
response to the dawn of the post-IVF era anywhere else in the world.
The “hope” lesson here, if we are to use that word in the 
aspirational sense that is currently popular (as opposed to the Hegelian or 
Marxian sense of it as illusory) would be for more legislative initiatives like 
that initiated by Warnock that both show respect for diversity, and use 
discordances as a resource in the effort to create a workable and 
sustainable compromise. One way to describe the fundamental principle of 
such a “technology of hope” for the law would indeed be “sociological”, or 
even “anthropological” in its understanding of morality as binding because 
it is felt as well as understood, because it is collective as well as individual, 
and because it is accepted in the spirit of toleration not absolutism.’ 
(Franklin, 2010, p. 508).
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The toleration of which Franklin writes included not only a rejection of the Pro-Life 
perspective, but also, as I argued in the introduction to this chapter, a firm 
rejection of old notions of professional autonomy in this area. This characteristic 
of the Warnock framework is as influential today as it was in the 1980s. But 
beyond the similarities and continuities between the present and the past, 
however one views the merits and demerits of those continuities (Franklin’s is a 
very sympathetic reading), there are also some differences. The pluralism and 
toleration that Franklin detects in the Warnock framework, setting aside for the 
moment that those whose views are marginalised might not see it that way, is in 
some ways more of a defining feature of its mutated, contemporary form. This 
mutation was influenced by the decline in the influence of Pro-Life views from the 
1980s to the present and the way in which the formal framework was used as a 
resource in the major debate that did take place, over hybrids embryos, rather 
than being discussed on its merits, which led to or reinforced a trend towards a 
diminution in the specificity of governance arrangements in this area.
So, broadly speaking, the direction is away from an embryo centric regulatory 
system. It is however hard to be definitive about this, for three reasons: there is a 
degree of opacity to the governance framework; the stated basis of the 
framework is today the same as it was back in the ‘80s, the special status of the 
embryo; and based on the first two points participants in the debate could choose
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to accentuate or play down aspects of the framework for instrumental ends (for 
further discussion and debate on some of these issues see Jacob and Prainsack, 
2010).
In terms of a core concern of this thesis: What are the consequences of this 
evolution for natural science research? The HFE Act 2008 was the culmination of 
a process of political debate stretching back over the preceding five or six years. 
Such was the consensus on some basic questions that before and to an extent 
during the battle over admixed human embryos the scientific community was 
pushing, tentatively, for a liberalisation of the regulatory regime, a more 
‘research-friendly’ structure, rather than merely defending the status quo. And in 
one way the 2008 Act is more permissive if not liberal than its predecessor, in the 
sense that it allows a wider range of research activities than the HFE Act 1990.
The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, and in particular 
two members of the Committee, its Chair at the time, Labour MP Ian Gibson, and 
the Lib Dem MP Evan Harris, spearheaded the attempt to liberalise the regulatory 
regime. Overall, the attempt failed, in part because there were too many different 
perspectives and aims in play. At the Parliamentary level Gibson was particularly 
concerned to ensure some decisions were taken by MPs rather than the 
regulator. Harris shared this concern to an extent but was perhaps more 
concerned to make sure the research framework allowed as many new forms of
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research as possible, an approach for which he was criticised by Gibson in the 
end (Interviews with Gibson and Harris, October 2008 and January 2009).
Natural scientists became concerned that if they did open themselves up too 
much to political decision-making along the lines advocated by Gibson, in 
keeping in some ways with the new modes of governance approach, it might 
make things worse. Better the devil you know became an influential viewpoint.
Critics argue that researchers can get away with anything. However, some 
researchers are in fact far from happy. They had to fight over something they 
hoped they wouldn’t have needed to. When the dust settled, what had they got? 
Regulatory restrictions based on respecting a plurality of views may be no less 
onerous than those based on respecting the embryo. Once again it is hard to be 
definitive about this. A number of factors, some replicable, others perhaps very 
specific to time and place, created a brouhaha around hybrid embryos. How the 
regulation of admixed human embryo research will develop in practice remains 
an open question, and indeed we may never know because the research may 
never take place, unless of course Burn is right about those crazy kids getting 
over-excited about iPS cells, and hybrids make a research comeback. More 
generally it remains to be seen how future governance decisions are made and 
how future debates play out.
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The UK is undoubtedly, compared with many other countries, an attractive place 
to conduct embryo research. Drawing on Levine’s study of the geographical 
preferences of stem cell scientists (Levine, 2010), Lovell-Badge’s summary 
assessment is that:
‘Research remains strong, and a recent analysis of publications suggested 
that there is a direct link between the type of regulation and achievements 
in this area of biomedicine, with the United Kingdom “overperforming” in 
comparison with many other countries, including the United States....’
However, while accepting that knowing where the barriers are is comforting for 
scientists, Lovell-Badge is wary of taking the international comparisons at face 
value. He goes on to argue that:
... if true, this has been in spite of substantial legislative delays in the 
United Kingdom. For example, the first human ES-cell lines were derived 
in the United Kingdom 5 years after Thomson first achieved this in the 
United States.’ (Lovell-Badge, 2008, p. 998).
If one trend over the past twenty years has been in the direction of normalising 
embryo research, a corollary of that trend is that some areas of research and 
innovation have become normally problematic: governance is less ‘embryo-
centric’ than it was; at the same time it is subject to the general dynamics of the 
new modes of science governance typical of controversial areas of research and 
innovation. In terms of the consequences of contemporary governance for 
research performance, a summary might be that while the UK has had a long 
lead in this area of research, with some key technologies and clinical 
achievements being pioneered in the UK -  IVF itself and PGD being the obvious 
examples -  these were some time ago now and, regarding Ruth Deech’s 
arguments about the central role of the regulator, before the HFEA existed. The 
UK continues to punch above its weight, as Deech puts it, echoing former UK 
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, but perhaps now it is better suited to developing 
work in the mainstream rather than innovating at the edges of knowledge where 
speed and freedom from bureaucratic delays is important.
305
Chapter Seven: Conclusions on the Changing Governance of Science
Investigation for this PhD was guided by these two questions:
To what extent and in what way do governance regimes incorporate 
proposals and approaches developed by social scientists, Science and 
Technology Studies and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge theorists in 
particular, and taken up by a range of actors in response to the 
perceived failures of older regimes?
What are the impacts of contemporary governance regimes on natural 
scientific research?
The time period studied was, roughly speaking, the years of the three 
consecutive New Labour Governments, which ran from 1997 to 2010, though the 
build up to this period was considered and comparisons were drawn with earlier 
periods, especially distinct periods after the Second World War, in order to 
contextualise contemporary governance and changes in governance. I used two 
case studies to inform the research on the main questions, research using 
human tissue and research using human embryos. In regard to both case 
studies, new Acts of Parliament were passed during the New Labour years, 
following extensive public and Parliamentary debate (The Human Tissue Act
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2004 and The Human Embryology Act 2008 respectively). To assist with the 
analysis of the two main research questions, I used the case studies to, in 
particular, develop answers to the following:
What role do important themes in the discourse of contemporary 
governance, specifically precaution, participation, engagement, pluralism 
and deliberation, play in its substantive constitution?
In my thesis STS and SSK approaches are drawn upon as well as situated within 
political and governmental processes. In keeping with this reflexive methodology, 
one that also takes public actors’ roles seriously, the detail and various kinds of 
data are to some degree blended into the thesis as a whole, and comparisons 
are made across a number of areas. Notwithstanding this, in developing the 
general argument I endeavoured to use material from the two case studies rather 
than other areas of natural science research, and I concentrated a good deal of 
detail about and discussion of the two case studies into two chapters, chapters 
five and six.
My novel contribution is to link, in detail and with evidence, STS /  SSK to 
governance and natural science research. In this concluding chapter I draw 
together my discussion of STS /  SSK and my answers to the research questions.
I make the argument that while there is much continuity between old and new
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forms of natural science research governance, there have been changes, which 
have affected the way some areas of natural science research are carried out in 
the UK. Some of these changes are the result of the work of various actors, 
including some STS and SSK theorists, perhaps in ways that they did not know 
or did not intend.
7.1 The case studies: comparisons and generalisations
In both case studies, through law, regulation and some ethical and social science 
analysis and critique, natural science research as an activity was pinpointed as 
deserving of particular attention and control. Mary Warnock made this explicit 
when her Commission considered embryo research in the 1980s. It is perhaps 
slightly less obvious in relation to human tissue research, but it is a consequence 
if not always the explicit intention of the network of governance arrangements for 
research in this area. As discussed in chapter five, at a general level Dixon- 
Woods and Ashcroft note that, as far as the human tissue and human data 
research community is concerned, ‘it is the designation of an activity as research 
that is today critical to how it is controlled, not the inherent “riskiness” of the 
activity.’ It is the social characterisation of the activity and, crucially, the range of 
institutional arrangements that follow from this that is the cause of the difficulties 
for researchers:
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The institutional risk (the one that requires the institution to be able to 
make displays of the robustness of its systems) takes priority over the 
risks to society. The social policing of ethics and governance itself 
reinforces this tendency... the practical consequence for researchers is 
that procedural compliance with regulatory requirements is inescapable.’ 
(Dixon-Woods and Ashcroft, 2008, p. 387).
In chapters five and six I charted changes to the governance of natural scientific 
research in these areas and the consequences for natural science research. The 
two issues are closely linked. A range of scholars has closely studied both case 
studies and different writers have come to different conclusions on some similar 
issues. As I argued in chapter one, different framings and different starting points 
influence the conclusions reached. In my own case one key framing was to take 
the concerns of natural scientific researchers more on their own terms than do 
some social science researchers. Whereas some social scientists treat natural 
scientists as the objective ‘other’, I tried to engage with natural scientists more in 
the spirit of Max Weber’s verstehen or ‘empathetic understanding’; I tried to 
understand their concerns in terms of the realities of research practice, for 
individuals and groups. This was achieved in part by my choice of research 
questions. In particular the second question (what are the impacts of 
contemporary governance regimes on natural scientific research?), while 
secondary in overall importance to the first question within my research, helped
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to provide a particular focus to investigation of the first question. Indeed, it 
provided a measure of change, to some extent. Accordingly, some of my 
characterisation of changes in governance was achieved through a discussion of 
the consequences for research practice.
In the remainder of this section and the rest of this concluding chapter I step back 
a little from the consequences to focus directly on what the case studies, taken 
together, tell us about the first research question -  to what extent and in what 
way do governance regimes incorporate proposals and approaches developed 
by social scientists, Science and Technology Studies and Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge theorists in particular, and taken up by a range of actors in response 
to the perceived failures of older regimes?
As we saw in chapter one, Jonathan Porritt, a former Director of Friends of the 
Earth and an advisor to both Prince Charles and Tony Blair when he was Prime 
Minister, believed that in the aftermath of the BSE debacle science would only 
regain public trust if it became ‘more precautionary; more participative; less 
arrogant; less compromised by its paymasters; more compassionate; and more 
holistic.’ (Porritt, 2000, pp. 33; 136). STS /  SSK’s approach to natural science 
governance shares many characteristics with the approach advocated by Porritt, 
and indeed at a practical and policy level there are a number of connections 
between academic and non-academic players. STS and SSK’s approach was
labelled the ‘Democratic Model’ by social scientists Alan Irwin and Peter Healey 
in a submission to the important House of Lords inquiry into Science and Society 
(published in 2000). Ian Hargreaves, former editor of the Independent, 
championed this framework, and argued that it should include ideas of ‘socially, 
economically and environmentally sustainable development’ and be “‘based 
largely on participatory processes in which publics (as citizens and consumers) 
predominate”.’ (Hargreaves and Ferguson, 2000, p. 11). As I went on to discuss 
in chapter two, while it is perhaps the case that the most widely known STS and 
SSK studies cover agricultural and environmental issues, the analysis has been 
applied to a much wider range of cases. Indeed leading STS and SSK scholar 
Brian Wynne argues that the trends he is concerned about affect all areas of 
science:
‘We have meandered blindly from nuclear power in the relatively early 
post-war years of institutional science advice for policy, though a dense 
variety of other imbroglios involving scientific knowledge as supposed 
public policy authority, including thalidomide and other pharmaceuticals, 
chemical pesticides, food irradiation, chlorofluorocarbons, whooping cough 
and later MMR triple vaccines, radioactive waste management and 
disposal, waste incineration, oil and gas rig environmental risk 
assessment and disposal, BSE, high voltage power lines, and other 
electromagnetic fields.’ (Wynne, 2006, p. 213).
311
Even medical genetics, widely seen as an area of science and medical practice 
in which professionals and patients work closely together based on a high level of 
trust, is not immune to the corrosive influence of institutional scientific arrogance 
according to Wynne (Wynne, 2006, p. 212). The alternative to traditional 
governance arrangements, argue critical STS and SSK scholars is a hermeneutic 
project, drawing upon critics of Enlightenment rationality such as Ernst Bloch, 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer.
In summary, the most general and important theme of the strand of STS and SSK 
the core interests of which are political and institutional is a critique of what it 
regards as the instrumentalism and urge to control that it believes animates 
modern science and its leading institutions. Implicitly and at times explicitly this 
critique contains the projection of an alternative that draws on some strands of 
anti-modernist, environmental and feminist thinking, which in turn, returning to 
more modest policy-oriented goals, it is hoped can provide resources to change 
the practice of science.
As we saw in chapter five, STS academic Richard Tutton hoped and to a degree 
believed that such ideas and goals had influenced the emerging new governance 
of human tissue research in the aftermath of Alder Hey. The medical profession 
was criticised for its arrogance, for its instrumental approach to human bodily
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material and for its disregard of patients’ feelings, interests and concerns. 
Legislation was brought in with the explicit aim of not just remedying specific 
wrongs but of driving through a change in the culture of research. As Simon 
Denegri observes, the steps New Labour took in this area were of a piece with its 
ambition to challenge the power and autonomy of some of the traditional 
professions:
There was a pretty overt agenda at the time about wanting to smash the 
professions and the hold the professions had over the health service. So 
there were probably lots of political reasons for why they rammed it quite 
hard, well, very hard, from the outset. And there were very strong 
advocates for the patient voice within the Department -  such as Harry 
Cayton and Claire Rayner; these were people New Labour trusted from its 
very first days in office and had built strong relationships with, who were 
on the rise as compared with some of the clinical leaders.’ (Interview, 
Denegri, April 2011).
At the same time, Government was subjectively and in many ways practically 
very much in favour of aspects of, if not much of, medical research and practice.
It was, for example, around the same period, re-organising cancer services and 
research in a way that included a particular enthusiasm for clinical research and 
an injection of extra money. Of a piece with enthusiasm for research and in tune
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with its centralising tendencies, New Labour was keen to promote a system of 
consent for researchers working with larger, organised, collections of material for 
research: biobanks. A number of leading researchers and professional bodies 
were closely involved in developing these initiatives and new structures. Linked 
to the thinking behind biobanks, in legislation and in the political and policy 
debates that have taken place over the past fifteen years, human tissue research 
governance has been closely tied together with Government, Research Councils 
and other funders’ initiatives to encourage the archiving of research data.
Taken together, two trends -  the encroachment of ethical and legal codes on the 
indefinite retention of and the direct peer-to-peer sharing of some kinds of 
sensitive and rich data by researchers themselves and the centralised storage 
and linking of potentially sensitive data -  point in the direction of archiving of 
standardised and partially anonymised research data sets overseen by 
Governmental and quasi-Governmental bodies. This is occurring across both the 
social and natural sciences today. But while this is a relatively new issue for the 
social sciences it is a longer standing one in some areas of natural science that 
deal with large data sets and potentially sensitive material and information, such 
as human genomics, human tissue and human medical data research. And it is 
one many researchers are unhappy about, in part because of the lack of trust in 
them that it involves, in part because of the complexity in some areas and in part 
because in some cases access to what is truly interesting and important for
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researchers, rich, identifiable data, has been made difficult by the replacement of 
norms based on professional discretion and confidentiality with others drawn 
from data protection and rights-based thinking. Some ethicists and social 
scientists had little sympathy when natural scientists complained about 
transformations to practice over the past 15 to 20 years, seeing natural science 
as the object to be critiqued and reformed. A more fruitful approach would have 
been and would be to see commonalities between natural scientists and social 
scientists as researchers keen to generate, access and share rich data within 
their respective communities for the production of robust results.
The Government thought it was, or found it easy to believe that it was, possible to 
promote both human tissue research and an agenda of patient choice and 
participation that drew upon aspects of the Democratic Model. In practice what 
this led to was a system of governance in which aspects of the Democratic Model 
were performed by Government and regulators in such a way that restrictions 
were placed on researchers, traditional medical and researcher autonomy was 
challenged, all without much evidence that the broader public really cared one 
way or another.
In so far as power was transferred, it was from the medical profession to 
governance agencies. As a real believer in the need for substantive, literal, 
participation in this area, Jean McHale (2011), points out, anonymisation of tissue
and data and the centralisation of control over information works to deny 
substantive participation. There is power in this observation even though I would 
disagree with her belief that the public positively wants to participate and her 
claim that current practice risks bringing about another crisis of confidence similar 
to Alder Hey (she believes anonymisation and anonymised research are legally 
problematic, thinks proposals on the table to deal with some issues can’t work, 
and wants a commission akin to the Warnock Commission of the 1980s into 
embryology to look into the whole area). This illustrates a point made in chapter 
three, that in assessing the role of ideas associated with STS / SSK theorists in 
governance the important point to look at is what the ideas ‘do’ when they 
become a part of debate and a part of processes. The ideas have in practice 
contributed, perversely perhaps for some of those most committed to them, to 
channelling and closing down debate, and to reinforcing untoward trends in 
research governance (untoward from some perspectives), such as centralisation, 
a premature demand for ‘relevance’ and bureaucratic management of specialist 
and professional activity.
I turn now to consider the changing governance of embryo research and some 
generalisations from it. At the beginning of chapter three I outlined how the 
patterns of research governance established after World War Two had changed, 
in particular since the 1980s. The post war system relied heavily on scientists’ 
self-governing structures. The deal was that in return for funding and autonomy
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scientists would deliver advances in knowledge and useful applications (and 
munitions and defence systems). There were close ties between scientific, 
political, economic and military elites, and change was managed through, on the 
whole, elite policy formation. Some issues attracted a great deal of public 
interest, but even in these contexts, elites would still aim to manage and control 
the broad direction of research, while controversies tended to be around specific 
applications of science. Analysis or attention tended to focus on the use or abuse 
of science, with the science itself viewed in fairly neutral terms. This was a model 
of science and governance that, in broad terms, many on the old left (such as J.
D. Bernal) endorsed just as did the old right (Gillott and Kumar, 1995, chapter 
six).
While posing a challenge to researcher autonomy, as I argued at the beginning of 
chapter six, Mary Warnock’s inquiry into human embryo research during the 
1980s was still influenced by these approaches to policy formation. A committee 
of the great and the good took on the role of deciding policy. Where appropriate, 
soundings were taken of public opinion to inform elite deliberations, but that was 
about as far as it went. As we also saw in chapter six, Warnock herself took a 
similar approach in the advice she offered to those reworking the governance of 
embryo research in 2007:
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‘One may generalise from the case of IVF to other cases where it is feared 
that dedicated and ambitious scientists and doctors may pursue research 
that some members of society find repugnant. Examples include 
embryonic stem-cell research, therapeutic cloning and the construction of 
mixed-species embryos for research purposes. But it is essential that 
ignorance and prejudice should not be allowed to dictate the outcome. 
Everyone should be educated so as to have a broad understanding of 
science and an appreciation of its potential for good. Without this we 
cannot responsibly erect barriers to scientific advance.’ (Warnock, 2007).
Many STS and SSK scholars believe that this is really how governance still 
works. The elite thinks the public needs educating out of its ignorance, and in the 
meantime the decisions are best kept to an informed few. One initiative to 
challenge this approach was upstream engagement, which it was hoped would 
open up debates on science to a wider set of framings:
‘upstream engagement may well mean far more than just early public 
debate at a point prior to polarized opinions or significant research and 
development. Rather, it will involve an ongoing cycle of dialogue among 
affected parties. Therefore, the agenda will need to move from industry 
product based debate (found in downstream dialogue) to broader framing 
of the issues. This will involve unpacking the assumptions that go into
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science alongside exploring how technologies fit in with forms of society 
that citizens wish to have. Thus ideally debating visions all parties have for 
society and how the technologies can/should/could and cannot be 
developed to fit within these. This path of deliberating societal visions and 
assumptions may even lead to exploring some more radical ways of 
approaching the interaction of citizens and science that have yet to be 
conceptualized. In the wake of the GM and BSE affairs in Europe, 
nanotechnologies may well have arrived at a time where there is genuine 
opportunity to try something different.’ (Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden,
2007, pp. 360-1).
Human tissue governance was recast during a particularly febrile political 
moment during the New Labour years. As Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden noted, 
endorsing the views of one of their interviewees, there was no guarantee that this 
would last:
‘“...there is an opportunity now which there won’t be in three or four years 
time and probably wasn’t there three or four years ago to ask quite deep 
questions about new technology development trajectories... in the UK it 
will be because memories of the GM debate will fade, the furore will fade 
and so [will] the willingness of decision makers to take on board new 
lessons, new ways of working, new ways of thinking about things, lessons
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about technologies, society and interaction... It’s a political opening not a 
technological one although it does coincide with a technological one.”
(Civil Society member, interview, 2004)’ (Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden, pp. 
360-1).
And indeed things did settle down. The reworking of human embryo research 
governance took place on terms more amenable to research scientists. What is 
more, they also benefited from established relationships with patient groups and 
parliamentarians who were powerful advocates for research. These differences 
with the governance of human tissue research should not be overstated, 
however.
Aspects of and in some ways the entire reworking of human embryo research 
governance took the form of a controlled deliberative process. And while it is the 
managerial character of deliberative processes that the more critical strands in 
STS and SSK often highlight and criticise (Brown, 2009, chapter nine), these 
criticisms, reasonable as they are in some ways, can also obscure some less 
obvious consequences.
The whole furore over hybrid embryos was in large part down to a gesture made 
in 2000 (a promise to ban their use) and a commitment to taking deliberation 
seriously. Deliberation is therefore not window-dressing in this context. There is
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an amusing, somewhat circular, but also serious point to be made here about the 
relationship between high theory and on the ground policy. Some might dismiss 
Jurgen Habermas’ book on genetics, embryology and the future of human nature 
(Habermas, 2003) as fearful, angst-ridden speculation. But then the author is 
Jurgen Habermas, a seminal post war theoretician of reason through and 
resulting from dialogue. So how could we possibly say such a thing; how could 
we possibly avoid a dialogue on such matters? Or, in Rawlsian terms, how could 
we place these ideas outside a reasonable consensus? That this seems 
unthinkable means that fearful projections of a possible future take their place in 
the governance process, whatever their intellectual shortcomings. As Nikolas 
Rose argues, while:
‘such concerns from philosophers and social theorists are seldom based 
on an examination of the realities of biomedicine’... because ... ‘their 
dilemmas owe more to popular science predictions and speculations about 
even more breathtaking advances in genomic medicine, reproductive 
technology, neuroscience, and psychopharmacology “just around the 
corner” (McKibben 2003, Silver 1998, Stock 2003)... ‘we need to be alert 
to the ways in which these predictions of fundamental transformations -  
imminent, but somehow always just out of reach -  function in the present.’ 
(Rose, 2007, pp. 78-79).
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7.2 STS /  SSK and New Players at the Policy Table
Barry Barnes, in debate with Brian Wynne in 2007, made the point that 
Government is marginalising single-issue campaigners in favour of ‘the public’. 
But then, he asked, aren’t we all, the public, us, that is, aren’t most of us single 
issue campaigners today? Barnes also painted this picture: scientists are the old 
boys who sit around the policy table. Others would like to join them via the 
challenge to various epistemologies that are currently dominant. Scientists at the 
policy table become advocates of policy. Social scientists are joining the high 
table and acting in the same way -  they join a peer group and feel they can talk 
about anything. Brian Wynne replied, defending his role: he wasn’t there to give 
particular expert answers in the area of public engagement, say. Rather, he was 
there to ask awkward questions, particularly around the co-production of science 
and policy.
Barnes is nearer to the point than Wynne on this. It is a part of critical STS /  
SSK’s failure to understand the influence of some ideas it has championed that it 
also struggles to accept a role it has come to play. In this section I look at critical 
STS /  SSK’s analysis and develop Barnes’ point about the policy arena today.
In chapter three (section 3.6) I discussed the approaches taken by leading 
scientists and scientific institutions to the new patterns of governance that have
developed since the mid 1990s in particular. I argued that these can be theorised 
by reference to two seminal sociological and political theorists, Erving Goffman 
and John Rawls. This allows us to contextualise and interpret some of the novel 
aspects of institutional medical scientific activity since the mid 1990s as well as to 
think about the different levels or layers of perspectives on the changes that have 
occurred, particularly as expressed and presented in the public and policy 
domain. With this in mind, one reading of official, that is institutional-scientific, 
statements and approaches, or put another way, one reading of the role played 
by representatives of the scientific community at the policy table, is that they are 
sometimes an implicit, perhaps even explicit, rebuke to the more forceful views of 
some of the rank and file. The official statements are attempts at impression 
management, they are influenced by pressures to conform to a new governance 
consensus and they are at the same time attempts to work the governance 
structures to researchers’ advantage.
Critical STS and SSK, focused as they are on pursuing a critique, paid insufficient 
attention to the subtleties of, and tacit rules guiding, natural science research 
practice in the areas discussed in this thesis. They also paid insufficient attention 
to the real and substantive changes to governance and to institutional science’s 
adaptation to and role within new governance patterns and structures. Like the 
bioethicists criticised by Adam Hedgecoe, and the campaigners commonly 
criticised by social scientists, some critical social scientists have been guilty of
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bringing a high degree of certainty to their analyses of and interventions into a 
messy area of practice and the complex realities of adaptation through 
performance. Relatedly, as I discussed at the end of chapter five, at issue is the 
tension between analysis and commitments (see Jasanoff, 1996, Williams,
2006).
Crudely, we might identify two strands in social science analysis. One aspires to 
develop a grounded and realistic sociology of medical practice (such as Dixon- 
Woods, Wilson, Jackson, Cavers and Pritchard-Jones, 2008). This tradition in a 
sense is trying to move the field back to an older tradition that worked 
sympathetically with clinical scientists in a context-specific way. A rather different 
tradition is attempting to pursue a deeper critique, concretely in the context of this 
PhD a critique of medical arrogance and researchers’ privileges among other 
things. The differences are sometimes presented as disciplinary ones -  such as 
sociology vs. bioethics, or sociology vs. post-modernism or cultural studies -  but 
often they are contrasting approaches within sociology (Hedgecoe, 2004). 
However, just as critical STS /  SSK’s analysis of research practice and natural 
science researchers’ role in governance is too black and white, so to claim that 
there is such a clear-cut demarcation, and between just two traditions, would be 
not only crude, but also wrong in part. For, as Barnes suggests, it is not just 
some kinds of social scientists that play a role at the policy table. Critical STS 
and SSK plays a similar role in some ways, and as we saw in chapter two with
the lengthy discussion of Misunderstanding Science?, critical STS and SSK 
positively sought such a role through the Policy Turn. This points to a failure of 
(self-) analysis on the part of Critical STS and SSK.
In her critique of Collins and Evans’ attempt to classify expertise, to demarcate 
some boundaries between technical and political aspects of debates and 
decisions and to point to the rise of what they called the ‘folk wisdom’ viewpoint, 
Sheila Jasanoff highlighted what she regarded as the enduring importance of a 
different approach, one which ‘invites us to take the boundaries themselves as 
entry points for inquiry into the relations between science and power, to ask how 
they come about, and what functions they serve in channelling both knowledge 
and politics.’ From this perspective:
‘The questions that loom as interesting, then, have to do with: the nature 
of categories and classifications (as in the influential work of Michel 
Foucault and Ian Hacking); with the agents, instruments and processes 
that produce these classifications; with patterns of inclusion and exclusion 
on either side of the line of expertise; and with the influence of history and 
culture on the drawing and redrawing of these kinds of boundaries. The 
project of looking at the place of expertise in the public domain appears in 
this light as a project in political (more particularly democratic)
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theory, with epistemological questions embedded in it, but not wholly 
reducible to epistemology.
All this makes the kinds of distinctions that C&E try to draw 
between the scientific and the political phases of the decision-making 
(262, 276) seem at best naive and at worst misguided.’ (Jasanoff, 2003, p. 
394).
As we saw in chapter two, Jasanoff accepted that SSK ‘may reasonably be 
asked to cultivate a reflexive self-awareness of the ways in which our scholarly 
work may play out in the arenas of the “real world’”, because ‘all SSK scholars 
are necessarily engaged in an enterprise that is as deeply political as it is 
intellectual, even when their case studies or historical projects seem to be remote 
from the driving political concerns of late-twentieth-century societies.’ (Jasanoff, 
1996, p. 409). However, what Janasanoff did not accept in 1996 and did not 
seem to want to contemplate in 2003 was that agents, instruments and 
processes with influence could bear some relationship to critical SSK. Brian 
Wynne agrees with her. When it was claimed (by others) that STS and SSK had 
indeed had an influence, Wynne recoiled and, as we saw in chapter one, stated 
in his ‘Dazzled by The Mirage of Influence?’ article that:
‘My most striking personal experience of STS engagement in policy 
worlds has been sheer disorientation at my failure to recognize my own
ideas in what has been celebrated as my work’s public influence. In the 
very process of taking on influence, we are reinterpreted in ways that of 
course we don’t control, and may not accept nor even understand. The 
next question hovers: can STS influence its own “influence,” to limit its 
transformation into alien goods? Once started, the agony continues.’ 
(Wynne, 2007, p. 501).
And yet, like Jasanoff, Wynne seeks influence and indeed acknowledges not only 
that different kinds of arguments and approaches have been used by STS and 
SSK, but also that they should be, so long as they are kept in a relationship with 
each other. Unsurprisingly, coming from the perspective that he does, Wynne 
argues that the pragmatic policy-oriented aspects of STS and SSK should be 
kept in a relationship with, should be informed by, more radical thinking:
The pragmatic should not be entirely separated from, even counter­
posed to the radical. Indeed I suggest that in order to be effective, it 
has to be informed by a more radical cultural and historical perspective, 
which illuminates the sheer contingency, sometimes laughable 
absurdity, of what we encounter in those technoscience, social science 
and “policy” worlds.’ (Wynne, 2007, p. 500).
The failure to gain influence (Wynne’s assessment of STS and SSK’s lack of
influence) could be understood as a claim that the pragmatic was in reality 
separated from the radical, rendering the pragmatic something different, 
something alien even. This denial of influence is strikingly similar to the (self-) 
analysis of some radical feminists, as discussed by Janet Hailey and Helen 
Reece. If there is influence it is not really feminism (or STS /  SSK). But this 
assessment is hard to sustain. As I argued in the introduction and as I have 
discussed throughout this thesis, given that some STS /  SSK writers have 
engaged directly and indirectly with political and policy debates on the ways in 
which governance regimes could be changed, this body of work is of necessity 
shaped by this engagement. Wynne looks for signs of input into governance, 
while simultaneously defending the value of observance and critique. But activist 
STS and SSK must also be considered, in part, as an output of the construction 
of new forms of governance: through engagement with the political and policy 
process, the issues, ideas and questions addressed by these same theorists 
have in part been framed by those ongoing processes. To put the point another 
way: taking the idea of social science as an input and an output of governance 
processes in the round, as a whole, like everyone else who engages with politics 
and governance, social scientists interested in influencing governance, which 
includes critical STS and SSK, have in part deliberately tailored their approaches 
in an effort to contribute to science governance and have in part had this forced 
upon them through the way in which their ideas and practical activities were 
folded into the process.
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Critical STS and SSK have highlighted a number of trends, including the 
meanings and values scientists bring to debates and the way that particular lines 
of inquiry are opened up and closed down through a focus on scientific aspects 
of issues and the reification of concrete and specific forms of knowledge. These 
points are important and of continuing relevance. However, the focus on critique, 
of the real and presumed institutional and cultural power of natural science, 
means that there is a lack of sympathy, or even interest, in natural scientists’ 
problems; and a lack of interest in the ways in which some natural scientists have 
absorbed and responded to some social science analysis, even if not always in 
ways that social scientists anticipated or imagined. That they ignore or fail to see 
these changes and influences and try to separate their critical approach from 
their own and others’ more pragmatic work has obvious intellectual shortcomings. 
It could be seen as a counter-hegemonic project, or perhaps it could highlight a 
genuine self-assessment that both the pragmatic and the critical work have had 
little or no influence. Radical elements in STS and SSK are very ambitious, 
utopian to an extent, which may have helped to blind them to the influence their 
ideas, in the hands of others sometimes, have had.
329
7.3 New Labour and New Modes of Governance
A number of scholars focus on Government commitment to innovation and the 
idea that old barriers are being broken down within what has been called the 
Knowledge Economy. At the start of the New Labour years, leading sociologist 
Anthony Giddens, architect of the ‘Third Way’ and proponent of ‘Reflexive 
Modernisation’, argued that expertise and expert communities undermine 
bureaucratic control as theorised by Weber in his idea of an ‘Iron Cage’. Looking 
back on the period of New Labour and indeed a little further back, as I discussed 
at the beginning of chapter six, Duncan Wilson argues that ‘if we see bioethics as 
a “mediating element” between politics, the public and science, then 
contemporary society provides it with fertile ground (Rosenberg, 1999, p. 38).
The biomedical sector is increasingly seen as a prized component of the so- 
called “knowledge economy”, with politicians and private investors placing great 
stock in the progress of research (Rose, 2007).’ (Wilson, 2011, p. 137).
Reflecting on New Labour and science, Jane Gregory and Charles Thorpe point 
to its enthusiasm for science and innovation and argue that it pursued this 
through a ‘post-Fordist’ policy of participation and innovation (Thorpe and 
Gregory, 2010; Thorpe, 2010). And finally, to return to Giddens, Alan Finlayson, 
in his Making Sense of New Labour (2003), which Thorpe and Gregory draw on 
substantively, places Giddens’ Reflexive Modernisation alongside what he calls
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think-tank Demos’ ‘vanguardist futurism’ as defining New Labour’s approach to 
science and modernisation.
This is a beguiling analysis, one shared in many ways by critical STS and SSK. 
But it is one-sided, partial. Public participation on the scale and intensity as 
proposed by Gregory and Thorpe barely existed in any sector or in any period 
under New Labour; and most certainly this kind of analysis has little to say about 
the very many areas of scientific research that do not naturally fit with the idea of 
innovation through public involvement. Wilson is right, bioethics, and as I added, 
STS and SSK, do play a mediating role, but this is a double-sided one, not so 
one dimensionally positive for the ‘progress of research’. And finally, yes, New 
Labour did like to cultivate a relaxed and non-bureaucratic manner, and it did 
pursue a pattern of change, or modernisation, through problematising the 
professions. But many have criticised its intense interest in micro-management -  
attacking (some) of the old professions should not be equated with a looser, less 
constrained pattern of governance. It was certainly interested in innovation, but 
then hyper-innovation, as Moran called it, has its downsides. Contrary to 
Giddens’ image of a fluid ever-changing landscape, some research governance 
under New Labour could be seen in a Weberian way. Certainly, some aspects of 
research have become enmeshed within tight bureaucratic control.
New Labour’s approach to the governance of science can be considered a 
hybrid. It was defined by its engagement, rhetorically, performatively and 
substantively, with the Democratic Model, a model informed by themes linked to 
SSK and other strands of social science. There were of course many other 
processes in play. In practice, there was overlap in the Government’s and others’ 
treatment of distinct strands, reflecting mixed understandings, pragmatism and 
disparate aims at Government level.
In relation to the overall research questions I conclude that while there is much 
continuity between old and new forms of natural science research governance, 
there have been changes, and that some of these changes are the result of the 
work of various actors, including some STS and SSK theorists, in championing 
aspects of the Democratic Model. This has had some negative consequences, 
including: a loss of professional discretion; a less open and realistic relationship 
between science and society; loss of clarity about social science analysis and 
goals; and confusion about issues of public interest associated with scientific 
research and knowledge. These follow from the content of governance, but also 
from the way it has been developed and concretised by all the players: the 
pursuit of political goals via policy, structured engagement processes and ‘hot 
topics’. A typical outcome is greater complexity and greater influence for 
bureaucrats and managers. That campaigners and SSK did not aim for this is 
largely true. That they have some responsibility for the outcome is also true.
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7.4 Future Research
Four issues or areas could be explored to develop this thesis.
1; For a number of reasons, the UK case studies I have examined are of 
international significance and, as I noted in chapter one, the changes associated 
with the Democratic Model are thought by many to be particularly marked in the 
UK, making it a useful case study for analysis of changes to governance. 
Comparing and contrasting developments in the UK with other countries, in 
particular the US and Europe, would, among other things, help to contextualise 
changes in the UK.
2. STS and SSK theorists have a longstanding and deep interest in expertise and 
governance. As we have seen, it has also been the subject of much debate and 
dispute within those disciplines. In parallel, to an extent, the natural scientific 
community and some allies have developed a keen interest and concern about 
what they regard as the mishandling of expertise within governance, policy 
worlds and the media (for a popular discussion see Mark Henderson’s The Geek 
Manifesto, 2012). A social science approach that looks at how these debates are 
framed, by whom, how evidence or sometimes pieces of evidence circulate within 
these debates and, crucially, how natural scientists themselves draw upon and
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use sociology of science theories would contribute a novel dimension to 
academic study of these questions.
3. In this thesis I have focused on critical STS /  SSK and natural science 
research governance. In doing so I used two case studies which, while different 
in some key aspects regarding issues of governance, are similar to the extent 
that critical STS /  SSK focused on the institutional power of the medical and 
natural scientific research community in both cases. Examination of critical STS /  
SSK engagement with environmentalism, an area in which STS /  SSK academics 
sometimes ally themselves with rather than confront institutionally powerful 
natural science, would provide a useful point of comparison to develop the 
analysis further.
4. Implicitly and sometimes explicitly in my criticisms of critical STS /  SSK’s 
approach to natural science research governance, I have suggested how a more 
constructive engagement with natural science might be envisaged. This needs 
further elaboration, but based on the work conducted for this thesis it should 
include: more attention to the subtleties of, and tacit rules guiding, natural science 
research; more understanding of the real and substantive changes to governance 
and of the adaptation of institutional science to and its role within new 
governance patterns and structures; less certainty in analyses of and 
interventions into messy area of practice and the complex realities of adaptation 
through performance; greater recognition of natural scientists as fellow
researchers in the first instance, struggling to develop knowledge; and, finally, a 
more sympathetic (based on a more self-aware) approach to engagement in a 
context-specific way.
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Appendix: List of interviewees, in date order
[Positions and job titles are given as of the date of the interview]
Dr Calum McKellar, Director of Research, Scottish Council on Human Bioethics, 
27 June 2008.
Martin Johnson, Professor of Reproductive Sciences, University of Cambridge, 3 
July 2008.
Diane Warburton, Director, Shared Practice, 3 July 2008.
Josephine Quintavalle, Founder and Director, Comment on Reproductive Ethics, 
4 July 2008.
Dr Murdo Macdonald, Policy Officer, Science, Religion and Technology Project, 
Church of Scotland, 8 July 2008.
Ian Wilmut, Chair of Reproductive Biology and Director, Scottish Centre for 
Regenerative Medicine, University of Edinburgh, 8 July 2008.
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Austin Smith, MRC Research Professor in Stem Cell Biology and Director, 
Wellcome Trust Centre for Stem Cell Research, University of Cambridge, 11 July 
2008.
John Burn, Professor of Clinical Genetics and Executive Director, Life Knowledge 
Park, Newcastle University, 21 July 2008.
Ian Gibson, Member of Parliament (UK), 16 October 2008.
Evan Harris, Member of Parliament (UK), 13 January 2009.
Stephen Minger, Director of the Stem Cell Biology Laboratory and Senior 
Lecturer, Wolfson Centre for Age Related Diseases, King's College London, 10 
March 2009.
Sheila McLean, International Bar Association Chair of Law and Ethics in 
Medicine, and Director of the Institute of Law and Ethics in Medicine, Glasgow 
University, 25 March, 2010.
James Ironside, Professor of Clinical Neuropathology, University of Edinburgh,
25 March, 2010.
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Peter Furness, President, Royal College of Pathologists, 31 March 2010.
Richard Sullivan, Professor in Oncology and Oncopolicy, King’s College, 20 April 
2010.
Hugh Whittall, Director, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 13 May 2010.
Nick Dean, Retired (formerly Branch Head, Clinical Ethics and Human Tissue, 
Department of Health), 7 July 2010.
David Price, Professor of Medical Law, De Montfort University, 12 July 2010.
Margaret Brazier, Professor of Law, Manchester University, 21 July 2010.
James Wilsdon, Director, Science Policy Centre, Royal Society, 8 March 2011.
Simon Denegri, Chief Executive, Association of Medical Research Charities, 11 
April 2011.
Shaun Griffin, Director of Communications and Public Affairs, Human Tissue 
Authority, 4 May 2011.
Joyce Tait, Professor, University of Edinburgh, Scientific Advisor to Innogen, 16 
May 2011.
Catherine Lyall, School of Social and Political Science, Edinburgh University, 
Deputy Director, Innogen, 17 May 2011.
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